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Foreword 
The CRPD is a legal instrument that is going to be implemented at 
the domestic level. I mean there’s people, and people live in 
countries. They don’t live in the EU as a governance body. 
Therefore, if the CRPD is going to make a difference to people in 
the EU, it is going to make a difference to them in their towns and 
cities and local communities. So if you are not engaging at the 
national level then you are not going to be making much of a 
difference vis a vis the CRPD.     
       Interviewee 1 
To ensure that citizens’ rights are complied with, you have to 
scrutinise what happens in the Member States.   
       Interviewee 2 
Because it falls under national competence. So we do try to expand 
our scope in that light but it’s not legislatively very easy. It has to 
be done through soft diplomacy and soft law.   
       Interviewee 4 
I mean ultimately we want, you know, to make people’s lives better, 
just I mean, that’s what counts, doesn’t matter what policies you 
have in place or funding systems, if it doesn’t affect individual 
people in the Member States or it doesn’t mean anything to them 
on an everyday basis then it doesn’t really matter.  
       Interviewee 7 
I really think that for the majority of us the meaning of the acronym 
“CRPD” is unknown. I personally know what it is because of a 
previous office, but I can assure you that it has never emerged 
during the works on the Semester.    
       Interviewee 9 
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Abstract 
The European Union’s (EU) commitment to human rights has become a 
fundamental value stated in its Treaties. It arises from several instruments, 
among which is the accession to United Nations (UN) agreements. The EU is 
obliged to respect, protect, and fulfil the principles included in the human rights 
treaties it concludes. So far, the Union has acceded to only one UN human rights 
treaty: the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
However, the fact that the EU has partial legal competences on human rights 
may be a barrier to realise its duties under international law. The thesis explains 
that such a limitation can be overcome by alternative procedures to guarantee 
the implementation of the Convention.  
 This situation represents a general trend of the EU, which tends to enlarge 
its fields of action through the development of soft procedures. On one hand, 
these allow the Union to engage in issues under national and local competence. 
On the other hand, they promote processes that alter the classic ideas of power 
and international relations. For this reason, the thesis refers to a theoretical 
framework that includes classic power theories as well as modern studies about 
soft law, experimentalist governance, and international networks. This research 
both explains real situations in the light of theories and verifies academic studies 
through observations. 
 This thesis assesses the impact of EU soft processes concerning the 
implementation of the CRPD. The primary assumption is that these processes 
are effective when they influence the national and local levels on harmonising 
their policies with those of the Union. In order to facilitate the search of evidence, 
the assessment focuses on a specific principle of the Convention: independent 
living rights. Furthermore, the research includes the analysis of interviews that 
engaged EU top-level professionals, who offered invaluable insights to 
understand underlying processes and confirming theoretical hypotheses. In 
addition to evaluating the EU conclusion of the CRPD, the findings of the 
research enhance the knowledge about international relations through 
governance processes, suggesting best practices and predicting new courses. 
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Chapter 1  
Introductory chapter 
1.1 Introduction 
This first chapter introduces the thesis. It describes the research: (i) topic; (ii) 
question; (iii) design; and (iv) methodology. This chapter aims to outline the 
logical flow of reasoning that started and structured the research. Figure 1-1 
visually summarises the contents and the structure of this chapter. 
 In addition to this introduction and the concluding remarks, this chapter 
includes four sections. Section 1.2 describes the topic of the research in order to 
frame the context of the study from the outset. Section 1.3 explains that the 
research topic is relevant to contemporary international debates; it also raises 
the research question and describes the design and methodology. Section 1.4 
introduces the nature and purpose of the interviews, which form a crucial 
component of the research. Lastly, section 1.5 outlines the structure of the thesis. 
Figure 1-1 - Visual content chart of the research project flow of reasoning 
1.2 Introducing the thesis 
The impetus for the research arose from a personal interest in the European 
Union’s commitment to international human rights. This thesis aims to explain 
whether and how the EU can effectively implement international human rights. 
International human rights are principles included in international human rights 
conventions.1 The highest EU commitment to international human rights is 
 
1 ‘International Human Rights Law’ (OHCHR) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx> accessed 27 
Topic
•Personal 
interest in the 
EU and 
human rights
Questions
•How the EU 
implement 
human 
rights?
Design
•Focus on the 
EU accession 
to the CRPD 
Methodology
•Plan the 
research 
development
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probably the accession to international agreements. This opportunity is admitted 
by Article 216 of the TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, entered into 
force in December 2009.2  
The accession to any human rights treaty would bind the EU to respect, 
protect, and fulfil the principles included in that treaty itself. This consideration 
means that the EU should “undertake to put into place domestic measures and 
legislation compatible with [the] treaty obligations and duties”.3 Also, the Vienna 
Declaration affirms that “the human person is the central subject of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and consequently should be the principal 
beneficiary”.4 This entails that domestic measures and legislation must reach 
persons in order to guarantee a valid human rights implementation. Moreover, 
the TFEU states that “every person holding the nationality of a Member State 
shall be a citizen of the Union”.5 This implies that the EU should have a direct 
obligation towards all its citizens when it concludes any human rights treaty. 
However, concluding any international treaty does not, in itself, widen or broaden 
existing EU competences. As such, the EU Member States’ national and local 
authorities lay in the middle between the Union and its citizens. This hierarchy 
results in the fact that the EU might not establish domestic measures and 
legislation that directly benefit its citizens when the relevant matters are subject 
to national competence. 
The EU Treaties state that “to exercise the Union’s competences, the 
institutions shall adopt regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and 
opinions”.6 Regulations, directives, and decisions are binding instruments that 
are either directly applicable in the EU Member States or in need of being 
transposed into national legislation.7 As such, the Union can establish EU law 
that binds its Member States.  
 
April 2019. Usually, “human rights” is used in international law, and “fundamental rights” is 
used in EU law. The locution “fundamental rights” emphasises the fact that these rights 
are constitutional rights in the EU. However, the research focuses on the EU 
implementation of human rights as part of international law. 
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 (OJ C 
326/47). 
3 ‘International Human Rights Law’ (n 1). 
4 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 Preamble. 
5 TFEU Art 20.1. 
6 ibid Art 288. 
7 Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, The ABC of European Union Law (Publications Office of the 
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Besides, the EU Treaties establish that the Union can legislate only in 
those areas where it has competence,8 and the TFEU does not include the 
implementation of international human rights among the Union’s competences.9 
The TEU also states that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the Member States”.10 This statement seems to mean that 
the EU cannot establish legislation that binds its Member States to international 
human rights.  
These considerations shape the conundrum that has sparked interest in 
this thesis’ topic: 
what does it mean for the EU to respect, protect, and fulfil the 
principles included in a human rights convention through domestic 
measures and legislation that would guarantee its practical 
implementation? 
In 2011, the EU11 acceded for the first time to a human rights treaty:12 the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.13 Besides, the CRPD 
is the only human rights convention concluded by the Union at the time of 
conducting this research. Therefore, an analysis of the EU implementation of the 
CRPD represents the first occasion to answer the question above. 
The initial assumption of the thesis is that if the EU cannot directly put in 
place domestic measures and legislation to implement the CRPD, it might 
influence national and local authorities in respecting, protecting, and fulfilling the 
principles included in the Convention. Lastly, the research aims to explain and 
verify this assumption. 
 
European Union 2010) 87–95 <https://euicc-ks.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/abc_eng.pdf> accessed 29 April 2019. 
8 TFEU Art 2. 
9 ibid Artt 3-6. 
10 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012 (OJ C 326/13) Art 5.2. 
11 Several authors prefer to make clear that the European Community, instead of the European 
Union, concluded the CRPD. This clarification is historically correct, and it may be relevant 
to specific studies. However, the emphasis on this distinction is useless for of this thesis, 
and it will be avoided to facilitate the reading. 
12 EU Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2010 (2010/48/EC [OJ L 23/35]). 
13 UN General Assembly Resolution, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Optional Protocol 2006 (A/RES/61/106). 
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1.3 The research question, design, and methodology 
The initial personal interest in the topic of the thesis was followed by a preliminary 
study to assess the opportunity to develop this three-year research. This section 
summarises that preparatory work, which produced a workable project that 
confirmed the opportunity to develop robust research. 
1.3.1 Rationale of the research 
The questions, design, and methodology of this research take inspiration from 
the Guide of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) 
on human rights indicators.14 This Guide defines human rights indicators as 
“specific information on the state or condition of an object, event, activity or 
outcome […] that can be used to assess and monitor the promotion and 
implementation of human rights”.15 Adhering to this definition, this research 
assesses the EU opportunities to implement international human rights.  
The Guide clarifies that indicators can be either quantitative or qualitative, 
and fact-based or judgement-based.16 In line with this classification, this research 
is a qualitative fact-based study. The thesis describes and explains real 
situations “as a narrative, in a categorical form, and based on information on 
objects, facts or events that are, in principle, directly observable and verifiable”.17 
This aspect will be clarified throughout the section.  
The use of common indicators to measure the realisation of human rights 
is a useful instrument to harmonise the implementation and monitoring of 
international human rights.18 The realisation of human rights satisfies the duties 
of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the international principles that rule human 
rights legislation.19 The Maastricht Guidelines state that “the failure by a State 
 
14 ‘Human Rights Indicators - A Guide to Measurement and Implementation’ (UN Office of the 
High Commissioner on Human Rights 2012) HR/PUB/12/5 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2019. 
15 ibid 16. 
16 ibid 16–19. 
17 ibid 18. 
18 ibid 2. 
19 ‘Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (UN Economic 
and Social Council 2000) E/C.12/2000/13 17 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2F
C.12%2F2000%2F13&Lang=en> accessed 1 April 2019. 
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party to comply with a treaty obligation concerning economic, social and cultural 
rights is, under international law, a violation of that treaty”.20 Therefore, the 
parties of international human rights conventions are duty bearers towards the 
principles contained in the concluded treaties. 
This research focuses on one specific duty bearer: the European Union. 
The EU implementation of the CRPD is the real situation that this research 
analyses in order to assess the Union’s opportunities to fulfil its obligations as a 
duty bearer of international human rights. 
One way to assess the realisation of human rights by duty bearers “is to 
measure the enjoyment of rights by rights holders”.21 As “human rights are 
universal legal guarantees protecting individuals”,22 the rights holders are 
individuals. Hence, if duty bearers have obligations towards rights holders, then 
the treaties’ parties have obligations towards individuals. Therefore, the EU has 
obligations towards its citizens when it concludes international human rights 
treaties. However, national and local authorities are in the middle between the 
EU and its citizens because there is a competence issue to consider. 
The Guide of the OHCHR states that “the realization of human rights 
requires continuous efforts on the part of the duty bearer […] to respect, protect 
and fulfil them”.23 Three kinds of indicators can measure the duty bearers’ 
continuous efforts: (i) structural, (ii) process; and (iii) outcome.24 In brief: (i) 
structural indicators “reflect the ratification and adoption of legal instruments and 
the existence as well as the creation of basic institutional mechanisms”;25 (ii) 
“process indicators measure duty bearers’ ongoing efforts to transform their 
human rights commitments into the desired result”;26 and (iii) “outcome indicators 
capture individual and collective attainments that reflect the state of 
enjoyment”.27 In line with this categorisation, this research assesses the EU 
implementation of the CRPD through an analysis of relevant structures, 
 
20 ibid 17. 
21 ‘Human Rights Indicators - A Guide to Measurement and Implementation’ (n 15) 28. 
22 ibid 10. 
23 ibid 33. 
24 ibid 34. 
25 ibid. 
26 ibid 36. 
27 ibid 37. 
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processes, and outcomes. Lastly, the concluding chapter of the thesis will follow 
the tripartite scheme of the indicator framework to summarise the crucial findings 
of this study. 
Figure 1-2 - Structure-Process-Outcome indicator framework 
Also the EU Fundamental Rights Agency has adopted the OHCHR 
indicator framework to develop indicators for the realisation of EU fundamental 
rights, which the Agency summarises with the figure above.28 It is interesting to 
note that the three indicators (structure, process, and outcome) cross two broad 
areas that are the legal and the social ones. Besides, the figure visually suggests 
some conceptual overlapping between structure and process, and between 
process and outcome. One reason for this overlapping is the presence of an 
implicit cause-effect relationship between the three indicators and the legal and 
social areas. This consideration means that outcomes depend on processes, 
which in turn depend on structures. However, there may be several intervening 
variables influencing the alleged linearity of this cause-effect relationship.  
 To conclude, this research presents a qualitative fact-based socio-legal 
study interpreting the EU opportunities to meet its obligations as a party to an 
international human rights treaty. Its investigation of structures, processes, and 
outcomes follows a presumed sequence of four passages: (i) the EU accession 
to an international human rights treaty; (ii) the EU legal and structural 
implementation of the treaty; (iii) the EU creation of processes to reach the 
national and local levels; and (iv) the achievement of outcomes concerning the 
fulfilment of international human rights by EU citizens. The thesis aims to analyse 
 
28 ‘Fundamental Rights Indicators’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2011/fundamental-rights-indicators> accessed 2 April 
2019. 
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these four passages and their web of influence and interactions showing the 
relevant contribution to the EU implementation of international human rights. 
1.3.2 Research aim and question 
This research aims to describe and explain EU opportunities to implement 
international human rights, and it does that through the CRPD case study. The 
central assumption of the study is that the EU has the opportunity to implement 
the CRPD in a way that might influence the national and local levels.  
Figure 1-2 suggested that this EU influence may be a three-step exercise: 
(i) creating structures; (ii) developing governance processes; and (iii) promoting 
evaluations of outcomes. These three steps inspired three analytical 
perspectives to study the EU implementation of the CRPD: (i) the creation of EU 
CRPD-related structures and processes; (ii) the CRPD mainstreaming within 
existent EU structures; and (iii) the CRPD mainstreaming within consolidated EU 
processes. The analytical chapters of the thesis explore each of these three 
perspectives. 
The desire to evaluate outcomes stimulated the pragmatic focus of the 
project on one specific principle of the Convention. The researcher, suggested 
by his Supervisors, decided to focus on Article 19 CRPD: living independently 
and being included in the community. This choice moved from preliminary 
considerations that arose during the initial phases of the project. For instance, 
FRA stated that “the EU and its Member States have prioritised efforts supporting 
the right to independent living, underlining how central this right is to the effective 
implementation of the CRPD”.29 Therefore, the idea was that these prioritised 
efforts could have stimulated the production of independent living rights policies, 
where the research could have looked for data and evidences. Also, Article 19 
CRPD is a good example where the competences of the EU and its Member 
States are shared and this aspect is central for the investigation of the research. 
The shared competence issue will be explored in depth in Section 2.5. 
 The research’s primary assumption and pragmatic focus are the bases of 
this thesis’ research question: 
 
29 ‘The Right to Independent Living of Persons with Disabilities’ (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights) <http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2014/right-independent-living-
persons-disabilities> accessed 10 October 2018. 
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how is the EU exercising influence on the domestic implementation 
of the CRPD and independent living rights? 
This question: (i) is original because it addresses a topic that has not been 
researched before; (ii) is significant because it is relevant to contemporary social 
situations beyond academia; and (iii) is rigorous due to the research’s design 
and methodology, which will be exposed in the next sub-sections.30 
1.3.3 States obligations under the CRPD and its Article 19 
This sub-section provides a short contextualisation of the States obligations 
under the CRPD in general and its Article 19 in particular. This introduction might 
be useful to situate eventual uninitiated readers by depicting one of the crucial 
topics of the research. More detailed descriptions of these background issues 
are included in Chapter 2.  
 The CRPD is a UN human rights convention, and it was the last one 
adopted at the time of this research.31 As introduced in Section 1.2, UN 
conventions are international treaties that states can ratify in order to adhere to 
shared principles to pursue. When states become parties to human rights 
conventions, they commit themselves to implement the treaties’ principles and 
guaranteeing their fulfilment by citizens. 
 The CRPD is the first UN convention that is open for signature by regional 
integration organisations.32 Thanks to this opportunity, the EU could conclude 
the CRPD as a mixed agreement with its Member States. This means the EU 
has duties within the limits of the competences that the EU Member States 
conferred on the Union itself. Following Article 44 CRPD, the EU is considered a 
 
30 The assessment of the originality, significance, and rigour of the research project referred to 
official guidelines i.e. ‘REF 2021’ (Research Excellence Framework) 
<https://www.ref.ac.uk/> accessed 3 April 2019; Mark Reed, ‘How to Write a 4* Paper for 
#REF’ (Twitter, 23 November 2016) 
<https://twitter.com/profmarkreed/status/801348612345253888> accessed 5 April 2019. 
31 The list of the UN human rights conventions includes: the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1969); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1979); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1985); the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (1989); the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (1990); and the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (2006). 
32 UN CRPD Art 42. 
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“State Party” when it has the formal competence to implement specific principles 
of the Convention. As previously explained, competences can be exclusive and 
shared, and their borders are often blurred. This thesis illustrates how the Union 
acts as a State Party to the CRPD when implementing a shared competence 
principle, namely living independently and being included in society. 
 Article 4 CRPD states the general obligations that the States Parties have 
to respect. It emphasises that the central aim of the Convention is the full 
realisation of the human rights of persons with disabilities. Also, it clarifies that 
the States Parties have to adopt legislative, administrative and other measures 
for the implementation of the Convention. In particular, international cooperation 
is a crucial resource to implement the treaty provisions. The thesis assumes and 
explains that cooperative instruments can offer valid opportunities to implement 
the CRPD that are no less effective than legislative provisions. 
 After the initial general provisions of the CRPD, the second cluster of 
articles states more specific rights of persons with disabilities. Among these, 
Article 19 refers to the right to living independently and being included in the 
community. The obligations of the States Parties under Article 19 are explained 
in the relevant General Comment,33 where there is a reference to the distinction 
between goals that are immediately applicable and progressively achievable.  
 The immediate duty to respect entails that the States Parties must not 
interfere with the right of persons with disabilities to live independently and be 
included in the community. In particular, “States parties need to phase out 
institutionalization”.34 In line with this objective, the duty to protect includes a 
strict control over funds that must not be “spent on maintaining, renovating, 
establishing building or creating any form of institution or institutionalization”.35  
 The determined focus on deinstitutionalisation implies the progressive 
realisation of alternative measures to substitute institutions. For this reason, the 
duty to fulfil indicates a series of programmatic actions aiming at developing the 
 
33 ‘General Comment No. 5 (2017) on Living Independently and Being Included in the 
Community’ (Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2017) CRPD/C/GC/5 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D/C/GC/5&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018 Part III. 
34 ibid 10. 
35 ibid 11. 
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conditions for persons with disabilities to living independently within their 
communities. 
 As emphasised by the CRPD Committee, the realisation of the rights 
stated in Article 19 CRPD is subject to both negative and positive obligations. 
This means that the States Parties must refrain from doing something (i.e. 
institutionalisation) and must plan the adoption of correct solutions (i.e. 
community services). Also, Article 19 is subject to a competence that is shared 
between the EU and its Member States.36 This complex texture depicts an 
uncertain situation where the EU might favour soft strategies over hard methods 
in order to realise its duties as State Party to the CRPD. This assumption 
stimulated the research design to focus on the EU opportunities to implement 
the principles stated in Article 19 CRPD. 
1.3.4 Research design and approaches 
The rationale of the research has shaped the socio-legal approach of this study. 
Coherently, the thesis describes and explains relationships between 
international law and the social environment. The research question identifies 
the EU as a hub where these causal relationships take place. In particular, the 
research question assumes that the mediation of international human rights 
legislation by EU law can influence the realisation of human rights principles at 
the national and local levels. 
 The design of this research as an interdisciplinary study has influenced its 
approaches. For instance, Tobi and Kampen suggested that interdisciplinary 
studies put the research question at the centre and use different approaches to 
answer it.37 To do this, the study needs to consider both observable variables 
and theories.38 This consideration means that interdisciplinary research adopts 
two approaches, at least: (i) inductive when specific situations verify academic 
theories; and (ii) deductive when academic theories explain specific situations.39 
 
36 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2014) CRPD/C/EU/1 28 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2FC%2FEU%2F1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
37 Hilde Tobi and Jarl K Kampen, ‘Research Design: The Methodology for Interdisciplinary 
Research Framework’ (2018) 52 Quality & Quantity 1209, 1211. 
38 ibid 1212. 
39 David A De Vaus, Research Design in Social Research (SAGE 2001) 5–6. 
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This thesis is a fact-based qualitative study, which means that it analyses 
a specific situation with qualitative methods through inductive and deductive 
approaches. The specific situation analysed in this study is the one depicted in 
the research question. This situation entails that the research seeks shreds of 
evidence concerning the EU implementation of the CRPD, and that it interprets 
the findings when evidence is debatable. 
On one hand, the choice of the specific situation frames the background 
knowledge, which needs to include notions about three domains: (i) the EU 
commitment to human rights; (ii) the EU accession to the CRPD; and (iii) the EU 
relevance to independent living rights. These three domains are described in 
Chapter 2. Besides, the three analytical perspectives indicate structures 
(entities) and processes that need adequate background study before 
developing any analysis. In detail: (i) Chapter 4 focuses on the EU CRPD-related 
governance; (ii) Chapter 5 investigates the CRPD mainstreaming within existent 
EU entities; and (iii) Chapter 6 explores the CRPD mainstreaming within 
consolidated EU processes. The background knowledge about all these topics 
represents the descriptive40 stance of the research.  
On the other hand, the choice to analyse the specific situation concerning 
its influencing characteristics shapes the borders of the thesis’ theoretical 
framework. This framework needs to define influence and to investigate how 
influence can be exercised in the international sphere: (i) soft law; (ii) governance 
processes; and (iii) networking opportunities. The theoretical framework of the 
research is included in Chapter 3. 
The thesis acquires an explanatory41 trait through: (i) the deductive use of 
theories to explain the specific situation; and (ii) the inductive use of evidence in 
the specific situation to verify and enlarge theories. In general terms, the 
explanations of the thesis regard the evolution of EU policy-making, from hard to 
soft processes, that derives from an increasing need for flexibility.42 Therefore, 
the thesis frames the specific situation about the EU accession to the CRPD into 
this evolutionary framework of the EU governance. 
 
40 ibid 1–2. 
41 ibid 2–3. 
42 Carol Harlow, ‘Three Phases in the Evolution of EU Administrative Law’ in Paul Craig and 
Gráinne De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2011) 455–463. 
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The conceptual design of the thesis includes background and theoretical 
existent knowledge. Also, it considered the generation of new data as a pivotal 
factor for a complete understanding of the thesis’ topics. The research 
supplements deductive and inductive approaches with other kinds of reasoning 
in order to reveal underlying and unpredictable social situations. In short, 
abductive reasoning can promote intuitive conclusions when documents suggest 
outcomes without providing evidences. On the other hand, intuitions may need 
to be strengthened, and this can be done by generating new data that promote 
retroductive reasoning. For this reason, the research included de-structured 
interviews that could have generated new data able to explain unclear and 
underneath processes.43 
 In sum, the research design has been developed to ensure that the 
answers to the research question will be “as unambiguous as possible”.44 To 
achieve this aim, the research includes descriptive and explanative sections. In 
addition, it uses different analytical approaches concerning the kind and use of 
data. The research design has identified the data and the means to collect and 
analyse such data. The next part of this sub-section will describe the 
methodology to develop the research design described above. 
1.3.5 Methodology, data collection and generation 
This research is a fact-based qualitative socio-legal study. It aims to answer the 
question of how the EU influences the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. The consideration that influence results from socio-
political interactions suggested the need to focus on such interactions to answer 
the research question. The design of the research has indicated the necessity to 
use different analytical approaches to reach an answer. The use of different 
approaches shapes the methodology of the study.  
Given suggested that “methodology consists of the actions to be taken in 
the study and the reasons for these actions in testing or generating theory”.45 In 
addition, the author argued that “qualitative research typically includes positivist, 
 
43 Norman WH Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry (2nd edn, Polity 2007). 
44 De Vaus (n 41) 9. 
45 Lisa M Given, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods (Sage Publications 
Inc 2008) 517. 
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interpretivist, constructionist, critical, and participatory paradigms”.46 Her 
definition of critical paradigms refers to international structures and processes 
that influence the social level. Also, she considered the involvement of 
“participants as partners in uncovering and addressing power imbalances”.47 The 
similarities between these explanations and the thesis’ design led this research 
methodology to draw inspiration from Given’s work.  
Her methodology to develop qualitative research includes the choice of a 
study sample.48 The study sample of this research begins with the selection of 
the EU accession to the CRPD. A focus on independent living rights supplements 
this selection. This focus was considered a necessary method to concentrate the 
efforts in order to find real examples of EU influences. As a consequence, the 
EU implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights indicates the 
perimeter of the background knowledge and the interviews’ study population.49 
Following Kharel, this study is a non-doctrinal legal research as “it 
observes relevant social facts interrelated with law”.50 This definition reflects the 
multidisciplinary approach of the study. The data collection of a multidisciplinary 
study includes multiple sources, and this qualitative research collects primary 
and secondary data from literature review and interviews. 
The literature review undertaken to contextualise the research question 
adopts a pluralistic approach, as suggested by Given.51 In fact, it includes three 
main areas: (i) qualitative research methods; (ii) background knowledge about 
the fact-based study; and (iii) theoretical framework. These three areas of the 
literature review constitute the primary basis of the first three chapters of the 
thesis. These adopt an explicative narrative that defines the literature 
boundaries.52 
The literature review was useful in learning about the thesis’ topics and 
research development. Also, the support of this study’s supervisors and 
 
46 ibid 518. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid 520. 
49 ibid. 
50 Amrit Kharel, ‘Doctrinal Legal Research’ [2018] SSRN 2 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3130525#> accessed 11 April 
2019. 
51 Given (n 47) 489. 
52 ibid. 
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informants was the most important primary source for developing the research 
with a proper method. 
The literature review was essential for the research’s background and 
theoretical framework. This part of the literature review gathered data from 
available primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are international and 
EU legislation and judgements. Secondary sources are publications that may be 
either institutional or academic. Institutional publications are reports of 
international bodies. Also their websites were essential sources of secondary 
institutional data. Lastly, academic publications are the secondary sources that 
this research used to develop its theoretical framework. The concepts included 
in the theoretical framework are the basis of this thesis analysis. 
The analysis of this research integrates its background knowledge with its 
theoretical framework in order to develop deductive and inductive reasoning. 
Besides, it includes abductive and retroductive thoughts. These mainly derive 
from the consideration of two sets of primary sources. The first set includes the 
minutes of international meetings and reported speeches. The second set refers 
to the conducted interviews. This second set represents the original data 
generated by the research.53 The next section focuses on the interviews’ design. 
1.4 The interview design and methodology 
The interviews design and methodology build upon the research design and 
methodology. Section 1.3.3 suggested that this study needs to go beyond the 
existent knowledge to answer the research question. For this reason, the 
research includes interviews to generate new data and knowledge, 
supplementing the sources of the literature review. 
However, the interviews are not the centre of the research. Instead, they 
are instruments to develop the analysis of the thesis. This aspect is crucial 
because it shapes the design and methodology of the interviews first and then 
their analytical application. In fact, the thesis does not include any data analysis   
of the interviews, as with NVivo for instance.54 Instead, it uses their original data 
 
53 ibid 193–194. 
54 A NVivo analysis was a considered option during the early stages of the study and the 
researcher attended relevant training. However, the analysis adopted a different approach 
after the completion of the interviews and the evaluation of the collected material. 
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as primary sources to supplement the literature review. This method aims to 
develop an analysis of the research question that can be as complete as 
possible. 
1.4.1 The interview design 
Since the interviews were conducted to supplement the background research, 
the identification of the interviewees resulted from the background research 
itself. This is because the role of the interviewees was to explain the uncertainties 
of underlying processes. As such, underlying processes are the topics to explore 
with the interviews. 
The interviews supported the analysis of this study, which includes an 
investigation of EU entities and processes concerning the implementation of the 
CRPD and independent living rights. Therefore, the identification of these entities 
and processes represents the first step to generate a list of possible 
interviewees.  
The entities and processes identified and analysed in this study are: (i) in 
Chapter 4 (a) the EU CRPD focal point, (b) the EU CRPD monitoring framework, 
and (c) the EU CRPD coordination mechanism; (ii) in Chapter 5 (a) the European 
Commission, (b) the European Parliament, (c) the European Ombudsman, and 
(d) the EU Fundamental Rights Agency; lastly in Chapter 6 (a) the European 
Semester, and (b) the European Structural and Investment Funds. The 
documentary research concerning these entities and processes allowed the 
identification of relevant officers as possible interviewees. 
The identification of the possible interviewees resulted in a list of almost 
250 officers. All these persons were relevant to the entities and processes 
considered in the study and listed above. They were mentioned in the public 
documents that are primary sources of this thesis. The attendance lists of 
meeting minutes were the most useful sources from which names that were 
relevant to this research were collected. Other significant sources were: (i) 
organisation charts; (ii) authorship of reports; and (iii) personal suggestions. 
When thought relevant, the public sources that allowed the creation of the 
confidential list of possible interviewees are indicated alongside the descriptive 
parts of the thesis.55 
 
55 See Sections 4.3.3.1; 4.4.3.2; 4.4.4.1; 5.2.1.1; 5.2.2.3; 5.3.1; 5.3.2.1; and 6.2.2. 
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Among the officers included in the confidential list, nearly 50 were 
contacted. The selection of the persons to contact took into account: (i) a fair 
distribution among the analysed entities and processes; (ii) the potential 
contribution to the research; and (iii) the hierarchical position of individuals. The 
first round of contacts involved only higher position officials engaged with the 
entities and processes listed above. This choice was made to confer legitimation 
and prestige on the research itself. Among the 50 contacted officers, 15 agreed 
to proceed with the interview.56 
The difficulties in approaching top EU-level officers, in persuading them 
about the relevance of this study, and in organising the interviews were time and 
resource consuming. The small size of the population57 did not offer alternatives 
to the selected group. The choice to interview key informants at the EU level was 
the most critical factor in limiting the number of the interviewees. However, the 
amount of the interviewees is satisfying because the 15 interviewed top officials 
are relevant to almost all the entities and processes analysed in this study.58 This 
process aimed to guarantee that the insights supporting the analysis of this 
research belong to persons that materially oversee the EU implementation and 
monitoring of the CRPD during the time of this research.  
1.4.2 The interview methodology 
The rationale of the research first suggested that this study would have met 
qualitative standards. The design of the research confirmed this characteristic. 
Also the design of the interviews pointed towards a qualitative approach. 
Coherently, the methodology to conduct the interviews followed qualitative 
methods. In addition to the adherence to a rationale, other two pragmatic reasons 
 
56 Among the 15 interviews, 3 written contributions involved whole offices. In these cases, 
several persons worked together to answer the questions of the interview. Although they 
worked together, they have been counted as one single interview. As such, the total 
number of the interviews (15) stands for the amount of the contributions only. The real 
number of the persons that contributed either singularly or jointly might be 20 people, at 
least. In addition, the total number of the contacted persons may be around 50 people. 
This amount includes those who merely forwarded the first-contact email and those who 
have never replied to it. 
57 Given (n 47) 645. 
58 Among all the entities and processes described in the thesis, only one institutional office had 
no representatives in the interviews because its officials preferred not to be involved. This 
research’s unrecorded informants have provided insights about this unrepresented office.  
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justify this choice: (i) the small dimension of the population; and (ii) the search 
for underlying processes. 
 The 250 names that fill the confidential list of possible interviewees were 
filtered to select adequate persons following the criteria illustrated in the previous 
sub-section. The suitable ones were top EU-level officers belonging to the 
entities and processes analysed in the thesis who were overseeing the 
implementation and monitoring of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
Besides, particular attention was paid to having a fair distribution of the 
interviewees among the entities and processes analysed in the thesis and listed 
in the previous sub-section. The officers with these characteristics were few, and 
they worked far away from one another and the researcher’s location.59 These 
essential characteristics of the design of the interviews are not in line with 
quantitative research methods.60 As such, a qualitative approach was the only 
alternative. 
 Frey described quantitative research as objective and statistical.61 On the 
contrary, this study’s interviews generated data that were subjective and 
interpretive. “Qualitative methods can bring to the forefront knowledge about 
phenomena that are not understood or that have not been explored”.62 This is 
the reason why the research design includes a qualitative method to generate 
data. Given explained that “to generate data from a sampled data source, 
researchers interact with the data source using qualitative research methods 
within an overall strategy of inquiry”.63 “Interviews are an example of a data 
generation method”.64 The author added that the term generation has two 
meanings: (i) the research creates data that are not available in the literature 
review; and (ii) the researcher stimulates new lines of reasoning in the 
 
59 The interviews of this research involved people from: Brussels, London, Rome, Sofia, 
Strasbourg, and Vienna. The headquarters of the entities analysed in this study are 
located in these cities. The location of the researcher was the University of Leeds in 
England. 
60 Bruce B Frey, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Educational Research, Measurement, and 
Evaluation (Sage Publications Inc 2018). 
61 ibid 1349. 
62 ibid 1340. 
63 Given (n 47) 193. 
64 ibid. 
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interviewees’ minds, who create new insights. These considerations have also 
shaped the qualitative methodology used to conduct the interviews. 
The need for deepening the understanding of the structures and 
processes investigated by the literature review was the main reason for 
conducting the interviews. For this reason, the interviews had to meet the topics 
that were relevant to answering the research question. The interviews’ questions 
were open-ended, giving the interviewees the possibility to generate and share 
new insights. These characteristics led to the choice of semi-structured 
interviews.65 
1.4.3 The sampling criteria 
The research aimed to find evidence about EU influences on the implementation 
of the CRPD and independent living rights. Since citizens fulfil human rights, this 
kind of outcome might be evident at the local level. This entails that the analysis 
should have revealed influences that: (i) start in the EU arena; (ii) are mediated 
by mainstreamed entities; and (iii) impact on the local level. The initial aim of the 
interviews was to reveal this chain of influence by involving actors that were 
relevant to these three steps. 
 Bearing this in mind, the criteria to select the interviewees could have 
adopted two alternative approaches: the first one was top-down starting from the 
EU CRPD-related governance policy-making and verifying eventual outcomes; 
the second one was bottom-up starting from some local outcome and verifying 
eventual EU influences. The researcher, in accord with his supervisors, chose 
the top-down approach due to the following reasons. 
 First of all, the main interest of the thesis focuses on the EU level. 
Therefore, this should have been the natural starting point for the interview 
process. Also, starting with the local level had the fatal risk of not having time to 
reach the EU level, and this eventuality could have severely damaged the whole 
research. A second weakness of the bottom-up approach concerned the 
identification and choice of the outcomes from where starting. This would have 
entailed a preliminary study of the independent living policies in the 28 EU 
Member States in order to find the best examples. However, this effort was 
dramatically time and resource-consuming and not feasible for the research. The 
 
65 ibid 811. 
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researcher tried a preliminary study on three EU Member States (Bulgaria, Italy 
and the UK). Again, the search for promising outcomes was not satisfactory 
enough despite the dedicated resources. The last factor that made the bottom-
up approach unfeasible was the actual possibility that national and local 
policymakers would have unlikely admitted of having been influenced by the EU, 
and this would have severely affected the finding of evidence. 
 After these preliminary considerations, the search for the suitable 
interviewees started from the bodies that are part of the EU CRPD-related 
governance: (i) focal point (EU Commission); (ii) monitoring framework (EU 
Parliament, EU Ombudsman, FRA, and EDF); and (iii) coordination mechanism 
(DISG, COHOM, DHLG, and Work Forum). Therefore, the suitable interviewees 
would have worked for these bodies on the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. 
 Then, the documentary study allowed to depict an intermediate level 
between the EU and the national level, starting from the liaison offices of several 
EU bodies. These included specific offices of the EU Commission, such as 
Country Desks, European Semester Offices, and responsible units of the ESI 
Funds management (i.e. the OPs’ Contact Points). The EU Parliament and FRA 
have their National Liaison Officers as well. Also, several networks act as bridges 
between the EU and the national level. For example, the EU Ombudsman leads 
the European Network of Ombudsmen. Besides, non-institutional networks are 
no less critical, like the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions 
(ENNHRI), the European Network of Equality Bodies (Equinet), the European 
Disability Forum (EDF), and the European Network on Independent Living 
(ENIL). 
 The search for possible interviewees within all these bodies produced a 
list of 250 names. At this stage, the researcher received the favourable opinion 
of the Ethics Committee66 and, in accord with his Supervisors, he decided to start 
to contact a selection of the identified officers. The selection would have 
considered a fair balance between the different bodies and offices. The idea was 
to postpone the identification of national-level interviewees after having 
evaluated the results of two rounds of interviews: the first round involving 
 
66 See Annex I: ‘Ref. AREA 17-044 - Favourable Ethical Opinion’. 
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interviewees from the EU CRPD-related governance, and the second round 
interviewing officers belonging to the intermediate level. The expectation was 
that the upper-level interviewees could have suggested lower-level colleagues. 
First round interviews: EU CRPD-related governance 
Body Contacts Correspondence Interview Modality 
EDF 3 officers Feb – Mar 2018 
2 interviewees 
14 March 2018 
Video call 
EU Commission  
3 officers 
DG EMPL C3 
Feb – Apr 2018 NO  
EU Parliament 
3 MEPS 
PETI Com 
Feb – Mar 2018 NO  
EU Parliament 
 
1 MEP 
EMPL Com 
Feb – Mar 2018 NO  
EU Parliament 
 
4 MEPS 
Disability 
Intergroup 
Feb – Mar 2018 
1 interviewee 
20 March 2018 
Video call 
EU Ombudsman 3 officers Feb – Mar 2018 
2 interviewees 
7 March 2018 
In person 
Brussels 
FRA 3 officers Feb 2018 
1 interviewee 
1 March 2018 
In person 
Vienna 
Second round interviews: intermediate level entities 
Body Contacts Correspondence Interview Modality 
Equinet 3 officers April – June 2018 
1 interviewee 
15 June 2018 
Written reply 
ENIL 2 officers April – June 2018 
1 Interviewee 
25 June 2018 
In person 
London 
ENNHRI 2 officers April – June 2018 NO  
EU Commission 
8 Eur Semester 
National Officers 
April – June 2018 
3 interviewees 
15 May 2018 
19 June 2018 
Written replies 
EU Commission 
2 officers 
DG EMPL F1 
April – May 2018 
1 interviewee 
11 May 2018 
Written reply 
EU Commission 
4 officers 
DG REGIO B3 
April – June 2018 
1 interviewee 
4 June 2018 
Written Reply 
EU Commission 
4 DG EMPL 
National Officers 
April – August 2018 
2 interviewees 
30 April 2018 
3 August 2018 
Written Replies 
FRA 
3 National 
liaison Officers 
April 2018 NO  
Figure 1-3 - Summary of the interview schedule 
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 The development of these two rounds of the interviews started 
approximately at the beginning of 2018 (with the first contact email sent to the 
potential interviewees) and lasted until the end of the year (with the evaluation of 
the gathered material). The table below summarises the main passages of the 
interview schedule. At the end of this period, the researcher, in accord with his 
Supervisors, decided to stop the interviews, skipping the third round involving 
national actors. The decision arose from both timing concerns related to the 
research schedule, and considerations about the concluded experience and the 
gathered data. 
The crucial factor is that the conduction of the interviews was challenging 
and it required more time than planned. In short, the contacts with the potential 
interviewees were prolonged and, as a consequence, requests for replies were 
a constant. Also, the results of the interviews were somehow unexpected, and 
thus a change in their strategy was inevitable. On one hand, several interviewees 
were very talkative, providing pages of insights each. On the other hand, other 
interviewees were not very keen on being interviewed and offered few data if 
none at all. Therefore, after several months of work, the decision was to take 
stock of the gathered material and start the research analysis phase. 
 For example, interviewing the EU Commission officers were tremendously 
complicated. Some of them seemed like scared of someone asking questions. 
For instance, the Disability Unit officers (after months of emailing and despite the 
intercession of the Supervisors) refused the interview. This aspect affected the 
research because the Disability Unit is a central topic of the thesis. Also, several 
intermediate entities did not want to be involved, as the ENNHRI and the 
contacted FRA Liaison Offices. Others, like Equinet, offered very basilar insights 
without any possibility to add original data to the thesis. 
 To conclude, the sample of the interviews has some criticality that 
influenced the final design and analysis of the research. Despite this, the 
interviews are satisfying because they provided original material for the analysis. 
They also offered a pioneering perspective to study on the implementation of 
human rights that can be useful to conduct further research, which might 
implement this thesis, starting from filling the criticalities illustrated in this sub-
section. 
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1.4.4 The interview process 
The process of the interviews started with their design and concluded with their 
transcription. It lasted for almost one year. 
The 50 selected possible interviewees were contacted by an email 
previously approved by the AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee.67 This 
email explained the aims of the research and the reasons why the study needed 
to conduct interviews. Also, the email clarified the forms of the interviews.68 In 
detail, it explained that the interviews could have been carried out either in face-
to-face interactions or through internet video calls. Despite this, some of the 
contacted persons expressed a preference to reply in writing, and their request 
was accepted. Therefore, the conducted semi-structured interviews took these 
three different forms. 
When selected for the first contact, the 50 EU-level officers had public 
profiles and did not belong to any vulnerable group as identified by the University 
of Leeds guidelines.69 Who had agreed to proceed received a second email,70 
which included an information sheet and a consent form for their recruitment.71 
They were asked to sign the consent form to start the interviews and to allow 
their use for this thesis. The signed consent forms are confidential material. 
The information sheet explained that the interviews would be a single one-
hour interaction. In addition, it clarified that the questions would be sent in 
advance. Although personalised, the questions were similar for all the 
interviewees. This is because they aimed to investigate the underlying processes 
that allow the EU to influence the implementation of the CRPD and independent 
living rights. The choice to ask similar questions was also instrumental in 
collecting comparable data. Comparable data was useful during the analysis to 
explain similarities and differences between the studied entities and processes. 
 
67 See Annex I: ibid. 
68 Given (n 47) 471. 
69 ‘Policy on Safeguarding Children, Young Persons and Adults in Vulnerable Circumstances’ 
(University of Leeds) 
<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/secretariat/documents/safeguarding_policy.pdf> accessed 18 
April 2019. 
70 ‘Approaching and Recruiting Research Participants’ (Leeds University) 
<http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/info/71/good_research_practice/104/planning_your_research/3> 
accessed 18 April 2019; Marcello Sacco, ‘Ethical Review Form’ 6. 
71 Marcello Sacco, ‘Info Sheet & Consent Form’. 
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Similar questions aimed to verify the interviewees’ conscious exercise of 
influence. Their consciousness would have implied an understanding of the 
difference between hard and soft instruments as well as the intentional use of 
specific strategies to reach the national and local levels. In addition, all the 
interviewees were asked to describe their strategies and explain barriers and 
catalysts for the EU influence. Furthermore, all of them were asked about real 
examples that could verify their explanations.  
The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. The audio records 
are strictly confidential material and were not used for the analysis. The raw 
transcriptions are confidential as well, but they constitute the original primary 
sources that support the analysis of this thesis.72 The transcriptions are literal 
instead of interpretive. Their interpretation was left to the analytical part of the 
research. 
1.4.5 The interview ethical considerations 
Since the interviews involved living human participants, the methodology to 
conduct the interviews required ethical considerations.73 These considerations 
satisfied the University of Leeds guidelines and requirements. Among such 
requirements, an ethical application was submitted before starting the interviews 
to the Faculty Research Ethics Committee,74 which approved the project.75 
 This research does not address sensitive ethical issues as the interviews 
did not involve children, hospitals, or any other case indicated as sensitive by the 
University of Leeds guidelines.76 Despite this, the study respects ethical 
protocols to protect the persons involved, who are international professionals. 
 The interviewees were selected from a small population with specific 
characteristics. Their identification from the text is the main ethical issue that the 
methodology of the interviews had to prevent. No other hazards have been 
 
72 Given (n 47) 471. 
73 ‘Does My Project Need Ethical Approval?’ (Leeds University) 
<http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/info/70/ethics/100/does_my_project_need_ethical_approval> 
accessed 18 April 2019. 
74 Sacco, ‘Ethical Review Form’ (n 72). 
75 See Annex I: ‘Ref. AREA 17-044 - Favourable Ethical Opinion’ (n 68). 
76 ‘UOL Guidance on Identifying Ethical Issues’ (University Research Ethics Committee 2016) 
UREC/08/21 
<http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/download/108/uol_guidance_on_identifying_ethical_issu
es> accessed 18 April 2019. 
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identified. In order to avoid the identification of the interviewees, the study 
needed to pay attention to three principles: (i) confidentiality; (ii) anonymity; and 
(iii) pseudonymity.77 The application of these three principles might limit the 
possibility that third parties could identify the interviewees. 
 Although all the primary sources (voice records and transcriptions) are 
strictly confidential, the research refers to the contents of the interviews. The 
participants were informed about this limit of confidentiality in their information 
sheet. To avoid any inconvenience, the interviewees received the transcriptions 
of their interviews to retract or clarify any passage. The participants were 
informed that also anonymity could have been only partially guaranteed by the 
research. This issue is due to the so-called deductive disclosure principle. This 
principle refers to the possibility to deduce the interviewees’ identity from the 
indirect information provided in the text. One of the main issues that encourage 
deductive disclosure is “participants having jobs that are not widespread”.78  
The research design predicted this issue. In fact, the choice to interview 
EU top officials targets participants who occupy positions that have no equal. 
The prediction of a possible ethical issue allowed to explain it to the participants 
in their information sheet. The interviewees were also informed about the 
methodology to prevent their disclosure. In detail, their direct data have been 
substituted by pseudonyms both in the transcriptions and in the written replies. 
The re-identification is possible with a cypher that is strictly confidential. This 
means that the research analysis grabbed data from documents that include no 
direct data of any interviewee. As a consequence, the text of the thesis does not 
provide any direct data that may allow the identification of the interviewees. 
 Records, anonymised documents, and signed consent forms are 
confidential files that are stored in the researcher’s M: drive of the University of 
Leeds, protected by ID and password. Also the electronic correspondence 
between the researcher and the interviewees is confidential. It is securely stored 
in the personal mailbox of the University of Leeds, protected by ID and password. 
All the collected primary data are used for this research only. 
 
77 ‘Confidentiality and Anonymisation Guidance’ (University Research Ethics Committee 2016) 
<http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/downloads/download/925/confidentiality_and_anonymisation_guida
nce> accessed 18 April 2019. 
78 ibid 3. 
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To conclude, the researcher attended specific workshops to address the 
ethical requirements of the University of Leeds adequately. Besides, the 
researcher followed training in the correct way to manage data. On this, he 
prepared a Data Management Plan and submitted it to the Research Data Leeds 
Office,79 which approved the Plan.80 Lastly, the researcher compiled a Fieldwork 
Assessment Form in order to prevent any hazard during the interviews.81 This 
document revealed no dangers for both the researcher and the interviewees. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
In addition to its introductory and concluding chapters, this thesis includes five 
other chapters. Among these, the first two describe and explain the background 
and theoretical frameworks of the research, and the other three include the 
analysis of the research. 
Chapter 1, this introductory chapter, has described and explained the 
basis of the thesis. It outlined the logical steps that start with the identification of 
an international issue that is worthy of a three-year research, and it went on 
introducing the research question, design, and methodology. 
Chapter 2 includes the background knowledge of this thesis. It introduces 
the EU commitment to human rights and explains that the accession to 
international human rights treaties is part of this commitment. Then the chapter 
focuses on the CRPD because this is the study case of the research. It also 
presents the institutional difficulties the EU faces to implement the Convention 
due to the conferral principle. The conferral may be a significant problem, 
especially when dealing with shared competence issues. Article 19 CRPD, which 
states independent living rights, is an example of shared competence issues. For 
this reason, the chapter includes a focus on independent living rights that aims 
to depict their relevance within the EU borders. 
Chapter 3 includes the theoretical framework of this thesis. It explains the 
difference between power and influence, stating that while hard (coercive) 
processes exercise power, soft (non-coercive) processes exercise influence. 
 
79 Marcello Sacco, ‘Data Management Plan’. 
80 Marcello Sacco, ‘MSacco RDM’ (11 October 2017). 
81 Marcello Sacco, ‘Fieldwork Assessment Form’. 
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This difference is pivotal and relevant to the conferral issue. In fact, the conferral 
is an example of hard law that may be a barrier for the EU to implement 
international human rights. However, the EU may foster the implementation of 
human rights principles through soft processes rather than hard ones. In addition 
to the definition of influence, the chapter introduces three concepts that concern 
the exercise of influence in the international sphere: (i) soft law; (ii) 
experimentalist governance; and (iii) networks. The analytical chapters will use 
these concepts to explain how the EU can implement the CRPD exercising 
influence instead of power. 
Chapter 4 is the first of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It 
focuses on the EU CRPD-related governance, which includes the EU CRPD: (i) 
focal point; (ii) monitoring framework; and (iii) coordination mechanism. Chapter 
5 is the second among the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It investigates 
the CRPD mainstreaming within the four EU institutions and bodies that are part 
of the EU CRPD focal point and monitoring framework: (i) the EU Commission; 
(ii) the EU Parliament; (iii) the EU Ombudsman; and (iv) the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency. Chapter 6 is the last of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. 
It explores the CRPD mainstreaming within two crucial processes of the EU 
governance that are: (i) the European Semester and (ii) the ESI Funds.  
The three analytical chapters describe the entities and processes on 
which they are focused. The descriptions frame the discussion and show if these 
entities and processes can exercise influence. In addition to descriptions, the 
analytical chapters include explanations that offer reasoning about the effective 
exercise of influence on the domestic level in implementing the CRPD and 
independent living rights.   
The explanations of the three analytical chapters build upon the 
comparison between the three groups of sources of the research: (i) background 
knowledge; (ii) academic theories; and (iii) new data from interviews. The 
explanations can develop from each of these three groups of sources. However, 
any explanation may adopt different approaches depending on the group of 
sources that allows developing the explanation itself. This consideration means 
that: (i) background knowledge may support inductive and intuitive explanations; 
(ii) academic theories may purport deductive explanations; and (iii) new data 
from interviews may suggest retroductive explanations. 
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 Chapter 7 is the last of the thesis, and it includes the conclusions of the 
research. The conclusions build upon the developed analytical explanations to 
create new knowledge about the evolution of the EU opportunities to exercise its 
influence on the implementation of international human rights principles. The 
concluding chapter reinterprets the analytical findings in light of the structure-
process-outcome indicator framework, which inspired the development of the 
research. 
1.6 Concluding remarks 
This introductory chapter explained that the thesis is based on a robust 
preliminary research project. The project started with a personal interest in the 
opportunity for the EU to conclude international human rights treaties. Such 
interest raised some questions about the practical possibility for the EU to meet 
its obligations as duty bearer following its accession to an international human 
rights treaty. The main issue is that such obligations would be satisfied with the 
fulfilment of human rights by EU citizens. However, the Union may have 
competence issues to reach individuals with its human rights policies. This is 
because the full breadth of international obligations have to be overlaid on a 
complex set of governing structures that only affords the EU legal competence 
in some areas.  Therefore, the Union is driven to seek soft power ways of nudging 
change to implement the CRPD. The preliminary project of this research 
assumed that a specific study on the EU implementation of the CRPD could have 
verified the EU opportunities to conclude international human rights treaties. 
This preliminary assumption developed a research question as well as the 
design and methodology to answer such a question reliably. This introductory 
chapter explained that the research question is relevant to the contemporary 
international socio-political debates on human rights legislation. In addition, the 
chapter illustrated that the answers to the research question result from design 
and methodology that are both original and rigorous. They are original because 
of their mix of approaches and the interviews that generate new data. They are 
rigorous due to the background knowledge and academic theories that support 
the analysis of the study. 
The preparation of the research project included in this introductory 
chapter has been instrumental in developing a reliable and coherent research. 
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The preliminary project clarified the ideas about what to study and how to study 
it. Lastly, the project suggested the thesis’ structure in order to have a clear and 
consequential exposition of the contents.  
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Chapter 2  
The background of the research 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the topics of the research. Its structure moves from broad 
to focused topics. This choice reflects the research design’s flow of reasoning, 
which started with a question about the EU opportunity to conclude international 
human rights treaties, and it narrowed to the specific case concerning the EU 
accession to the CRPD with a focus on independent living rights. This 
background chapter frames these topics. 
The research’s broad domain concerns the EU opportunity to implement 
international human rights. For this reason, Section 2.2 explains that the Union’s 
commitment to the promotion of human rights rests on three pillars: (i) the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ; (ii) the inclusion of fundamental rights in the EU 
Treaties; and (iii) the EU conclusion of international human rights conventions. 
This research later focuses on this third pillar and on the EU opportunities 
to implement the international human rights treaties it concludes. Its focus on the 
CRPD case aims to find evidence to such possibilities. Section 2.3 describes the 
main effects of the EU accession to the CRPD. It originally presents a group of 
three effects: (i) legal; (ii) institutional; and (iii) political. The section introduces 
these three effects together with one of their limits: the principle of the conferral.  
Building upon the principle of the conferral, Section 2.4 investigates the 
competence issue that characterises the legal relationship between the EU and 
its Member States. Due to the competence issue, the EU cannot legislate all of 
the CRPD principles, but it may supplement its legislative prerogatives with 
institutional and political processes. This case mainly reflects the situation of 
shared competence issues. Independent living rights are among shared 
competence issues, and Section 2.5 addresses this matter. 
Lastly, section 2.6 focuses on independent living rights in the EU, and it 
narrows down to two topics relevant to this principle: deinstitutionalisation and 
personal assistance. The aim of the section is twofold: on one hand, it describes 
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the topics; on the other hand, it emphasises the vital role of the EU to correctly 
implement the CRPD principles at the national and local levels. 
Figure 2-1 - Visual content chart of Chapter 2 
2.2 The EU commitment on human rights 
The European Union1 has primarily economic and commercial roots. The Union 
builds upon the Treaty of Rome,2 which had commercial purposes mostly. 
Despite this, the EU commitment to the promotion of human rights has been 
increasing over time. Examples of its engagement can be found: (i) in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice; (ii) in the EU Treaties; and (iii) in 
the EU accession to international human rights treaties. This section describes 
these three different domains of the EU effort to realise international human 
rights. 
The EU commitment to human rights started with the pioneering case law 
of the ECJ. The Court “shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed”.3 This means that the ECJ interprets what 
appears in the Treaties but also what is unwritten. Its mandate is to guarantee 
univocal interpretations of the Treaties. 
For instance, in the early ’60s, the ECJ had to defend the doctrine of 
supremacy by insisting the EU is underpinned by general principles of law that 
include human rights. In this respect, the jurisprudence refers to two leading 
cases establishing that: (i) the EU legislation is directly applicable in the EU 
 
1 The emphasis on the distinction between the European Community and European Union is 
not necessary for this thesis, and it will be avoided to facilitate the reading. In spite of this 
choice, some direct quotations may include the word Community. 
2 The Treaty of Rome, signed the 25 March 1957 and entered into force the 1 January 1958, 
includes: (i) the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (TEEC); and (ii) 
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012 (OJ C 326/13) Art 19. 
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Member States;4 and (ii) the EU legislation enjoys primacy over national law even 
when constitutional.5 Grimm affirmed that the EU Treaties had been interpreted 
with a constitutional approach since these two judgements.6 
In the beginning, the established supremacy of the EU legislation 
concerned only the contents of the EU Treaties that were merely economic and 
commercial. Subsequently, in 1970, the ECJ stated that “respect for fundamental 
rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court 
of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework 
of the structure and objectives of the Community”.7 Therefore, the limits of the 
ECJ competence do not derive from a strict reading of the EU Treaties but from 
the general principles of EU law.  
At first, the ECJ drew inspiration by the EU Member States’ constitutions to 
develop the general principles of EU law. Then, the Court contemplated also 
international treaties for its interpretations.8 The fact that the majority of the EU 
Member States ratified the same human rights conventions persuaded the ECJ 
to consider those treaties as general principles of EU law.9 In this way, human 
rights have become a legal matter of the EU through the case-law of the ECJ. 
Defeis stated that “the Maastricht Treaty, adopted in 1992, converted the 
obligation to respect human rights previously articulated by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), into a treaty obligation”.10 In fact, “with the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the Community clearly went beyond its original economic objective, i.e. creation 
of a common market, and its political ambitions came to the fore”.11 Since the 
 
4 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECJ Case 26/62, ECR-2. 
5 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECJ Case 6/64, ECR-587. 
6 Dieter Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case: 
Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation’ (2015) 21 European Law Journal 460, 460. 
7 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECJ Case 11/70, ECR-1126. 
8 R & V Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECJ Case 181-73, ECR-450. 
9 Nold KG v Commission [1973] ECJ Case 4/73, ECR-493. 
10 Elizabeth F Defeis, ‘Human Rights, the European Union, and the Treaty Route: From 
Maastricht to Lisbon’ (2017) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 1207 
<https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2597&context=ilj> accessed 30 
April 2019. 
11 ‘Treaty of Maastricht on European Union’ (EUR-LEX, 2010) 
<http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/23e2e276-05ee-49f6-b3ca-
d6db7e3b2738.0005.02/DOC_2> accessed 1 October 2017. 
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Treaty of Maastricht,12 the EU primary legislation mentions fundamental rights. 
In fact, Article F.2 TEU as amended by the Maastricht Treaty stated that “the 
Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
law”. 
While the Treaty of Maastricht opened the doors to human rights, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam13 represented a real shift. Its Article F TEU, as amended by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, stated that the EU is grounded “on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law”. Article F introduced the possibility to take action against those EU Member 
States that did not respect its dispositions. Besides, the new Article 6.a TEC 
stated to “take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial 
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”.  
In 2000, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union14 was 
proclaimed in Nice with a non-binding force. After the 2004 failure to be inserted 
in the EU Constitution, the Charter was amended and proclaimed again in 
2007.15 It finally became binding on the 1 December 2009 with the Treaty of 
Lisbon,16 which is into force at the time of developing this research. 
Article 6 TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, gives the status of primary 
legislation to the Charter. However, Article 51 of the Charter limits its competence 
“only when implementing Union law”. This is because the EU Treaties do not 
explicitly confer the promotion of human rights on the EU.  
Also on this issue, the ECJ offered its interpretation by stating that the EU 
Member States shall respect the EU Charter even when national legislation links 
to EU law without implementing.17 This case-law means that the ECJ expanded 
 
12 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Text) 1992 (OJ C 191/1). 
13 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related Acts 1997 (OJ C 340/1). 
14 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000 (OJ C 364/1). 
15 ‘The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (European Parliament 2019) 3 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_4.1.2.pdf> accessed 2 May 2019. 
16 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community 2007 (OJ C 306/1). 
17 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2010] ECJ Case C-617/10, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 [19]; 
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its prerogatives to the EU general principles in 1970, and it has further enlarged 
its competence to the scope of EU law since 2010.18 
This section has revealed that the evolution of the EU commitment to 
human rights rests on the relationship between the EU primary legislation and 
the ECJ jurisprudence. Furthermore, the conclusion of international human rights 
conventions represents a third opportunity for the EU to reinforce its engagement 
in human rights. This third opportunity is the main focus of the thesis, and the 
next section includes an overview of the case concerning the EU accession to 
the CRPD. 
2.3 The EU accession to the CRPD: origins and effects 
The commitment of the EU to disability rights can be divided into four periods:19 
from the 1980s to the middle 1990s following the wave of the UN Decade for 
Persons with Disabilities;20 (ii) the mid-1990s when the EU Commission21 asked 
for a stronger effort;22 (iii) the period following the Amsterdam Treaty23 due to its 
anti-discrimination provisions; and (iv) from both the Treaty of Lisbon24 and the 
EU conclusion of the CRPD25 on. 
The EU was an active stakeholder during the drafting of the CRPD.26 It 
strongly supported the opportunity for the Convention to “be open for signature 
 
Joined Cases HK Danmark [2013] ECJ C-335/11 and C-337/11, OJ C 156/08. 
18 Francesca Ferraro and Jesús Carmona, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’ 
(European Parliament 2015) PE 554.168 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/554168/EPRS_IDA(2015)554
168_EN.pdf> accessed 2 May 2019. 
19 Bjørn Hvinden and Rune Halvorsen, ‘Which Way for European Disability Policy?’ (2003) 5 
Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 296, 304–305; Mark Priestley, ‘In Search of 
European Disability Policy: Between National and Global’ (2007) 1 Alter 61. 
20 UN General Assembly Resolution, World Programme of Action concerning Disabled Persons 
1982 (A/RES/37/52). 
21 EU Commission Communication, Equality of opportunity for people with disabilities 1997 
(COM(96) 406 final [OJ C 12/01]). 
22 Eilionóir Flynn, From Rhetoric to Action: Implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (Cambridge University Press 2011) 63–64. 
23 Treaty of Amsterdam. 
24 Treaty of Lisbon. 
25 EU Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2010 (2010/48/EC [OJ L 23/35]). 
26 Gráinne De Búrca, ‘The EU in the Negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35 
European Law Review <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525611> 
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by all States and by regional integration organisations”.27 Finally, the CRPD is 
the first human rights treaty of the United Nations that allows such an opportunity. 
The EU signed the CRPD on its opening day for signature on 30 March 2007, 
approved the conclusion of the Convention on 26 November 2009,28 and formally 
deposited the relevant documents on 23 December 2010.29 After the deposit of 
all the instruments of accession, the CRPD entered into force in the EU 
legislation on 22 January 2011. The CRPD is the first human rights treaty 
concluded by the EU and by any regional integration organisation. 
The possibility for the EU to conclude international treaties is now stated in 
the EU Treaties.30 The Treaty of Lisbon has conferred legal personality on the 
EU,31 and this status allows the EU to negotiate and conclude international 
treaties.32 As the negotiation of the CRPD took place before the ratification of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, the legal basis for the EU to engage in such unprecedented 
competence derived from Article 13 TEC.33 The assumption was that Article 13 
TEC authorised to “take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
[…] disability”, and De Búrca considered the conclusion of the CRPD as such 
appropriate action.34 
The EU accession to the CRPD brings with it effects that are more or less 
evident. This section originally divides such effects into three groups: (i) legal; (ii) 
institutional; and (iii) political. 
 
 
 
accessed 10 October 2018. 
27 UN General Assembly Resolution, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Optional Protocol 2006 (A/RES/61/106) Art 42. 
28 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC. 
29 ‘Status of Treaties, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (United Nations, 
Treaty Collection) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
15&chapter=4&clang=_en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
30 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 (OJ C 
326/47) Part Five Title V Artt 216-217. 
31 TEU Art 47. 
32 ‘Glossary of Summaries, Legal Personality of the Union’ (EUR-Lex, Access to European 
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accessed 10 October 2018. 
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2.3.1 Legal effects 
The two direct legal effects that derive from the EU accession to the CRPD are 
that: (i) the EU institutions have to respect the CRPD, and (ii) the EU Member 
States might comply with the CRPD when implemented by EU law.  
These effects derive from the TFEU, establishing that “agreements 
concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States”.35 Also, the ECJ case-law states that “the provisions of the 
agreement, from the coming into force thereof, form an integral part of 
Community Law”.36 Craig and De Búrca assumed that “as agreements entered 
into by the Community, they can be viewed as sharing some of the key 
characteristics of EC law, and in particular could be capable of direct effect and 
enforcement by individuals whenever sufficiently precise and unconditional”.37  
However, the real terms are more controversial than the quotations above 
seem to suggest. For this reason, the EU has to address the competence issue 
when legislating on the CRPD principles. The next section deepens this aspect. 
An interesting legal aspect of the EU ratification of the CRPD links to the 
hierarchy of the EU legislative sources. Within such a hierarchy, the EU 
Commission inserts the CRPD between EU primary and secondary law.38 This 
positioning means that: (i) the EU secondary law has to comply with the CRPD, 
and it is interpreted through the lenses of the CRPD itself;39 and (ii) the EU 
primary law includes provisions that the implementation of the CRPD has to 
respect. While the next section will investigate this second point, the first point 
suggests the following reasoning.  
As explained in Section 2.2, the ECJ has the competence to interpret the 
EU secondary law, and the Court emanates general principles in line with 
recognised international principles. Therefore, the ECJ interprets EU secondary 
 
35 TFEU Art 216; See also: Treaty of Amsterdam Art 300(7). 
36 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State (n 8) Para 5. 
37 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (4th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 207. 
38 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2014) CRPD/C/EU/1 para 14 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2FC%2FEU%2F1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
39 Alan Dashwood and Derrick Wyatt, Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law (6th edn, Hart 
2011). 
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law taking into consideration the CRPD principles. For this reason, the EU 
Commission itself stated that “in accordance with CJEU case law, such 
agreements prevail over provisions of Union secondary legislation. This means 
that such provisions must be interpreted and applied in a manner that is 
consistent with those agreements”.40  
Figure 2-2 - Hierarchy of EU legislative sources 
The ECJ has already referred to the CRPD and developed a relevant 
jurisprudence. For instance, the Court mentioned the Convention as an 
appropriate legal context in a 2013 judgement41 concerning the interpretation of 
an EU Directive.42 In detail, the ECJ looked at the CRPD to define two concepts: 
disability and reasonable accommodation. About disability, the judgement states 
that the “Directive 2000/78 must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the convention”.43 Since “the concept of ‘disability’ is not defined 
by Directive 2000/78 itself”,44 it must be interpreted in the light of the definition 
stated in the CRPD.45 About reasonable accommodation, the judgement repeats 
using the Convention for its meaning.46 This example shows how the 
interpretations of the ECJ strengthen the link between EU law and the CRPD. 
The just described case of the ECJ introduces a challenge. At the year of 
the mentioned judgement, several EU Member States had not ratified the CRPD 
yet. However, the Court stated that they had to respect the quoted EU Directive 
consistently with the CRPD provisions. In other words, the EU Member States 
 
40 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 38) para 14. 
41 C-335/11 and C-337/11 (n 17) paras 3–5. 
42 EU Council Directive, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation 2000 (2000/78/EC [OJ L303/16]). 
43 C-335/11 and C-337/11 (n 17) para 32. 
44 ibid 36. 
45 C-335/11 and C-337/11 (n 17) Judgement Pt 1. 
46 ibid Judgement Pt 2. 
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had to respect the CRPD principles as EU law without having ratified the 
Convention itself as an international treaty. This concrete example is a reminder 
of the so-called direct effect principle of the international agreements concluded 
by the EU.47 In particular, as Cremona explained, “the Court is not merely 
discussing the relationship between an international legal obligation and the 
Community legal order: it is determining the relationship between an international 
agreement (which has become part of the Community legal order) and the 
domestic legal orders of the Member States”.48 The ECJ case-law is an example 
of international human rights implementation with the mediation of EU law. 
Another example of how the CRPD is mediated via EU law is the EU 
Regulation that governs the ESI Funds.49 This Regulation considers the respect 
of the CRPD as an ex-ante conditionality for any EU Member State to receive 
funding.50 The legal effect of this ex-ante conditionality is a direct consequence 
of the EU conclusion of the CRPD. It entails that any EU Member State should 
respect the CRPD provisions, independently of their ratification of the 
Convention, in case they want to accede to ESI Funds. Chapter 6 will explain 
this aspect in detail. 
2.3.2 Institutional effects 
In addition to legal effects, the EU accession to the CRPD brings with it 
institutional effects. In fact, for its implementation and monitoring, the Convention 
establishes international offices51 and requires the creation by its Parties of focal 
points, monitoring frameworks, and coordination mechanisms.52 De Beco 
 
47 ‘Summaries of EU Legislation, The Direct Effect of European Law’ (EUR-Lex, Access to 
European Union law) <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Al14547> accessed 10 October 2018. 
48 Marise Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union’ in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2011) 234. 
49 EU Parliament and Council Regulation, laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
(1303/2013 [OJ L 347/320]). 
50 ibid Annex XI Part II Area 3. 
51 UN CRPD Artt 34-40. 
52 ibid Art 33. 
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suggested that this variety of institutional bodies is the most complete ever in the 
context of the UN human rights treaties.53 As a consequence, the EU modified 
its institutional organisation to meet its duties as Party to the CRPD.  
 To do this, the EU established under Article 33 CRPD: (i) a focal point; (ii) 
a monitoring framework; and (iii) a coordination mechanism. The thesis refers to 
these three entities taken altogether as the EU CRPD-related governance, which 
is analysed in Chapter 4. The EU CRPD-related governance is mainstreamed 
within the existing organisation of the EU governance. This consideration means 
that the EU CRPD-related governance involves actual offices of institutions and 
bodies. These have additional tasks to oversee, and they might provide 
adequate resources to meet their new duties. This condition entails: (i) dedicating 
offices and staff to the EU CRPD-related governance; (ii) modifying the mandate 
of existing offices to include CRPD-related tasks; and (ii) linking these offices 
with the others to make them work together. 
The EU established its CRPD-related governance as follows: (i) the EU 
focal point for the implementation of the CRPD is the EU Commission;54 (ii) the 
framework that monitors the implementation of the CRPD includes: (a) the EU 
Parliament, (b) the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, (c) the European 
Disability Forum, and (d) the European Ombudsman;55 lastly (iii) the coordination 
mechanism includes: (a) the Commission Inter-Service Group on Disability, (b) 
the Human Rights Working Group of the Council, (c) the Disability High Level 
Group, and (d) the Work Forum.56 
 It is interesting to summarise the main steps of the process that led to the 
EU CRPD-related governance’s establishment. In 2009, the EU Council Decision 
on the conclusion of the CRPD indicated the EU Commission as the unique EU 
 
53 Gauthier De Beco, ‘Study on the Implementation of Article 33 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Europe’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner on 
Human Rights 2014) 4 
<https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/ICC/GeneralMeeting/25/Meeting%20Documents/Study%20on%
20the%20Implementation%20of%20Article%2033%20of%20CRPD.pdf> accessed 10 
October 2018. 
54 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Art 3. 
55 ‘EU Framework for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/people-
disabilities/eu-crpd-framework> accessed 10 October 2018. 
56 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 38) 64. 
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focal point.57 Then a Code of Conduct “sets out the arrangements between the 
Council, the Member States and the Commission on […] the implementation of 
the Convention”.58 These arrangements mainly focus on the collaboration 
between the EU and its Member States to implement and monitor the 
Convention. Such cooperation is necessary because of the overlapping of 
competences. In 2012, the EU Commission proposed the new framework 
monitoring system,59 which became operative one year later.60 Although the 
CRPD asks for the adoption of a coordination mechanism and even when the 
mentioned Code of Conduct refers to it, no official coordination instrument was 
initially provided.  
Such absence and other concerns were underlined in 2015 by the CRPD 
Committee. Among its Concluding Observations, the Committee pointed out that: 
(i) the framework should conform with the Paris Principles; (ii) the EU 
Commission, being the focal point, should not be a member of the framework (as 
it was initially); (iii) there should be more than one focal point; and (iv) the whole 
CRPD-related governance must be adequately funded.61 Following these 
concerns, the EU Commission left the framework,62 and a kind of coordination 
mechanism was presented. Other measures to meet the CRPD Committee 
Concluding Observations are impossible to evaluate because they are 
contemporary with this research. 
The EU CRPD-related governance and its effects will be extensively 
explained in Chapters 4 and 5. The important point to clarify at this stage is that 
the EU accession to the CRPD has been modifying some institutional processes 
 
57 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Art 3. 
58 EU Council Communication, Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and 
the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and 
representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2010 (2010/C 340/08 [OJ C 340/11]) para 1. 
59 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2012. 
60 EU Council Note Set up of the EU-level Framework required by Art. 33.2 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2013. 
61 ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the European Union’ (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/CO/1 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2fC%2fEU%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
62 ‘Minutes of the EU High Level Group on Disability Meeting’ (EU Commission 2016) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 10 October 2018. 
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of the EU itself. These changes have two main goals: (i) the implementation of 
the CRPD; and (ii) the monitoring of the CRPD implementation. Since the 
Convention finds realisation with its fulfilment by EU citizens, the EU CRPD-
related governance might aim to enter into contact with national and local 
authorities to reach their domestic level with its human rights policies. 
The effects of institutional contacts between the EU and the national and 
local levels are different from the legal effects described in the previous sub-
section. The assumption is that while legal implications have a binding force by 
definition, institutional effects may impact on the national and local levels with 
instruments that are different from the binding force of law. If this assumption 
was confirmed, it could be possible to state that the EU can implement and 
monitor the CRPD with either binding or non-binding means. This distinction is 
the cornerstone of the next chapter’s theoretical discussion about the dichotomy 
between power and influence. As the thesis explores EU possibilities to influence 
the CRPD implementation, this background information about the difference 
between legal and institutional effects represents a cornerstone of the whole 
study.  
2.3.3 Political effects 
In addition to legal and institutional effects, there are political effects that derive 
from the EU conclusion of the CRPD. The main political effect is the inclusion of 
the implementation of CRPD principles in the political agenda of the EU. In 
reality, disability issues were part of the EU political agenda well before the 
conclusion of the CRPD. For instance, as explained in Section 2.2, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced the concept of non-discrimination against persons with 
disabilities, among other categories. Besides, its Article 13 TEC led to a package 
of two directives and one action plan to be approved.63 The action plan 
introduced both the European Year for People with Disabilities in 2003 and a 
subsequent multi-year action plan with the time horizon of 2010.64 
 
63 ‘Article 13. Proposals from the European Commission for Combating Discrimination’ 
(Commission for Racial Equalities 2000) 
<http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/publications/pdfs/article13.pdf> accessed 10 
October 2018. 
64 EU Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Equal opportunities 
for people with disabilities: A European Action Plan 2004 (COM(2003) 650 final [OJ 
C96/24]). 
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 After its accession to the Convention, the EU launched a new Disability 
Strategy.65 The adoption of the 2010-2020 Strategy represents the EU’s political 
commitment to implement the CRPD.66 “The Commission has identified eight 
main areas for action: Accessibility, Participation, Equality, Employment, 
Education and training, Social protection, Health, and External Action”.67 With a 
focus on these eight priority areas, the Disability Strategy defined goals to be 
reached at the EU level and suggested actions to be taken by the EU Member 
States.68 While the 2003 plan involved the EU Commission only, the 2010 
strategy engages with the EU Member States. This change is significant because 
it shows planned cooperation between the Union and the national and local 
levels to implement the CRPD. 
 A five-year plan set out the implementation of the Disability Strategy.69 
This plan contained a list of actions to pursue, among which there was a political 
commitment to optimising the use of ESI Funds.70 In this respect, Section 4.4.3.1 
shows real examples of political discussions about the drafting of the ESI Funds 
Regulation. This Regulation obliges the EU Member States to respect CRPD-
related conditionalities in order to obtain any EU funding. Thus, the political 
commitment that derives from the EU conclusion of the CRPD affected the 
drafting of an EU Regulation that now exercises its legal effects on the EU 
Member States. Also, the need to implement the Regulation implies the 
necessity to establish offices that modify the institutional organisation of EU 
institutions and bodies. Similar to the institutional effect, the political impact 
works through means that are not binding but persuasive. This consideration 
enters into the distinction between power and influence that will be explained in 
the next chapter. 
 The political commitment may impact on the EU institutional organisation. 
For instance, the EU Disability High Level Group (DHLG) has changed its role 
 
65 EU Commission Communication, European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed 
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe (COM(2010) 636 final). 
66 ibid 2. 
67 ibid. 
68 Flynn (n 22) 68. 
69 EU Commission, Initial plan to implement the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 - List 
of Actions 2010-2015 (SEC(2010) 1324 final). 
70 ibid 18. 
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from sharing information71 to discussing the implementation of both the Disability 
Strategy and the CRPD.72 The DHLG is a network that includes EU and national 
top-level authorities that oversee disability-related policies. The DHLG joins the 
EU with the national and local levels to discuss the implementation of the 
Convention. For this reason, the Group is part of the EU CRPD coordination 
mechanism, which will be explained in Chapter 4.  
 The European Economic and Social Committee “proposes linking the 
implementation of the [European Disability Strategy] to that of the Europe 2020 
Strategy”.73 Europe 2020 is “a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth”.74 Any strategy of the Union is a common political agenda on which the 
EU national governments agree. The strategies are a reference framework, and 
their specific targets are implemented at the EU, national, and local levels. Such 
implementation is regularly reported to verify that everyone meets the 
undertaken political commitments.75  
In 2010, the proposal for establishing the European Semester aimed “to 
put Europe on the path of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”.76 Since 2015, 
the Europe 2020 Strategy is implemented and monitored through the European 
Semester.77 The European Semester is a governance architecture for open 
coordination. Chapter 6 will describe how the European Semester may have a 
political effect on the domestic level in respect to the CRPD provisions. 
 
71 EU Commission Communication, COM (2003) 650 Para 4.1.2. 
72 European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 Para 2.2.4. 
73 ‘EESC Opinion: European Disability Strategy 2010-2020’ (European Economic and Social 
Committee 2011) SOC/403 para 1.2 <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-
information-reports/opinions/european-disability-strategy-2010-2020> accessed 4 March 
2019. 
74 EU Commission Communication, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth 2011 (COM(2010) 2020 final [OJ C 88/27]). 
75 ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-
monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-
strategy_en> accessed 4 March 2019. 
76 ‘Mastering Economic Interdependence: Commission Proposes Reinforced Economic 
Governance in the EU’ (European Commission, 12 May 2010) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_561> accessed 1 March 
2019. 
77 EU Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Since 2015, the 
implementation and monitoring of the Europe 2020 Strategy is part of the European 
Semester (COM/2015/0100 final). 
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 The political effects of the EU accession to the CRPD work through non-
binding processes as the institutional effects do as well. The question is: why 
using non-binding methods to implement an international human rights 
convention? There are two main reasons. The first reason is that political and 
institutional processes are law-making instruments, which means that legal 
provisions result from political and institutional processes. The second reason is 
that the EU does not have the competence to legislate on all the CRPD 
principles, which means that political and institutional processes need to 
substitute the legal provisions that the Union cannot emanate because of a lack 
of competence to do it. This issue of competence is investigated in the next 
section. 
2.4 The EU competence issue and the CRPD 
Like the EU, all the EU Member States are Parties to the CRPD.78 The common 
status of being Parties to the CRPD implies that the Union and its Member States 
are peers within the framework of the Convention. Being peers means that there 
is no hierarchy between them in this context, where they have a horizontal stance 
with respect to the CRPD.  
On the other hand, the EU and its Member States need to agree on the 
division of their competences concerning matters that are relevant to the 
implementation of the Convention itself.79 Generally speaking, the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States is stated in the EU 
Treaties, and it realises the so-called principle of conferral.80 As anticipated in 
the previous section, the EU cannot legislate on each topic of the Convention, 
and this section explains the legal reason for this. 
The EU Treaties confer the power of action in defined areas on either the 
EU or its Member States in either exclusive or shared prerogatives. However, 
the division of competences, as stated in the EU Treaties, widely covers limited 
areas, and it does not define their possible overlapping. For instance, the 
 
78 ‘Status of Treaties, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (n 29). 
79 Jennifer W Reiss, ‘Innovative Governance in a Federal Europe: Implementing the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Innovative Governance in a Federal 
Europe’ (2014) 20 European Law Journal 107, 114. 
80 TEU Artt 4-5; TFEU Part I Title I. 
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principle of non-discrimination has un uncertain competence because it is 
intersectional81 and transversal.82 This uncertainty means that the competence 
concerning the principle of non-discrimination (among others) is subject to 
interpretation. Ultimately, the European Court of Justice is in charge of 
guaranteeing univocal interpretations.83 
Article 44 CRPD includes an attempt to clarify the question of competences 
when it asks its Parties to “declare […] the extent of their competence with 
respect to matters governed by the present Convention”. As a consequence, the 
EU elaborated a Declaration of Competence,84 formalising the conclusion of the 
Convention as a mixed agreement.85 
“When participating in ‘mixed’ agreements […] the Union and its Member 
States are subject to a duty of sincere cooperation”.86 Sincere cooperation is a 
legal duty stated in the EU Treaties.87 Therefore, the Code of Conduct’s88 
reference to coordination may aim to manage the sincere cooperation between 
the EU and its Member States in implementing the CRPD. In addition, the Code 
of Conduct explains that two goals of such sincere cooperation are: (i) the 
elaboration of common positions about CRPD issues;89 and (ii) the co-working 
on monitoring and reporting.90 
At the time of writing this thesis, the mentioned Declaration of Competence 
is under revision by the EU Commission because the CRPD Committee asked 
 
81 Dagmar Schiek and Anna Lawson (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and 
Intersectionality: Investigating the Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination 
(Ashgate 2011). 
82 Sylvaine Laulom, ‘French Legal Approaches to Equality and Discrimination for Intersecting 
Grounds in Employment Relations’ in Dagmar Schiek and Victoria Chege (eds), European 
Union non-discrimination law: comparative perspectives on multidimensional equality law 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2008) 283. 
83 TEU Art 19. 
84 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Annex II. 
85 Reiss (n 79) 112; Lisa Waddington, ‘The European Union and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared 
Competences’ (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 431, 438. 
86 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
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87 TEU Art 4.3. 
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to update such a document.91 The review of the Declaration of Competence 
should have been submitted one year after the publication of the CRPD 
Committee Concluding Observations.92 However, the revised document was still 
not provided at the time of conducting this research because the “discussion will 
imply longer time than the year given for reporting”, as an EU Commission officer 
publicly declared.93 An informant of this research revealed that a draft of the 
revised document was circulating, but it was informal and difficult to define. 
Indeed, the division of competences deals with the constitutional Treaties of the 
EU, and their re-discussion must involve all the EU Member States, which should 
act unanimously to decide on them. Therefore, any matter that consists of the 
division of competences between the EU and its Member States is a delicate 
issue. 
The Convention to which the EU has acceded includes issues that are 
outside the competences of the Union itself, notably those that touch social 
policies. Despite this, the EU made no official reservations due to competence 
issues when concluding the CRPD.94 Therefore, the EU is committed to the 
whole Convention insofar as it has the competence to take action, as made it 
clear in the Declaration of Competence. Therefore, the only way to meet its 
duties is to face the competence issue somehow. This thesis assumes that the 
EU promotes its institutional and political opportunities to implement the 
Convention when the conferral limits its legal opportunities to do that. It also 
explains that the EU works in this direction by exercising influence on the 
implementation of the CRPD. 
To conclude, the division of competences between the EU and its Member 
States is defined in the EU Treaties. These also state a duty to sincerely 
cooperate in working on those areas that flow from the EU values although 
having uncertain competence. Therefore, it might be useful to explore both the 
principle of sincere cooperation and the opportunity to interpret the conferral.    
 
 
91 ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the European Union’ (n 61) para 17. 
92 ibid 90. 
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2.4.1 The duty of sincere cooperation 
As illustrated above, the EU and its Member States concluded the CRPD as a 
mixed agreement. This definition entails that the Convention touches areas that 
are subject to different levels of competence. In theory, this means that the EU 
and its Member States can take action only in those areas where they have or 
share competence. In reality, since they ratified the CRPD and share the 
commitment to implementing the Convention, “pursuant to the principle of 
sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual 
respect, assist each other”.95 
 The ECJ linked the principle of sincere cooperation to the correct 
implementation of mixed agreements. For instance, it stated that “this duty of 
genuine cooperation is of general application and does not depend […] on 
competence”.96 This seems to mean that, despite the conferral, the EU and its 
Member States have to cooperate in issues concerning the EU’s international 
representation.97 
 Van Elsuwege suggested that the duty of sincere cooperation entails 
positive and negative obligations insofar as the EU Member States should: (i) 
take actions that are consistent with the policies of the Union; and (ii) refrain from 
actions that put into question the policies of the EU.98 There is a kind of effect 
utile aiming at promoting the legal personality of the Union.99 In turn, the loyalty 
of the EU Member States may cause a competence creep because their 
behaviour is affected by EU actions despite any conferral issue.100 
 As illustrated above, the Union drew up a Declaration of Competence and 
a Code of Conduct. While the former strictly addresses the principle of the 
conferral, the latter seems to focus on the principle of sincere cooperation. The 
Code of Conduct emphasises the establishment of common positions as a 
crucial factor of the cooperation between the EU and its Member States. These 
 
95 TEU Art 4.3. 
96 Commission v Germany [2005] ECJ Case C-433/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:462 [64]. 
97 Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘The Duty of Sincere Cooperation and Its Implications for Autonomous 
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should be consistent when implementing mixed agreements by sharing the 
fundamental values and aims of the ratified treaties.  
Regardless of the competence on specific matters, the Union and its 
Member States have to work in the same direction when implementing mixed 
agreements. This entails that they have to coordinate their policies in order to 
avoid contradictions and pursue consistent courses at the international level. 
This coordination results from soft processes that supplement the policy-making 
arena of the Union and national governments. For instance, Chapter 4 illustrates 
several situations that aim to reach common positions, as emerged during the 
analysis of the EU CRPD monitoring framework and COHOM. 
The doctrines of mixed agreements and shared competences are 
separate, although interrelated. For instance, the CRPD is not a mixed 
agreement in itself, but the EU and its Member States ratified the Convention as 
a mixed agreement because it includes areas with a concurrent jurisdiction 
based on the competences that sovereign states conferred on the Union. This 
entails that a mixed agreement includes shared competence areas, as the CRPD 
includes independent living rights.  
As Waddington explained about the CRPD, the definition of the legal 
predominance (between the EU and its Member States) in shared competence 
areas might be a complex exercise involving several variables.101 However, the 
principle of sincere cooperation bypasses this complexity because of fostering 
soft processes aiming at finding accord on the actions to pursue. The thesis 
explains that the establishment of soft processes based on cooperation is a 
deliberate strategy of the Union to implement the CRPD and independent living 
rights.  
Even though sincere cooperation might lead to desired outcomes, it 
cannot substitute the conferral although supplementing it. For this reason, the 
next sub-section focuses on how competences can be interpreted.  
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2.4.2 The interpretation of EU competences 
The Council Decision on the conclusion of the CRPD states that “competences 
are, by their nature, subject to continuous development”.102 Therefore, any doubt 
on the conferral is subject to interpretation, and this interpretation gives way to 
the continuous development of the competences. As such, it seems interesting 
to understand how competences may be interpreted. Also in this case, it is 
possible to distinguish between legal discourses and institutional-political 
ones.103 
The legal discourse about the interpretation of EU competences concerns 
the action of the ECJ. When the Court decides on EU competences, it gives 
interpretations that expand the meaning of the Treaties’ articles that deal with 
the principle of the conferral.104 This situation has been already introduced in 
Section 2.2 when describing how human rights issues entered in the EU legal 
framework. In brief, the ECJ cannot alter the competences that are stated in the 
Treaties, because only the EU Member States can modify the EU primary 
legislation. However, the ECJ applies a kind of competence creep that may 
expand the action of any EU competence through its interpretation.105 Any 
understanding of the conferral made by the Court is legally binding and 
represents a development of the EU competences. 
The described action of the ECJ is very straightforward as the Court 
decides whether the EU has the competence on specific matters or not. Usually, 
the EU and its Member States find agreement on the limits of their competences 
without complaining to the ECJ. For instance, in areas of shared competence, 
the EU Member States might act: (i) individually; (ii) collectively; or (iii) with the 
EU.106 In shared competence areas, the interpretation of the conferral starts at 
institutional and political levels because the EU and its Member States agree on 
common courses of action. Such agreements limit uncertainty and allow them to 
take action. Therefore, it would be incorrect to label the uncertainty of the 
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conferral with a negative stance only. In fact, this thesis looks at uncertainty as 
a prerequisite to adopting governance processes that somehow complement and 
substitute the legal rigidness of the conferral. Section 3.4 will theoretically explain 
this idea. 
The EU Declaration of Competence includes a brief explanation of the 
shared competence issue. It states that: (i) on those matters that affect common 
rules the EU has exclusive competence; (ii) on those matters that affect minimum 
standards the EU Member States have competence although the EU is free to 
act; and (iii) on the other matters the EU Member States have competence.107 
These three points establish a sort of priority to govern the matters of shared 
competence included in the CRPD. As a consequence, the interpretation of 
different issues as governed by either common rules or minimum standards is 
essential development of the EU competences, as Waddington explained.108 
In addition to this, following Cremona, further two key points are useful to 
understand the nature of any shared competence matter. The first key point is 
the existence of relevant legislation.109 This circumstance means that: (i) in the 
absence of EU legislation, the EU Member States have competence on any topic 
in respect of the principle of subsidiarity;110 however (ii) in the absence of national 
legislation, the EU may occupy the field to fill a legislative vacuum. The second 
key point is the existence of EU objectives on the matter itself. In this case, the 
competence of the EU increases as much as needed for achieving the relevant 
targets. This situation reflects the so-called effect utile111 that derives from the 
principle of proportionality.112 
The concepts mentioned above (common rules versus minimum standards, 
and subsidiarity versus proportionality) coexist in a concurrent and dynamic 
dimension. As Craig explained, while a rigid conferral produces hard hierarchy, 
a flexible competence concurrence produces flexible governance. While the 
former would tend to uniform, the latter would aim to harmonise the domestic 
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levels of the EU Member States.113 This means that cooperation is the basis of 
shared-competence matters.114 As a consequence, the power balance in shared-
competence issues depends on the cooperation between the EU and its Member 
States. 
To give an example, national legislations concerning persons with 
disabilities did not consider anti-discrimination approaches when the EU 
declared it was a goal of its policies. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
the EU commitment to disability rights includes four periods. While the first two 
periods were merely cooperative, the last two were based on primary law 
principles. Such principles fall under shared competences mainly. In 
implementing them, the establishment of strategies represents an exercise to 
share minimum standards. Following these strategies, the ratification of relevant 
EU secondary law represents an exercise to set common rules. Therefore, there 
is a sequence from cooperation, to minimum standards, to common rules. This 
sequence moves the predominance on matters of shared competence towards 
the EU.  
Once the EU has established common rules on specific matters, the EU 
Member States may complain before the ECJ against the competence of the EU 
to act in that direction. Due to the mentioned effect utile, the ECJ tends to expand 
the action of the EU itself.115 For this reason, the legal appeals of the EU Member 
States may finish with them losing any competence in the matter at stake. This 
possibility could be the reason why the EU Member States prefer to maintain 
shared competence matters within the political sphere. To do this, they may try 
to balance the EU’s attempt to establish its predominance with their effort to 
preserve a certain level of independence. This political game takes place in the 
soft governance of the EU. 
To conclude, the competences concerning the CRPD provisions are mainly 
shared between the EU and its Member States, notably in areas of social policy. 
Where existing EU law touches such provisions, the EU has a predominant 
competence. Where no EU law is active, the EU Member States should legislate 
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on the matter at stake, following the subsidiarity principle. When this is the case, 
the EU seems not to be obliged to take any initiative. However, the EU shows 
the tendency to pre-empt its Member States action to lead harmonisation 
processes.116 This pre-emption has to respect the balance of powers between 
the EU Member States subsidiarity prerogative and the EU harmonisation goal. 
Such means include the use of coordination and governance instruments that 
substitute legally binding provisions. This thesis evidences how the EU can 
implement international human rights with governance processes. The 
explanation focuses on the EU implementation of the CRPD and independent 
living rights. Their implementation is mainly shared between the EU and its 
Member States. 
2.5 The shared competence on Article 19 CRPD 
The EU Commission stated that the “EU competence for the promotion of 
independent living and inclusion in the community is shared with the Member 
States”.117 Parker and Bulic suggested that the extent of this sharing should be 
somehow put into practice to be understood.118 This is because shared 
competence matters need detailed guidelines that clarify the duties of the EU 
and those of the EU Member States. 
 In its report to the CRPD Committee, the EU Commission emphasised the 
role of the ESI Funds to support the transition from institutions to community-
based services.119 Since a legal provision includes the principle of this 
transition,120 it might be classified as a common rule with the predominant 
competence of the EU. However, it is crucial to understand this issue properly. 
The point is that the EU has put into place norms that try to exclude the possibility 
that the EU Member States use EU money to institutionalise people. This 
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situation is very different from saying that the EU prohibits its Member States 
from developing institutions. In other words, the EU cannot prohibit its Member 
States from developing institutions; therefore, the EU needs alternative means 
to harmonise its Member States’ policies against the development of institutions. 
In this context, the EU Ombudsman affirmed that “the fact that the 
Commission is not directly responsible for managing the funds should never be 
used as a reason for not acting if fundamental rights have been, or risk being 
violated”.121 As the EU has full competence in the use of EU money, it is 
responsible for how this is expended. If any EU Member State used EU money 
to finance institutions, the Union would risk being indirectly in breach of Article 
19 CRPD. Thus, to respect the Convention, the EU needs to guarantee that no 
EU money would be spent to finance institutions. In doing this, the EU would 
indirectly influence its Member States on finding alternatives to institutions. 
However, the competence to decide on institutions remains with the EU Member 
States. 
For this reason, the CRPD Committee, in its 2015 Concluding Observations 
on the EU, did not recommend the Union to forbid institutions, but it underlined 
the direct responsibility on the use of ESI Funds.122 The Committee knew that 
the EU cannot coerce its Member States into closing institutions, and it 
suggested to “guide and foster deinstitutionalisation” by making sure that no EU 
money is spent in the wrong way. This complex architecture summarises very 
well the difficulty of dealing with shared competence matters, but it also 
demonstrates how resourceful and creative the EU can be in getting around 
these rules. Also, it is necessary to remember that the ESI Funds themselves 
are subject to shared management, and this aspect further complicates the 
picture. A more in-depth analysis of the ESI Funds opportunities to influence the 
CRPD implementation is included in Chapter 6. 
Also the principle of personal assistance concerns Article 19 CRPD. 
Despite this, the EU Commission’s position is that “EU law does not directly 
address the issue of personal assistance schemes, which are a matter of national 
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competence”.123 It follows that Article 19 is subject to different levels of 
competence sharing. Indeed, the CRPD Committee did not make observations 
on the EU with respect to personal assistance. It is interesting that the CRPD 
Committee Concluding Observation on the EU emphasised deinstitutionalisation 
rather than personal assistance, although the latter is explicitly mentioned in 
Article 19 CRPD while the former is not. There may have been either a matter of 
priority or a pure question of competence. 
The previous section described the competence issue that derives from the 
EU conclusion of the CRPD, this section has focused on the difficulty to 
understand the legal extent of the shared competence on Article 19, and the next 
section will describe the relevance of independent living rights in the EU.  
2.6 Independent living rights in the EU 
This section contextualises independent living rights in the EU area, intending to 
show that it is vital that the Union engages with their implementation. Concerning 
independent living, Ratzka suggested that “no piece of legislation by itself will 
automatically guarantee our equal rights unless each of us in his or her everyday 
life actively claims and uses these rights”.124 For this reason, the section explores 
the pragmatic situation of independent living rights in the EU. The aim is to reveal 
that their realisation matters to persons, and it is not only a legal and competence 
issue. 
 During the 1970s in the US, the Independent Living Movement first started 
to claim the right to independence for persons with disabilities.125 Ten years later, 
that movement inspired the increasing activism of the European civil society. In 
April 1989, the first European Independent Living Conference took place in 
Brussels.126 After some decade of activism, by 2010, the European Independent 
Living Movement was a consolidated reality.127  
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As Gillinson, Green, and Miller explained, “independent living is a 
philosophy; a manifesto for empowerment, self-determination and self-fulfilment; 
and a way of being”.128 This means that such an abstract concept needs to be 
translated into practical terms. For this reason, ENIL listed pragmatic pillars “that 
are necessary to fully achieve independent living”.129 Those pillars have in 
common that institutionalised persons can achieve none of them. For this 
reason, the CRPD Committee clarified that deinstitutionalisation, although not 
mentioned in the CRPD, is the necessary prerequisite to fulfil independent living 
rights.130 
 Deinstitutionalisation is a negative right, in the sense that governments 
cannot institutionalise people. However, the fulfilment of independent living rights 
needs also positive actions, such as the creation of personal assistance services. 
Deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance are the two topics of the 
independent living principle on which this research focuses in order to find real 
examples of EU influences. The following sub-sections will describe the situation 
of these two topics in the EU. 
2.6.1 Deinstitutionalisation in the EU 
ENIL defines deinstitutionalisation as “a political and a social process, which 
provides for the shift from institutional care and other isolating and segregating 
settings to independent living”.131 The thesis adheres to this definition.  
Deinstitutionalisation is a recent priority in the EU area. As Mansell stated, 
“in Europe, residential institutions have been the typical response to the needs 
of disabled people needing accommodation and assistance [outside family 
support] with daily living since the early 19th Century”.132 In the meantime, civil 
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society movements have positively increased their pressure on institutions with 
regards to decision-making processes.133 Finally, it is necessary to enter into the 
new millennium to see a consolidated widespread interest in the matter. 
 Following the impetus of the 2003 European Year of People with 
Disabilities, the EU Commission funded a project that showed, among other 
findings, that few data were available about the multitude of institutions across 
Europe.134 This project raised awareness of a dramatic situation that was mostly 
unknown and would have required further urgent studies.135 Due to this reported 
and concerning status, the EU Commission included deinstitutionalisation in its 
2003 Action Plan.136 The first consistent action was the launch of another project 
named “Included in Society”. This project aimed to collect data to have a more 
precise situation about institutionalised people in Europe.137 
 The project included two action points. The first action point was the 
introduction of standard definitions to simplify data comparison. The second 
action point was a shared classification of the reasons why people were 
institutionalised. The realisation of these two action points involved European 
bodies, civil society experts, and national governments.138 
 The report of the project was published in 2007, and it showed that 1.2 
million persons with disabilities were living in residential establishments in 24 EU 
Member States (out of 27) plus Turkey. Several countries did not have any data 
to submit. Such shortage was reported about the data on: (i) the 
establishments;139 (ii) the age of the institutionalised persons;140 (iii) their 
gender;141 and (iv) their disabilities even.142 
 
Report_for_Web.pdf> accessed 10 October 2018. 
133 ibid. 
134 ‘Included in Society - Results and Recommendations of the European Research Initiative 
on Community-Based Residential Alternatives for Disabled People’ (EU Commission 
2003) 28 <http://www.enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ECCL_Included-in-Society.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2018. 
135 ibid 32. 
136 EU Commission Communication, COM (2003) 650 6. 
137 Mansell and others (n 134) 3. 
138 ibid 11. 
139 ibid 26. 
140 ibid 27. 
141 ibid 28. 
142 ibid 29. 
 
 
 56 
 The EU, by commissioning the mentioned research, allowed revealing a 
widespread situation of segregation, which was mostly unknown. The mediation 
of the EU brought the issue on the table. Even with no competence to directly 
legislate on the matter, the EU enabled private professionals to collected and 
disseminated concerning data as a consequence of which deinstitutionalisation 
has become an EU priority. 
Despite this, recent research revealed that institutionalisation was a 
common practice in several EU Member States. For instance, Bulgaria was 
improving the quality of institutions instead of funding community-based 
services, and this policy increased the residential care beneficiaries of 25%.143 
Similarly, Slovenia established a national programme on personalised funding to 
foster deinstitutionalisation,144 which aimed to support institutions’ residents in 
reality.145 
 Often, the inconsistency between national legislation and its local 
implementation prevents effective deinstitutionalisation policies. There are 
concerns about this issue for Finland146 and Sweden,147 for instance. This issue 
may also result in governments submitting national monitoring reports that do 
not represent the local situation.148 Also FRA stated that “the absence of 
coordination [among the different levels] can be a major barrier to the 
implementation of effective deinstitutionalisation”.149 
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 Institutionalisation is a national competence, but it is an EU matter as well. 
In fact, although committed to raising awareness on the issue, the EU indirectly 
supported institutionalisation. This incoherence derived from the use of ESI 
Funds by national governments to either renovate or build institutions during the 
financial period 2007/13.150 
 Also FRA emphasised the importance of ESI Funds for promoting 
deinstitutionalisation policies. In its 2017 reports, the Agency highlighted that 12 
EU Member States stated their commitment against institutionalisation due to 
the new ESI Funds Regulation’s dispositions.151  
Besides, FRA revealed that several EU Member States adopted national 
strategies that include measures against institutionalisation. However, the 
Agency expressed concerns about these strategies as well as the absence of 
coordination and monitoring.152 For instance, institutions are still a national 
choice in Slovakia and Sweden,153 while Denmark and Hungary show ongoing 
re-institutionalisation processes.154 
 Ten years after Mansell’s report, FRA showed that EU citizens still lived 
in institutions and that several major problems were unchanged, among which 
the difficulties to collect data and develop common policies. On the other hand, 
FRA also mentioned positive examples such as Finland and Bulgaria, which 
closed 25 institutions for children.155 
 It happens that the lack of alternatives to institutions may force persons in 
need to choose institutions as the place where to live.156 In addition, even when 
people do not live in institutions, but they are isolated from society with limited 
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control over their lives, they may be defined as institutionalised.157 These 
considerations underline the need for alternatives to institutions to fulfil 
independent living rights. Personal assistance services represent one of these 
alternatives. Their situation in the EU is described in the next sub-section. 
2.6.2 Personal assistance in the EU 
The CRPD Committee stated that “personal assistance refers to person-
directed/‘user’-led human support available to a person with disability and is a 
tool for independent living”.158 The thesis adheres to this definition. 
Article 19 CRPD includes negative and positive rights.159 Generally 
speaking, negative rights are immediately applicable, while positive rights are 
subject to progressive realisation.160 With regard to independent living, positive 
rights should guarantee adequate community-based services that substitute 
institution-based services. Article 19 CRPD states that community-based 
services include “personal assistance necessary to support living and inclusion 
in the community, and to prevent isolation or segregation from the community”. 
Also FRA classified community-based services as: (i) personal assistance 
services; (ii) physical adjustments; and (iii) assistive devices.161 
 The medical approach to disability looked at the institutionalisation of 
persons with disabilities as a correct solution for them. This misconception 
caused social inaccessibility and the absence of alternatives because the 
available resources were invested in institutions. For this reason, it is incorrect 
to state that institutions were the answer to social inaccessibility and the absence 
of alternatives. The CRPD now recognises a human rights approach to disability. 
This approach requires personal-assistance measures that respect the 
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independence of individuals. As the independence of persons starts in the places 
where they live, and since these places should not be institutions, personal 
assistance services should include both home and community services. The 
availability of these services measures the possibility for people with disabilities 
to live within their chosen environment maintaining control over their life.162 
 Personal assistance is not a defined service; instead, it refers to a whole 
system to provide and receive services. Personal assistance is the result of an 
interaction between the provider and the receiver, where the latter has full control 
over the provided services. Personal assistance “means the user is customer or 
boss”.163 Personal assistance schemes may require that: (i) services are not 
standardised; (ii) people can access services, including economic and logistic 
issues; and (iii) services are designed to be enjoyed actively within the 
community.164 Central is the possibility of choice for the individual. While the 
medical model caused passive attitudes, the possibility to choose fosters 
proactive feelings.165 The possibility to choose makes persons with disabilities 
individuals and active citizens, in antithesis with the active paternalism of 
states.166 In the context of personal assistance, citizens can be active individuals 
in three different ways: (i) they need to do something to receive services; (ii) they 
are empowered to organise their services; and (iii) they are emancipated 
struggling for their self-determination.167  
Askheim suggested that personal assistance “is the child of the 
Independent Living movement”.168 This has fostered solutions to allow persons 
with disabilities to live independently in the society, among which personal 
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assistance services. Due to the duty to close institutions in order to fulfil Article 
19 CRPD, personal assistance services might increase while institutions 
decrease. In addition, personal assistance services should be present before the 
closure of any institution in order to avoid any gap in delivering services for 
people in need.169 
 Therefore, if personal assistance services should be available before the 
closure of any institution, the initial investment in personal assistance services 
would be simultaneous with the temporary maintenance of the institutions that 
host persons.170 Usually, the cost of institutions puts a burden on public finances. 
These might also sustain the transition from institutions to community services 
through a critical economic effort. This aspect may be a barrier or an excuse for 
national governments to avoid the mentioned transition.171 On the other hand, it 
may represent an opportunity for the EU to intervene in national and local matters 
providing economic support. 
Also the private sector may be fostered to enter into this new market, and 
it would support the transition and erode the public monopoly on disability-related 
services.172 However, while the private sector may improve personal assistance 
services for persons with disabilities, it might be too market-oriented with the risk 
to be not as socially-supportive as public schemes.173 Indeed, this process would 
involve a different approach to welfare, which needs a different relationship with 
public and private service providers.174 Also in this case, the EU may give its 
support by providing guidelines. Besides, looking at personal assistance services 
as a market opportunity could increase the competence of the Union, offering a 
new perspective to the development of community services. 
As FRA ascertained, EU data on personal assistance services are 
challenging to find and compare.175 This difficulty causes issues in monitoring 
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the correct implementation of Article 19. Despite this, FRA suggested that “some 
form of personal assistance is available in 22 Member States”.176 Also, the 
Agency stated that persons with disabilities firmly ask for more personal 
assistance services.177 This situation means that the Union may have room to 
take action. For instance, the EU Commission finances the Academic Network 
of European Disability Experts (ANED), which collects data on personal 
assistance in its annual country reports.178 The 2019 synthesis report “about the 
progress being made across Europe to respect, protect and ensure the rights of 
persons with disabilities to live independently and to be included in the 
community”179 includes an overview of personal assistance schemes developed 
at the national and local levels.180  
To conclude, the positive and progressive realisation of the right to access 
personal assistance services seems more articulated than the negative and 
immediate obligation to close institutions. Although not exhaustive, these two 
sub-sections revealed that the EU started its deinstitutionalisation policies in 
2003, but its commitment to personal assistance services is still embryonic at the 
time of conducting this research. Despite this, the Union can occupy a field in 
which the national and local levels have difficulties to invest. 
These considerations suggest that the analysis of the research may find 
more evidence about EU influences on deinstitutionalisation than on personal 
assistance. On one hand, this would be coherent with the narrative of this 
section. On the other hand, it would mean that the transition from institutions to 
community-based services risks to be unbalanced and not as effective, as a 
consequence. This assumption will be verified in the analytical chapters of the 
thesis.  
 
 
176 FRA (n 157) 20. 
177 ibid 22. 
178 ‘Countries’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) <https://www.disability-
europe.net/country> accessed 1 July 2019. 
179 Neil Crowther, ‘The Right to Live Independently and to Be Included in the Community in 
European States - ANED Synthesis Report’ (The Academic Network of European 
Disability experts 2019) 4 <https://www.disability-europe.net/downloads/1040-task-year-4-
2018-19-policy-theme-il-synthesis-report> accessed 1 August 2019. 
180 ibid 51. 
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2.7 Concluding remarks 
This background chapter explored the topics underpinning the research design, 
and it showed their importance. Their relevance arises from three main aspects: 
(i) internationality; (ii) timing; and (iii) impact. In fact, this thesis concerns the 
current relationship between the international, EU, and national-local levels that 
influences the individuals’ fulfilment of their independent living rights. 
 These topics are significant also to the contemporary academic and socio-
political debates. For instance, although long-time debated, there are still 
uncertainties about the opportunity for the EU to accede to the ECHR.181 As 
known, the presence of a Court is an essential difference between the ECHR 
and the CRPD. However, this thesis focuses on the EU opportunities to 
implement international human rights with means that are different from the 
recourse to hard enforcement. This is an alternative perspective to consider the 
EU contribution to the realisation of international human rights that goes beyond 
the presence of any Court. 
 For this reason, the theoretical understanding of the possibilities to 
implement international law without hard instruments is a cornerstone of this 
thesis. Such an understanding is provided in the next chapter, which theoretically 
explains how the EU could use non-coercive means to reach its citizens with its 
human rights policies. 
 
 
181 Rafał Mańko, ‘EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)’ 
(European Parliament 2017) PE 607.298 7 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/607298/EPRS_BRI(2017)607
298_EN.pdf> accessed 25 March 2019. 
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Chapter 3  
The theoretical framework of the thesis 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the contemporary international situation about 
the EU opportunity to implement international human rights. In short, these are 
fulfilled by individuals, but the Union does not have all the legal competences it 
needs to reach its citizens with its human rights policies. 
 Section 2.3 inferred that the EU has the opportunity to implement the 
CRPD through three kinds of instruments: (i) legal; (ii) institutional; and (iii) 
political. The Union does not have the necessary competences to legislate on 
the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. This limitation 
suggests that the EU may use institutional and political instruments instead. 
These alternative instruments enhance the exercise of influencing processes. 
This chapter aims to introduce these influencing processes theoretically. 
 Section 1.3.4 suggested that this multidisciplinary study should have 
adopted a pluralistic approach to replying to its research question. This is 
because the question stimulates an explanation of a social situation that may 
have different theoretical interpretations. For this reason, this theoretical chapter 
includes and links different academic areas developing a peculiar explicative 
framework. The theoretical framework of the thesis explores four macro-areas 
that are originally linked to one another: (i) power theories; (ii) soft law; (iii) 
experimentalist governance; and (iv) international networks. Each of these is 
investigated in a dedicated section. 
 Section 3.2 includes a dense review of power theories’ classic authors. 
The theories addressed the concepts of power and influence with different 
perspectives that share the attention to several topics, among which coercion. 
The section introduces the original assumption that influence is like power 
without coercion. Also, it theoretically explains how influence can be exercised.  
The emphasis on coercion summarises the dichotomy between soft and 
hard power. Section 3.3 reveals the increasing importance of soft power 
(influence) in the international sphere. This is because international relations are 
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horizontal situations between sovereign governments, which influence one 
another using different strategies as the emanation of international agreements. 
UN human rights conventions are examples of international agreements. 
Their implementation requires soft influencing instruments, among which 
governance processes. Section 3.4 illustrates that both the EU and the CRPD 
develop governance processes. It also reveals that these processes are similar 
to the theoretically introduced experimentalist governance. 
International relations and governance systems have one common factor: 
they network different entities. For this reason, Section 3.5 depicts the 
influencing characteristics of international networks. It introduces the hypothesis 
that the world’s architecture is evolving from hard and vertical to soft and 
horizontal. 
Figure 3-1 - Visual content chart of Chapter 3 
3.2 Influence and power 
This research aims to show EU opportunities for implementing international 
human rights through means that are different from hard law. Thus, influence is 
a crucial concept of the thesis. For this reason, this section includes a theoretical 
study of influence as defined by power theories. 
Lukes stated that power is an “essentially contested concept”.1 The 
literature review included in this section confirms his statement. As such, the 
assumption that influence is like power without coercion will find theoretical 
verification from the critical comparative analysis of several classic authors. 
 
 
 
1 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 30. 
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3.2.1 A definition for influence 
The concepts of influence and power are part of the same academic debate. For 
instance, Wrong said that influence might be seen as interchangeable with 
power.2 On the other hand, Lasswell and Kaplan suggested that power is a form 
of intended influence,3 which is linked to social behaviours.4 Differently, Lukes 
thought that power includes influence.5 In detail, this author introduced a 
difference between power and coercion. Therefore, if power includes influence, 
then influence excludes coercion.6 His consideration moves from Bachrach and 
Baratz, stating that influence exists where A, “without resorting to either a tacit 
or an overt threat of severe deprivation, causes B to change his course of 
action”.7 
While the conceptual difference between influence and power has several 
interpretations, at least one common factor between the two concepts seems 
accepted by several authors: the link with social changes. For instance, Nye did 
not distinguish influence from power and said they represent “the capacity to do 
things and in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want”.8 
Already Foucault suggested that “the exercise of power […] is a way in which 
certain actions modify others”.9 Even, Wrong reminded that also a classic like 
Weber had linked power to the capacity to make social changes.10 Lastly, Lukes 
recalled Scott to suggest that also the capacity to resist a social change can be 
interpreted as an exercise of influence/power.11  
This review is the basis of the original definition of influence that has been 
developed for this thesis:  
 
2 Dennis H Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Blackwell 1979) 4; Joseph S Nye, The 
Future of Power (1st edn, PublicAffairs 2011) 6. 
3 H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan as quoted in: Wrong (n 2) 21. 
4 ibid 6–10; Keith M Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power (Edward Elgar 1991) 23–29. 
5 Steven Lukes, ‘Power’ (2007) 6 Contexts 59. 
6 Lukes (n 1) 21. 
7 Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (Oxford 
University Press 1970) 30. 
8 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 6. 
9 Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (1982) 8 Critical Inquiry 777, 788. 
10 Max Weber as quoted in: Wrong (n 2) 21. 
11 Lukes (n 5) 59. 
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the exercise of influence is the capacity to make or resist a social 
change without the use of coercive means.  
This definition of influence complements the contents of the previous two 
chapters and explains what the research is seeking. In detail, Section 2.3 
suggested that the EU has the opportunity to implement the CRPD through legal, 
institutional, and political processes. Legal processes are typical coercive 
instruments. Thus, they exercise power. Institutional and political processes use 
means that are not coercive. Hence, they exercise influence. As a consequence, 
the research seeks examples of EU institutional and political processes that can 
change the social situation of independent living rights. 
3.2.2 Influence as a matter of social sciences 
The definition to make or resist a change can define power in the natural 
sciences as well as in the social sciences. Lukes quoted a classic like Aristotle 
pointing out that “unlike natural powers, such as the power of fire to burn wood, 
there are human powers that are typically ‘two-way powers, powers which can 
be exercised at will’”.12 In fact, natural sources of power cannot choose their 
courses of action. On the other hand, human beings can choose to act in order 
to obtain or resist a change. Weber said that “an Action is ‘social’ if the acting 
individual takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its 
course”.13 It follows that the definition to make or resist a change addresses 
social sciences when it reflects a relationship between human beings. This 
consideration explains the social approach of the research. 
In sum, the exercise of influence is a social relationship between an agent, 
who wants a specific outcome, and a target, whose change is the outcome the 
agent wants.14 Therefore, there is no influence without a relationship. As such, 
the only way to exercise influence is to establish any social relationship. 
Influencing relationships start because an agent wants a change that involves a 
target. The concepts of these two paragraphs entail that the exercise of influence 
is intentional. 
 
12 Lukes (n 1) 71. 
13 Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology (Owen 1962). 
14 Wrong (n 2) 3–5; Foucault (n 9) 788. Other authors prefer the dichotomy principal/subaltern. 
However, the terms agent and target seem to better represent the situation in which a 
social actor can choose specific courses of action to make or resist changes. 
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The idea of intentionality is controversial because it may link influence with 
its effective exercise. For instance, Foucault operated a classification of social 
situations before stating that “power exists only when it is put into action”.15 On 
the other hand, Lukes talked about an “exercise fallacy” when theorising power 
as a dispositional concept.16 However, intentionality and effectivity are detached 
concepts. While agents and targets can intentionally choose to exercise 
influence, the effectiveness of their action may depend on the others’ action. 
Despite this, one active influence always results from influencing relationships: 
either that of the agent making changes or that of the target resisting changes. 
This idea is summarised by the original figure below. 
Figure 3-2 - The social relationship of influence 
Scott thought that intentionality is a critical element of influence.17 In 
accord with him, this thesis refers to the intended social influence. This 
perspective collocates influence into a causal dimension where either an actor 
causes a change on another,18 or an actor resists a change another wants.19 As 
Bloom suggested, influence “and resistance commonly represent an ironically 
 
15 Foucault (n 9) 788. 
16 Lukes (n 5) 59. 
17 John Scott, Power (Polity 2001) 1–2. 
18 John Scott, ‘Power, Domination and Stratification: Towards a Conceptual Synthesis’ [2007] 
Sociologia, problemas e práticas 25, 1. 
19 Lukes (n 1) 69; Peter Bloom, ‘The Power of Safe Resistance’ (2013) 6 Journal of Political 
Power 219. 
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stable relationship”.20 Within such a relationship, agents and targets know their 
status. This is because only their consciousness confirms their intentionality to 
cause or resist a change. Also Lukes suggested that it should be better to talk 
about manipulation instead of influence when the target is unconsciously 
targeted and cannot choose to resist as a consequence.21 
Among others, Foucault underlined that agents and targets might be 
individuals as well as collective entities.22 Lukes specified that “the latter can be 
of many kinds: states, institutions, associations, alliances, social movements, 
groups, clubs and so on”.23 As individual and collective entities are aware of their 
status within an influencing relationship, they recognise themselves reciprocally. 
As Wrong suggested, this means the intended social influence does not cause 
loss of compliance between the actors involved in the relationship. He defined 
the relationship as “intensive” when agents and targets recognise the right of the 
counterpart to exercise influence.24 
The previous sub-section assumed that the EU could implement the 
CRPD and independent living rights when it develops institutional and political 
processes that influence the national and local levels. This sub-section has 
clarified that the research looks at institutional and political processes as 
relationships where agents and targets try to make or resist social changes. 
3.2.3 The social relationship of influence 
This sub-section investigates the characteristics of the causal relationship 
between agents and targets. MacIver wrote that “society is the system of social 
relationships in and through which we live”.25 In his book, he also explained that 
such a system is always changing. This thesis looks at influence as a specific 
kind of social relationship, and at the exercise of influence as an attempt to 
change society in the desired way. 
The exercise of influence to make or resist change is a course of action 
that is put into place by individuals and collective entities. These take advantage 
 
20 Bloom (n 19) 225. 
21 Lukes (n 1) 22. 
22 Dowding (n 4) 84; Foucault (n 9). 
23 Lukes (n 1) 72. 
24 Wrong (n 2) 14–21. 
25 Robert M MacIver, Society: A Textbook of Sociology (Farrar & Rinehart 1937) 18. 
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of opportunities to change the social environment in desired ways. For instance, 
such opportunities are identified by Lukes as social situations,26 and by Dowding 
as structures.27 Situations and structures allow and incentivise social actors to 
impose their will on the ongoing social evolution.28 This explanation is coherent 
with Nye suggesting that the study of influence might consider two issues: (i) 
what are the actors in the relationship; and (ii) what is the situation of the 
relationship.29 
Besides, the influencing relationship can be either direct or indirect: (i) it 
is direct when agents exercise their influence on targets; (ii) it is indirect when 
agents exercise influence on a third party that can influence the real targets. As 
Wrong suggested, the causalities within influencing relationships may be 
challenging to understand.30 Nye explained that such difficulty increases in the 
case of indirect relationships because their situations involve several variables.31 
Lastly, Dowding pointed out that the difficulty of quantifying influence is not a 
measure for its exercise.32 It follows that the presence of an influencing 
relationship is a sufficient condition to prove the presence of influence.  
The central role of the social relationship is supported by Clegg, saying 
that “power is not a thing: it is relational”.33 Therefore, the assumption that the 
EU tries to implement the CRPD making changes at the national and local levels 
implies by itself the presence of influencing relationships. For this reason, the 
thesis does not need to quantify influence to state its exercise; instead, it can just 
show the presence of influencing relationships in the context of the EU 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights to prove the exertion 
of influence. 
Nye explained that any social situation involves four variables: (i) the 
domain; (ii) the means; (iii) the place; and (iv) the time.34 Such variables include 
 
26 Lukes (n 1) 25–29. 
27 Dowding (n 4) 5–8. 
28 ibid 18. 
29 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 6. 
30 Wrong (n 2) 82–83. 
31 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 94–95. 
32 Dowding (n 4) 5; Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 81–82. 
33 Stewart Clegg, ‘Circuits of Power/Knowledge’ (2014) 7 Journal of Political Power 383. 
34 Joseph S Nye, The Future of Power (1st edn, PublicAffairs 2011) 7. 
 
 
 70 
the concept of resources that may be used to exercise influence.35 Resources 
reflect the capacity to influence. However, Lukes, Wrong, and Dowding pointed 
out that resources themselves do not guarantee any exercise36 of influence but 
only its latency37 and relevant dispositional properties.38 Foucault suggested that 
resources might be used with strategies to exercise intended social influence,39 
and Nye explained that such strategies have the precise aim to reach desired 
outcomes.40 Lastly, strategies move the action of any actor that wants to exercise 
influence to make or resist any social change.41 
 The elaboration of strategies may depend on the mentioned four 
variables. For instance, Saunders thought that the place of the actors is essential 
to define strategies, as actors may be inside or outside any social situation.42 
Depending on the place of the actors: (i) the domain of the outsiders is the 
situation they want to change in order to join it; and (ii) the domain of the insiders 
is a specific topic of the situation of which they are part. Dowding distinguished 
these two cases as situational and outcome strategies.43 Bearing in mind Figure 
1-2 and its Structure-Process-Outcome indicator framework, it can be assumed 
that situational strategies target structures while outcome strategies target 
processes. Only the effectivity of these two strategies can produce desired 
outcomes. 
 In this respect, an example (which is only a simplification of the real facts) 
may be useful to understand the issue. As an outsider, the EU persuaded the 
United Nations to include the possibility for regional integration organisations to 
conclude the CRPD in the Convention itself. As an insider, now that it is part of 
the structure of the CRPD, the Union can use its authority to influence the 
implementation of specific topics of the Convention. Building on this idea, the 
 
35 ibid 8; Dennis H Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Blackwell 1979) 125–145. 
36 Lukes (n 1) 41–44. 
37 Wrong (n 2) 125–130. 
38 Dowding (n 4) 4–5. 
39 Foucault (n 9) 793–795. 
40 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 8. 
41 Dowding (n 4) 23; Foucault (n 9) 788. 
42 Clare Saunders, ‘Insiders, Thresholders, and Outsiders in West European Global Justice 
Networks: Network Positions and Modes of Coordination’ (2014) 6 European Political 
Science Review 167. 
43 Dowding (n 4) 47–49. 
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next sub-section will investigate the difference between persuasion and 
authority. 
3.2.4 The exercise of influence through authority and strategies 
The previous sub-sections explained that influence is consciously exercised 
without coercion. Differently: without consciousness, there is the exercise of 
manipulation; and with coercion, there is the exercise of power. On the other 
hand, influence can be exercised through persuasion and authority.44 
The last paragraph of the previous sub-section showed a practical 
example that suggested a difference between persuasion and authority. Such 
example introduced two alternatives: (i) if the EU is party to an international 
human rights treaty, it can use its authority to implement the treaty; but (ii) if the 
EU is not party to an international human rights treaty, it might use its persuasion 
instead. Since this research investigates the EU opportunities for implementing 
a concluded international human rights treaty, it follows that authority might be 
the best strategy for the Union to implement the CRPD with non-coercive means.  
 As any power-related concept, the definition of authority is subject to 
different interpretations. For instance, Wrong suggested that authority can be 
exercised in five forms: (i) coercion; (ii) inducement; (iii) legitimation; (iv) 
competence; and (v) personality.45 This explanation means that authority can be 
an expression of both hard power and soft influence. However, the thesis is 
interested in influence only, thus in three forms of authority: (i) legitimation; (ii) 
competence; and (iii) personality.46 
 Besides, Nye suggested that influence can be exercised through the 
legitimacy and credibility of agents.47 He explained that these two characteristics 
are essential because targets are not coerced; therefore, the influencing 
relationship is based on these two pillars.48 Legitimacy is directly connected with 
the situation, whereas credibility is a characteristic of the actor that depends on 
resources like benignity, competence, and charisma.49 Nye stated that targets 
 
44 Wrong (n 2) 21–24. 
45 ibid 35–64. 
46 Dowding (n 4) 143–144. 
47 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 83, 103. 
48 ibid 84. 
49 ibid 92. 
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could be influenced by agents only when agents are legitimate and credible, and 
targets acknowledge their legitimation and credibility.50 
 The fact that social actors can use authority to exercise either power or 
influence suggests that the same resources can be used in different ways. Nye 
and Wrong suggested that: (i) resources that allow the exercise of hard power 
may be: (a) force, and (b) money; while (ii) resources that allow the exercise of 
soft power may be: (a) knowledge, (b) values, and (c) legitimacy,51 as well as (d) 
mobilisation,52 (e) skill monopoly,53 and (f) numbers.54 However, only the use of 
resources defines the hard or soft nature of their exercise.  
 Nye added that strategies define the use of resources.55 The author called 
“smart power” the ability to combine resources with the right strategy to achieve 
desired outcomes.56 The confidence in the available resources allows 
elaborating and realising smart strategies.57 Smart strategies follow a rational 
five-point scheme: (i) what the desired outcome is; (ii) what the resources and 
the situation are; (iii) what the position and preference of the target are; (iv) use 
of either hard or soft means; and (v) what the probability of success is.58 It should 
be evident that the use of strategies entails the intentionality of the action. Lastly, 
the use of smart strategies implies a certain kind of professionalisation to 
elaborate on the strategies themselves. 
 To conclude, Nye also suggested that authoritative strategies may aim at: 
commanding change,59 controlling agendas,60 and establishing preferences,61 
interests, and needs.62 In sum, the EU exercises its influence on the 
 
50 ibid 93. 
51 ibid 21–22. 
52 Wrong (n 2) 148; Dowding (n 4) 146. 
53 Wrong (n 2) 137. 
54 ibid 197. 
55 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 21–22. 
56 ibid 23, 207–208. 
57 ibid 24. 
58 ibid 208–209. 
59 ibid 11; Wrong (n 2) 128. 
60 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 12; Wrong (n 2) 129–130. 
61 Nye, The Future of Power (n 2) 11–13. 
62 Dowding (n 4) 30–46. 
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implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights when it puts into 
practice soft strategies that use authoritative resources. 
3.3 Influence and international soft law 
The previous section introduced an original meaning for influence. The thesis 
aims to show examples of EU efforts to implement the CRPD and independent 
living rights through influencing processes. These represent a soft (non-coercive) 
way to exercise power. For this reason, the thesis gives the same meaning to 
influence and soft power. 
 This section investigates the idea of soft when connected to international 
power and law. This investigation is necessary because it explains that soft 
processes have always been part of human society, but that the current 
international architecture is affecting the balance between soft and hard powers 
promoting the development of influencing processes. 
3.3.1 The “rise” of soft power 
Soft power is a concept introduced by Nye in 1990.63 In 2004, the author 
published a new book to enhance the concept, which is defined as “the ability to 
get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”.64 
Although the concept is recent, Nye pointed out that “Rome did not succumb to 
the rise of another empire”.65 This historical link means that the exercise of soft 
power is part of human history. As such, this sub-section does not describe the 
historical rise of soft power, but it focuses on the rise of the consciousness of the 
importance of soft power. This consciousness is the basis of the intentionality to 
use soft power itself,  which is the real novelty of our time. The establishment of 
soft international law is evidence of the intentionality to use soft power. As 
Galbraith and Zaring stated, “the turn to soft law in international governance has 
been one of the signature developments in the field over the past forty years”.66 
 
63 Joseph S Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (Basic Books 
1990). 
64 Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs 2004) x. 
65 ibid. 
66 Jean Galbraith and David Zaring, ‘Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law’ (2014) 99 Cornell Law 
Review 735, 745. 
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These two authors suggested that the intentional use of soft power is 
increasing in contemporary times. Such an increase is due to several reasons, 
among which an alleged crisis of hard power.67 Gallarotti pointed out that the 
reasons underpinning the crisis of hard power are linked to the rapidity and 
complexity of contemporary society, which can be better managed with soft 
means.68 
Nye suggested that soft power works through imitation and attraction.69 He 
also added that soft power is different from hard power and economic power. As 
illustrated in Figure 3-3,70 economic power includes inducement, which occurs 
when agents pay targets to obtain desired outcomes. As payments exclude 
threat, they cannot be classified as hard power. Also, they are not to be classified 
as soft power either, as they lack imitation and attraction. 
Figure 3-3 - Three types of power 
 
67 ibid 744. 
68 Giulio M Gallarotti, ‘Soft Power: What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions for Its 
Effective Use’ (2011) 4 Journal of Political Power 25, 25–26. 
69 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (n 64). 
70 ibid 31. 
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In sum, the behaviour of targets can be changed by coercing, paying, or 
attracting them. However, as explained in Section 3.2, only the use of resources 
identifies the variable of the exercised power. For instance, money is a resource 
with which: (i) one may buy a gun to coerce another; (ii) one may induce (pay) 
another; or (iii) one may attract another as a social example. For the purposes of 
this thesis, only the last of these three cases concerns soft power. 
As stated in the first paragraph of this sub-section, the interest in soft power 
started with analyses of international politics. This interest was due to national 
security matters as well as new international relations practices. Nye explained 
that also the increased importance of information and communication technology 
(ICT) had intensified the intentional use of soft power in international relations.71  
The use of power and influence in international relations is possible due to 
the relational nature of power and influence. As such, this thesis considers that:  
international soft power is an influencing social relationship 
between two actors that belong to two different international 
entities.  
The fact that the relationship is influencing clarifies that the two entities establish 
their relationship to make or resist social changes.  
Shaw explained that the classic approach to sovereign states looks at 
states as independent entities. Sovereign states are hierarchical organisations 
where hard power usually prevails. On the other hand, the relationships between 
sovereign states should be horizontal and use soft power in order to avoid 
conflicts.72 Gallarotti argued that these international horizontal relationships 
create structures with boundaries and spaces that are subject to continuous 
reciprocal influences.73 
Nye suggested that the increased use of ICT has been creating a new 
globalised dimension with new flexible borders and new actors that are different 
from national states. Soft power seems to be more important than hard power 
within such a new dynamic globalised dimension.74 Part of its importance is a 
 
71 ibid 30–32. 
72 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (6th edn, Cambridge University Press 2008) 6. 
73 Gallarotti (n 68) 28–29. 
74 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (n 64) 90–97. 
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consequence of data control and sharing. On one hand, ICT allows easier access 
to data. On the other hand, too much information causes scarcity of attention. As 
a consequence, attention becomes a valuable resource for controlling data. It 
may be manipulated by propaganda, and propaganda is effective when 
conducted by credible actors. For this reason: (i) influence can be exercised by 
undermining the credibility of others;75 and (ii) influence can be exercised by 
enhancing one’s credibility. Credibility can be increased by being legitimate 
parties to social structures and by respecting commitments, for instance.76 
National governments adapt their strategies to the globalised dimension. In 
addition to increasing their use of soft power, they take into account new 
influencing competitors as non-state actors. Among the soft strategies to 
develop, Nye suggested that multilateralism is a major one. Multilateralism 
includes the establishment of networks to foster strategic diplomacy where 
communication and data exchange become vital resources to exercise soft 
power.77 The importance of international networks will be further explained in 
section 3.5. When multilateral networks are regulated, they are governed by 
international law, which is the focus of the next sub-section. 
3.3.2 International (soft) law 
Shaw originally described international law as an attractive means to establish 
relationships between states. It follows that international law primarily targets 
countries instead of citizens as national law does.78 While national law includes 
legislative, executive, and judiciary competences, international law usually does 
not.79 As a result, Craig and De Búrca talked about a democratic deficit of 
international law.80 The reason for this is that international law usually does not 
rise from politicians but from agreements between the executive branches of two 
 
75 ibid 106–107. 
76 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ 
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or more countries,81 and this distance from citizens characterises its lack of 
democracy. 
 Shaw stated that “the current trend in international law is to restrict the 
use of force as far as possible”.82 Thus, the current trend is to use soft 
instruments. This means that soft international law exerts attraction. This 
attraction concerns the governments’ feeling that they may take advantage of 
their inclusion in situations established by international law. As such, respecting 
international law is a direct consequence of the recognition that its situation is a 
potential advantage.83  
 As authors like Abbott and Snidal suggested, this means that international 
law is usually soft, while national law is ordinarily hard.84 Shaw mentioned 
another difference between national and international law that is the relationship 
between law and politics.85 The critical point is that politics adopt legal 
instruments, which in turn bind politics. In sum, although a recognised definition 
of soft law is still under debate,86 and even contested,87 one of the differences 
between hard law and soft law may be the relationship between law and politics.  
 Following the contents of Section 3.2.4, if the law is a resource to exercise 
power or influence, its hard or soft nature is not intrinsic, but a consequence of 
the strategies for using the resource itself. Therefore, a classification of legal 
instruments between hard and soft laws might not be reliable without considering 
the situation in which the legal instruments allow to make or resist changes. For 
instance, any EU Member State that is in breach of any EU law could go straight 
to the EU Court of Justice. This situation would be a hard use of the law. In reality, 
any EU Member State that is in breach of any EU law is usually subject to a 
political debate that may avoid the recourse to the ECJ.88 This situation is a soft 
use of the law. 
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Terpan suggested that the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact 
is an emblematic case for the difference described above.89 In other words, 
stating that the EU Member States must not infringe EU law is different from 
affirming that they should not, but it would be possible to open political debates 
if it happened. The key points are: (i) the different situations that guarantee the 
respect for the law; and (ii) the different reasons why the law is respected. In the 
case of hard use of the law: (i) courts are the situation that guarantees the 
respect for the law; and (ii) the law is respected to avoid coercive courses of 
action. In the case of soft use of law: (i) politics is the situation that guarantees 
the respect for the law; and (ii) the law is respected to take advantage of soft 
courses of action. The soft use of the law is the typical situation of international 
law. As it avoids coercive courses of action, international law is respected mainly 
due to its influence. 
 This original idea about the distinction between hard and soft laws 
depending on the situation seems to explain definitions like those of Terpan 
about “binding norms with a soft dimension” and “non-binding norms with legal 
relevance”.90 For instance, the author pointed out that although soft law often 
does not refer to any relevant court, courts may refer to soft law to explain their 
judgements. When this happens, the nature of soft norms intrinsically changes 
because its legal relevance has been officially recognised.91 In this respect, 
Section 2.2 described that human rights discourses entered into the EU 
legislation through the ECJ case law, which gave EU legal relevance to soft 
international law. For Terpan, the concept of enforcement is central because 
“enforcement goes from monitoring to more coercive mechanisms, including 
judicial control and sanctions”.92 This suggests that monitoring is a soft strategy 
to enforce international law. 
To conclude, both hard and soft laws appear as written documents that 
create behavioural expectations. The critical difference is that soft law does not 
admit the use of coercion, although establishing a kind of obligation.93 Figure 3-
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4 suggests that soft law is in between hard law and social norms.94 This idea 
reminds of the socio-legal nature of this study about influence, as introduced in 
Section 1.3.1. 
Figure 3-4 - Criteria for defining soft and hard law 
3.3.3 International soft law instruments 
Newman and Posner classified soft law instruments as: (i) best practices; (ii) 
policy guidelines; (iii) technical standards; (iv) prescriptive standards; and (v) 
advisory guidance.95 This classification follows their definition of soft law as a 
“set of written advisory prescriptions”. Although sharable, a similar rigid 
classification does not adhere to the explanations of the previous sub-section 
that considered the situation of the enforcement as an essential variable to define 
soft law. 
In fact, other authors like Abbott and Snidal described soft law instruments 
focusing on the political opportunity to engage in them. To do so, the authors 
suggested the characteristics of soft law instruments instead of listing them. For 
instance, they said that the more difficult the political relationship, the softer the 
relevant legal instrument. They also suggested that the softness of legal 
instruments may be measured by three variables and their balance: (i) obligation; 
(ii) precision; and (iii) delegation.96  
To synthesise: the lower the value of these three variables, and the softer 
the legal instrument. The softer the legal instrument, the easier the engagement. 
On this, Abbott and Snidal suggested that soft law instruments allow national 
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governments to save contracting and sovereignty costs when compared to hard 
means.97 Also, soft law instruments allow for avoiding uncertainties due to the 
lack of any agreement. Uncertainties are politically and economically more 
expensive than soft law instruments, which result in convenient compromises.98 
This consideration means that the exclusion from a situation governed by 
soft law results in a cost. This idea describes the “penalty default” principle of 
Ayres and Gertner.99 In sum, international entities promote and respect soft law 
instruments because the promotion of and respect for such instruments avoid 
extra costs. Abbott and Snidal added that soft law instruments are flexible and 
they establish relationships that would be problematic to maintain in other ways. 
Lastly, soft law instruments may be the first step leading to the adoption of hard 
options.100 
Also, Newman and Posner suggested two opportunistic motivations to 
adopt international soft law instruments instead of hard ones: (i) the involved 
actors are aware of the cooperative advantages of soft instruments; and (ii) the 
involved actors want to be as free as possible not to respect the prescriptions 
due to the agreements’ soft nature.101 In the same direction, Galbraith and Zaring 
stated that soft law instruments “can be negotiated and renegotiated with greater 
ease and violated with lower reputational costs-and therefore they can potentially 
contain stronger substantive provisions”.102 This idea is interesting because it 
suggests that the soft nature of instruments incentivises the parties to agree on 
principles that would not be otherwise included in hard agreements. As 
suggested above, soft instruments can change and harmonise the attitudes 
about specific principles, and this represents an opportunity to influence.   
 To conclude, Galbraith and Zaring stated that “the rise of international soft 
law has been accompanied by the need to implement it domestically. This raises 
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the question of what laws or framework of laws can be used for its 
implementation”.103 This is precisely the question that this thesis wants to 
answer. In particular, the research aims to show that the EU can use its influence 
instead of laws or framework of laws to impact on the implementation of 
international human rights principles. 
3.4 Influence and international governance 
Section 3.2 explained that the difference between power and influence is the use 
of coercion in social relationships that aim to make or resist changes. Such 
distinction reflects the dichotomy between the hard and soft use of resources 
and strategies. Section 3.3 explained that this difference is observable in 
international legal discourses, where soft law is increasing its importance. As 
such, the conscious use of influence is a crucial factor in international relations. 
This section suggests that the rise of soft law in international relations has 
a main institutional consequence. This outcome is the development and 
establishment of governance architectures that develop and implement soft law. 
The Canadian Institute on Governance suggests that “governance is how society 
or groups within it, organise to make decisions”.104 Craig and De Búrca 
emphasised that EU governance systems work in parallel with the classic hard 
governmental architecture.105 Also, the authors referred to supranational and 
multi-level governance to emphasise the involvement of transnational actors, 
which are state, sub-state, and non-state entities.106 The thesis adheres to these 
definitions. 
3.4.1 The EU: from soft law to soft governance 
It is possible to argue that the EU primary legislation has included examples of 
hard and soft legal instruments since the Treaty of Rome. In fact, the EU Treaties 
establish five forms of legal instruments: (i) regulations; (ii) directives; (iii) 
decisions; (iv) recommendations; and (v) opinions. However, among these, the 
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Treaties state that recommendations and opinions do not have any binding 
force.107 The EU Parliament stated that “recommendations and opinions do not 
confer any rights or obligations on those to whom they are addressed, but may 
provide guidance as to the interpretation and content of Union law”.108 In line with 
the explanations of the previous section, recommendations and opinions can be 
classified as examples of soft law. 
Terpan underlined that the EU is an original form of supranational 
organisation. On one hand, the EU Treaties establish a hard architecture that 
confers legislative, executive, and judiciary competences on the Union. On the 
other hand, new forms of coordination have been emerging since this hard 
architecture has become a limit for the integration of the EU Member States.109 
Barani explained that the EU had developed new soft law instruments to 
face the complexity of contemporary society by increasing its flexibility. The 
author assumed an ongoing passage from “supranational to intergovernmental 
methods”.110 Sabel and Zeitlin added that the complexity of contemporary society 
had increased the need to consult experts. The permanent link between the EU 
and civil society experts has created platforms that can influence the EU policy- 
and law-making processes.111 About this, Cullen, Harrington, and Renshaw 
stated that “experts become powerful, their power lying in their control over 
knowledge and information and their consequent capacity to determine 
policy”.112 This confirms the link between knowledge and power introduced in 
Section 3.2. 
 Barani affirmed that the EU started to use non-binding intergovernmental 
agreements in the 1980s. These aimed to avoid rigidities in favour of flexibility.113 
Such agreements developed networks between sub-state actors. These 
networks included monitoring procedures. One example of this form of soft 
 
107 TFEU Art 288. 
108 ‘Sources and Scope of European Union Law’ (European Parliament 2018) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.1.pdf> accessed 10 October 2018. 
109 Terpan (n 87) 69. 
110 Barani (n 100) 2–3. 
111 Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271, 278. 
112 Holly Cullen, Joanna Harrington and Catherine Renshaw, Experts, Networks and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017) 2. 
113 Barani (n 100) 13. 
 
 
 83 
intergovernmental instrument is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).114 
Terpan classified the OMC as a soft law instrument due to its monitoring 
procedures.115 
 The EU Parliament stated that “the OMC […] is a method of soft 
governance which aims to spread best practice and achieve convergence 
towards EU goals in those policy areas which fall under the partial or full 
competence of Member States”.116 This statement shows the intention to use a 
soft method to influence the EU Member States bypassing the limits of the 
conferral, as suggested by Szyszczak.117 Barani pointed out that the limits of the 
conferral correspond with the limits between hard law and soft law.118 
Terpan explained that the OMC is not subject to the ECJ, and also the EU 
Commission and the EU Council have a limited role. This architecture creates a 
horizontal situation where destructured entities of the EU Member States are 
peers that decide and monitor common courses of action.119 Lastly, the Lisbon 
European Council listed the four main characteristics of the OMC: (i) 
establishment of common goals; (ii) identification of best practices; (iii) domestic 
personalised implementation; and (iv) mutual learning processes.120 These are 
very similar to the main features of experimentalist governance architectures, as 
described in the next sub-section. 
3.4.2 Experimentalist governance 
As said in the previous section, Newman and Posner suggested two 
opportunistic motivations to adopt international soft law instruments instead of 
hard ones: (i) cooperative advantages; and (ii) unsanctioned infringements.121 
Sabel and Zeitlin emphasised the first reason when pointing out the EU needs to 
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develop a new flexible governance to reach shared decisions.122 The EU 
Commission itself confirmed its aim to “bring greater flexibility into how 
Community legislation can be implemented in a way which takes account of 
regional and local conditions”.123 Sabel and Zeitlin named experimentalist this 
kind of new governance based on flexibility.124 
 De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel said there is a global experimentalist 
governance that involves state, sub-state, and non-state actors with the attempt 
to decide common courses of action.125 Multi-level and non-hierarchic 
relationships between the involved actors are the key characteristics that define 
experimentalist governance. Such relationships create informal processes of 
“networked deliberative decision making”.126 
Experimentalist governance processes need two main pre-conditions: (i) 
strategic uncertainty; and (ii) multi-polar distribution of power.127 Generally 
speaking, forms of experimentalist governance are undertaken: (i) when hard 
processes are uncertain; (ii) when hard processes are counterproductive; and 
(iii) when the cooperation of states with sub-state and non-state actors is 
indispensable to set the agenda and solve problems.128 
 Sabel and Zeitlin explained that experimentalist governance processes 
follow a four-step scheme: (i) common goals are established; (ii) lower-level units 
are free to choose how to reach these goals; (iii) lower-level units must report on 
their results, which are peer-reviewed; and (iv) a general evaluation of the 
process offers the opportunity to establish new common goals.129 As such, 
experimentalist governance processes are open-ended processes.130 The 
similarity between this four-step scheme and the characteristics of the OMC may 
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suggest that the EU is developing experimentalist governance processes. This 
suggestion is what Zeitlin illustrated with the figure below.131 
In addition, Sabel and Zeitlin explained that experimentalist governance 
processes promote “the emergence of new forms of dynamic accountability”.132 
The reciprocal monitoring through peer review causes a “shift from accountability 
as rule following to accountability as the justifiable exercise of discretion subject 
to peer review”.133 Accountability can be linked with the concept of credibility as 
a resource to influence, introduced in Section 3.2. 
 De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel stated that “peer review is thus a 
mechanism for both learning systematically from diverse experience and holding 
actors accountable for their actions”.134 Positive peer reviews recognise the 
accountability of actors that strengthen their legitimation within the process and 
avoid any penalty default.135 Concerning this, Section 3.2 described legitimation 
as a resource to influence.  
Figure 3-5 - The EU experimentalist governance 
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 Sabel and Zeitlin looked at transparency and participation as necessary 
characteristics of experimentalist governance processes.136 On one hand, 
transparency is necessary for accountability. On the other hand, participation in 
soft governance processes shall be open to state, sub-state, and non-state 
actors based on the contribution they can give to the process. De Búrca, 
Keohane, and Sabel added that transparency and participation might fill the 
democratic deficit of networked deliberative decision-making processes.137  
 Sabel and Zeitlin explained that experimentalist governance processes 
are deliberative because they reach decisions. These result from compromises 
and reciprocal influences. Such decisions are revised at the beginning of each 
new deliberative cycle through influencing processes.138 The opportunities to 
exercise influence on the deliberative cycle pass through the maintenance of 
credibility and legitimation, which are maintained if the common goals are 
reached. 
 The agreement on common aims does not exclude that the flexibility of 
experimentalist governance processes respects the differences of the actors 
involved in the process.139 This peculiarity means that the actors involved in 
governance processes can pursue harmonised results with personalised 
courses of action. This situation means that the EU CRPD-related governance 
indicates common goals to implement the Convention, and then the national and 
local levels can decide on how to reach those goals. The next analytical chapters 
will provide explanations for this assumption.  
3.4.3 EU experimentalist governance and the CRPD 
The previous sub-section summarised the key features of a new form of 
international governance that several authors agree to term experimentalist. This 
kind of governance aims to find international convergence avoiding the use of 
coercive means. In other words, its processes exercise influence rather than 
power. As previously stated, Sabel and Zeitlin observed characteristics of this 
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new governance architecture in the EU. Besides, De Búrca analysed the CRPD 
experimentalist characteristics, and this sub-section builds upon her work. 
 In sum, De Búrca argued that the EU exported its anti-discrimination 
regime’s experimentalist governance characteristics to the CRPD. The author 
suggested that the unconventional methods of the EU anti-discrimination regime 
were unintentional means to overcome the limits of the existent top-down 
architecture.140 Due to these limits, the EU was finding difficulties in ruling 
second- and third-generation discrimination matters after having already 
legislated first-generation rights. Thus, the EU needed bottom-up insights, and 
this openness fostered the reinterpretation of its hard architecture.141 
  De Búrca defined the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty as the turning point that 
gave way to the EU anti-discrimination regime.142 She interpreted the inclusion 
of Article 13 as a victory of civil society against the classic powers of states and 
lobbies.143 Particularly, De Búrca listed five critical characteristics of the EU anti-
discrimination regime: (i) the legitimised involvement of non-state actors; (ii) the 
legitimation and funding of international networks; (iii) the central role of 
information exchange and its legitimised alternative to hard dispute-resolution 
processes; (iv) the continuous review of the meaning of discrimination and its 
application at both vertical and horizontal levels; and (v) the transition from 
negative to positive norms.144 
 The author observed that these five characteristics could also be noted in 
the CRPD drafting and governance processes.145 As the EU was involved in the 
Convention’s drafting process, De Búrca analysed the CRPD negotiation 
archives and conducted interviews to understand if the EU had exported 
experimentalist features of its anti-discrimination regime to the Convention.146 
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From her investigation, it emerged that the EU was not in favour of the new 
Convention at the outset, but then it changed its mind looking at the opportunity 
to export its anti-discrimination model at the UN level.147 
In the 2015 revision of her analysis, De Búrca observed an EU 
“downloading” of experimentalist features by the CRPD after the previous 
“uploading” of its anti-discrimination governance.148 This idea is very similar to 
the one that inspires this thesis. In fact, the research seeks evidence of the EU 
downloading of human rights principles from the Convention to their 
implementation. This perspective suggests that this study is following the 
footprints of De Búrca’s analysis. 
Besides, research interview is a method that this thesis has in common 
with De Búrca’s work. The author shared the feeling that her interviewees: (i) 
were not fully conscious of being part of a unique international governance 
architecture; (ii) showed different degrees of uncertainty that seemed to derive 
from overlapping between hard and soft roles; and (iii) expressed enthusiasm for 
positive processes as the exchange of best practices and participation.149 
Interestingly, the interviews conducted under this research suggest similar 
insights. One probable reason for this is that the populations of the two sets of 
interviews belong to similar quasi-experimentalist governance entities. 
Lastly, De Búrca concluded that feelings like unconsciousness and 
uncertainty were caused by the “embryonic stage” of the new governance 
regime.150 However, the similarities with findings from this thesis’ interviews may 
support different ideas. For instance, the open-ended character of the 
experimentalist governance entails that the embryonic stage of this kind of 
governance is somehow intrinsic. If any deliberative cycle establishes new goals 
to reach, there is a constant necessity to develop new methods to reach such 
goals. Hence, uncertainty seems unavoidable. In fact, Sabel and Zeitlin talked 
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about “destabilisation” because the starting point of any cycle can destabilise the 
certainties achieved with the experience of the previous cycle.151 
To conclude, the rise of soft power fostered the emanation of soft law and 
the establishment of flexible governance architectures. These may have different 
characteristics that allow their theoretical classification. However, they have a 
common starting point, which is the capacity to network international entities. 
3.5 Influence and international networks 
The previous sections of this chapter described the exercise of influence as a 
relationship between two actors that try to make or resist social change through 
soft resources and strategies. Once legitimised, this kind of relationship creates 
soft law instruments. Once institutionalised, they create flexible governance 
architectures. The contemporary international sphere sees increasing use of soft 
law and governance. This soft international architecture includes infinite 
influencing relationships between state, sub-state, and non-state entities that 
network with one another. These destructured entities restructure new 
networked international relationships. This is how this section approaches and 
explains international networks. 
 The distinction between network and governance systems is very narrow. 
In fact, the previous section concluded with the idea that governance 
architectures network international entities. Hence, governance can be explained 
as a specific structure of networks, which in turn can be generically defined as 
“a collection of points joined together in pairs by lines”.152 In detail, this thesis 
refers to social networks153 where points are social entities and lines are their 
relationships. In particular, this research is interested in influencing relationships. 
Blanco, Lowndes, and Pratchett suggested an exciting difference 
between policy networks and governance networks, affirming that governance 
networks represent an alternative to “the growing difficulties of traditional 
government” while policy networks aim to influence traditional governments more 
than substitute them.154 This idea is coherent with that of deliberative governance 
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introduced in Section 3.4.2, and it offers a new perspective to understand the 
complexity of the power balance in the international sphere. 
3.5.1 Influence and social networks 
Foucault affirmed that social networks include individuals as well as collective 
entities, and “power relations are rooted in the system of social networks”.155 
Wrong confirmed that social networks are themselves collective entities, and the 
promotion of collective entities is a smart strategy to exercise influence.156  
 Dowding talked about policy-making networks. He said that these 
networks develop various levels of independence from the control of 
consolidated institutional decision-makers.157 Nye explained that this happens 
because the parties to any network are peers that share the same goals. As a 
consequence, networks become independent collective entities that aim to 
realise the common goals of its constituent entities. It follows that the 
independence of any network is a pivotal factor in exercising influence and 
realising its goals.158 Consequently, influencing smart strategies should consider 
the opportunity to create and manage social networks.159 
Nye described the capacity to make or resist a social change with either 
coercive or non-coercive means as either hard power or soft power.160 This 
thesis assumes that soft power is equivalent to influence. Nye explained that soft 
power is more diffuse and less hierarchical than hard power and that the action 
of social networks fosters this difference.161 The author added that social 
networks have been increasing their importance due to technology.162 Burkhardt 
and Brass described technology as a new resource that has been shaping new 
smart strategies that involve the use of soft means to exercise influence.163 In 
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particular, a specific branch of technology known as information and 
communication technology (ICT) plays a prominent role in social inclusion.  
Warschauer stated that social inclusion refers “to the extent that 
individuals, families, and communities are able to fully participate in society and 
control their own destinies, taking into account […] civic engagement”.164 In 
short, ICT allows such participation by creating social networks that share data. 
The possibility to access and modify data have been re-shaping the 
contemporary social relationships from hierarchical to horizontal.165 In the words 
of Maoz, “we typically think of a network as a collection of units […] that have 
ties with one another. These ties determine how information and influence flow 
in the global village”.166 
Blooms thought that ICT spreads knowledge because it allows collecting 
and sending data. Access to knowledge offers the opportunity to exercise 
influence.167 With regard to ICT, Allen introduced a new idea for space. He said 
that the physical space is no more a condition to exclude any actor from any 
situation, and the inclusion in relevant networks is a precious resource to 
exercise influence.168 Nye agreed on this when suggesting that the technological 
space has become an independent geography where both information and the 
control of information are resources to exercise influence.169 Non-territorial 
dimensions are increasing their importance. This shift is so radical that Keohane 
and Nye referred to this evolution as the end of the post-feudal-time era.170 The 
authors assumed that interdependence is the central resource to succeed in non-
territorial dimensions. Therefore, they said that international strategies prefer 
influence to power because coercion causes dependence instead of 
interdependence.171 
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Also, Nye argued that these new horizontal situations offer the opportunity 
to include new actors in decision-making processes. Among these new actors, 
civil society is increasing its influence by creating more or less favourable 
consensus for institutional decision-makers.172 On the other hand, institutional 
decision-makers may use civil society to gain credibility and indirectly influence 
other targets.173 For instance, the aforementioned De Búrca’s analysis of the 
CRPD drafting process did not clarify whether the EU took advantage of the civil 
society representatives’ presence or vice versa. Probably, there were reciprocal 
conveniences from their networking due to their shared goal to be included in the 
CRPD governance. 
When international entities network, they may try to regulate their 
relationships heading to soft law and governance, the establishment of which is 
subject to the exercise of influence.  
3.5.2 Soft law and networks 
Section 3.3 has already introduced the idea of Galbraith and Zaring that 
regulatory networks create soft international law.174 The authors explained that 
the starting point of any international law process is that two or more states 
establish common goals to reach. Since not far ago, the typical means to 
conclude international affairs in any topic was through ambassadors and hard 
agreements. The establishment of regulatory networks has gradually substituted 
this habit. This new approach means that when two or more states want to 
establish an international agreement on a specific topic, the national executive 
branches that oversee the relevant issue interact to define the extent of the 
agreement.175  
Usually, the executive branches that contribute to drafting international 
agreements are also the entities in charge of their implementation. This 
combination means that these sub-state entities create international networks 
with two main goals: the first goal is the writing of an international agreement 
(regulative networks), and the second goal is its implementation once approved 
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(executive networks). In addition to sub-state entities, international networks may 
also include non-state actors as interest groups.176  
Galbraith and Zaring emphasised that international regulatory networks 
tend to gain independence both from the entities that established them and from 
the entities that constitute them. Further, such networks independently define 
new goals to reach, exercising their influence on the international sphere to 
achieve their aims. Newman and Posner suggested that the international 
landscape has become “softly dynamic”.177 They affirm that such dynamism 
derives from: (i) legitimacy claims; and (ii) political arena expansions.178  
These conclusions are coherent with the contents of the previous 
sections. In sum, soft international law is valid because international entities 
respect it in order to increase their legitimacy and to affect the political arena. In 
other words, any international entity that aims to exercise influence needs to be 
part of international networks that can influence international law. Although 
assuring legitimacy, inclusion is not enough to guarantee the exercise of 
influence. In fact, the opportunity to influence soft law also derives from a 
reputation that derives from the respect of soft law itself. Here it is a good reason 
to respect soft international norms. 
De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel suggested that the described evolution of 
international relations has made “the relations between entities, rather than the 
entities or organisations themselves” relevant sources of influence.179 The 
authors confirmed that “technological change helped to alter the relationships 
among international organizations and their role in world politics”.180 They also  
stated that “entities other than states now often have authority in part because 
other actors defer to them as legitimate rule makers”.181 
International networks have already been categorised as regulatory, 
executive, and deliberative international entities. In short, they can produce 
outcomes. Also, Druzin explained that networks have intrinsic effects that foster 
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self-standardisation.182 Self-standardisation means that the international entities 
that are part of networks choose to change because distinctive external 
characteristics attract them. Section 3.3 described attraction as a resource to 
influence. Self-standardisation is necessary to join networks and to maintain 
credibility and legitimation within networks. The more extensive the network, the 
more it is attractive and it will produce self-standardisation.  
Druzin stated that “policy-makers can learn to surf this structural 
undercurrent and strategically harness network effects to promote legal 
harmonization”.183 The author suggested that the attraction of international 
networks produces effects that can exercise influence. He said that the 
establishment of soft law instruments usually follows the promotion of standards 
by networks. However, the use of soft law “would have to be carefully weighed” 
because the effects of networks can be more influencing than any legal 
instrument.184 For instance, the self-standardisation of the candidate countries to 
join the EU may be more influencing than the respect for EU law after their 
accession to the Union. 
Druzin classified three main intrinsic effects of networks: (i) they have a 
lock-in effect, meaning that the entities that joined a network cannot easily leave 
it; (ii) they may favour power-brokers, which are entities that try to exercise their 
influence; and (iii) they may head to over-standardisation with the risk to ignore 
differences.185 Following the explanations of the previous sections, the use of 
networks as strategies to exercise influence might take these effects into 
account.  
3.5.3 Influence and the new world order 
This last sub-section draws inspiration from the work of Slaughter.186 In brief, she 
described a new world order where state, sub-state, and non-state entities create 
international networks that exercise their influence on the international sphere 
and from there on national and local levels. 
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The author pointed out that governments must have a global reach in the 
contemporary world where the national territoriality overcomes the borders of 
national states. As they cannot use hard power in international relations to avoid 
conflicts, they need to develop soft resources as persuasion and information. 
International agreements allow national governments to reach and influence the 
domestic level of other countries. In short, this can be done through international 
networks.187 
The ideas of Slaughter confirm the contents of the previous sections 
explaining that international relations are not limited to contacts between foreign 
offices or embassies; instead, they now involve state, sub-state, and non-state 
actors that are in touch with one another based on their expertise. This situation 
does not preclude the existence of national states, but it disaggregates them into 
semi-independent entities that can play at the international level on relevant 
issues.188 This international networking of disaggregated entities based on their 
expertise seems like a corporativist approach to international governance 
explanations.189 
In her book, Slaughter described horizontal and vertical networks. Both 
horizontal and vertical networks can be: (i) information networks to exchange 
information and best practices; (ii) enforcement networks to enable the domestic 
level; and (iii) harmonisation networks to promote standard courses. Besides, 
vertical networks become supranational when pieces of national sovereignty are 
conferred on them.190 
The author suggested that the establishment of any international network 
usually has three goals: (i) creating convergence or “informed divergence” at 
least; (ii) improving compliance with agreed standards; and (iii) increasing 
international cooperation. In addition, she talks about a kind of “regulatory export” 
when international networks influence other entities on adopting rules.191 This 
consideration reminds the mentioned self-standardisation of Druzin as well as 
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De Búrca’s uploading and downloading activities of the EU networking with the 
CRPD. 
Slaughter argued that international networks might aim to set “informed 
divergence”. In sum, international networks might be flexible enough to accept 
differences and allow non-compliance when explained with persuasive authority 
during peer review processes.192 This idea is in line with the experimentalist 
governance characteristics. Therefore, it seems possible to argue that non-
compliance can show the need to change the future goals of the network. 
Therefore, difference and non-compliance are not always negative patterns. On 
the contrary, they may exercise influence when defended within peer-review 
processes. 
Slaughter explained that international networks include three kinds of 
entities: (i) executive; (ii) legislative; and (iii) judiciary. This differentiation means 
that the three powers of national states appear like disaggregated units at the 
international sphere rather than like national monoliths represented by unitary 
ambassadors. Also, these three disaggregated power-area units are 
disaggregated into subject-areas. The entities that belong to each disaggregated 
subject-area re-aggregate themselves in the international arena creating 
relevant subject-area networks. Lastly, these subject-area networks may include 
entities that would have formally belonged to different power-areas as well as to 
none of them (non-state actors). Such subject-area networks develop a soft 
international governance that complements the hard power of national 
governments. The complexity of international networks has been causing the 
disaggregation of networks themselves with the consequent creation of networks 
of networks.193  
The described shift of the world order from hard and vertical to softly 
disaggregated and networked is ongoing and unpredictable. At the time of 
conducting this research, the classic hard architecture is coexisting with its soft 
counterpart. Building upon this, the next analytical chapters will show how the 
EU is taking advantage of disaggregated architectures to exercise its influence 
on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
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3.6 The application of the background and theoretical 
frameworks in the analysis 
This section aims to explain how the analysis of the next three chapters uses the 
concepts that have been illustrated in the just concluded three chapters about 
the background and theoretical frameworks. This section might be useful to 
prepare the readers for understanding what they are going to read next and what 
is the approach of the thesis. The following explanations touch three issues: (i) 
the structure-process-outcome indicator framework; (ii) examples of influence; 
and (iii) the interpretation of impact. 
3.6.1 The structure-process-outcome in practice  
Section 1.3.1 explained that the thesis takes inspiration from the structure-
process-outcome indicator framework of the OHCHR.194 This does not mean that 
the research develops indicators; instead, it entails that it uses the indicator 
framework approach in order to answer the research question. The underlying 
hypothesis is that if the EU implements the CRPD and independent living rights 
with soft resources and strategies, then the research should find soft structures, 
processes and outcomes that are relevant to that aim. The eventual confirmation 
of this hypothesis might confirm the validity of the indicator framework and 
stimulate the development of specific indicators about soft resources and 
strategies.  
 Article 31 CRPD asks the States Parties to gather statistics and data as a 
means to give effect to the Convention. This duty represents a formal step of 
human rights implementation that is part of international debates since the 
1980s. The critical factor is that the collection and use of information must 
respect international standards in order to be reliable and valid. For example, 
data should be comparable between states and throughout years. For this 
reason, there is an increasing interest in methodologies about human rights data 
collection. Even, it seems to be “fair to say that there is an emerging market in 
human rights indicators”.195 
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 Satterthwaite and Rosga wrote an interesting critic about the use of 
indicators, which were initially described as “abstract, quantifiable, and putatively 
transferable data bits”.196 Indicators were expected to provide a limpid measure 
for quantifying the states’ implementation of human rights. The authors argued 
that the implementation of human rights is a qualitative issue, and they 
questioned how quantitative data could adequately reflect this. They suggested 
that indicators should not be an attempt to shame states but to engage with them 
in constructive dialogues.197 The authors described the OHCHR debate, for 
instance, about the structure-process-outcome idea.198 
 The crucial reasoning about indicators is that it is “impossible to guarantee 
that a specific cause and effect relationship will be captured in relation to a 
specific right”.199 The next chapters illustrate evidence of influences that are part 
of cause and effect relationships without the presumption of exhausting all the 
intervening variables. A social situation is not an algebraic formula where a result 
follows defined operations, but it is a dynamic and unstable construction where 
different actors contribute with their more or less visible courses of action. 
This is why the OHCHR moved its emphasis from the final data to the 
participation in producing such data, because it recognised the need for including 
the actors involved in human rights implementation.200 Coherently, the next 
chapters look at participation as both a process and an outcome, stimulating 
actions and approaches that would be otherwise missed. This conceptual 
evolution increases the attention to qualitative indicators and concrete factors, 
despite the risk of reducing their abstract and objective measurability.201 The 
thesis enters in this debate by suggesting the importance of qualitative analyses 
for soft resources and strategies to measure the effort of states in implementing 
human rights treaties. 
 Qualitative studies of soft courses of action may be challenging because 
these are often unmeasurable. As illustrated in Section 3.2.3, the difficulty in 
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quantifying influence does not measure its presence and effectiveness. This 
entails that quantitative outcomes (i.e. the number of closed-down institutions) 
may be linked to spurious indicators only because measurable, thus ignoring 
concurrent unmeasurable factors and misleading the genuine cause and effect 
relationships. Therefore, the quantitative nature of indicators should be 
profoundly questioned. Also, the structure-process-outcome framework might 
need a serious reflection about the classification of structures, processes, and 
outcomes. This research contributes to developing such a reflection. 
 The design of this thesis took inspiration from the OHCHR indicator 
framework, but it somehow suffered the limits of an approach that is mainly 
quantitative. Although the categories of indicators include objective and 
subjective approaches,202 the OHCHR Guide does not focus on qualitative 
assessments. However, if states parties fulfil their treaty obligations by both 
guaranteeing the enjoyment of rights and demonstrating effort on compliance,203 
how effort can be qualitatively measured? This research focuses on the EU effort 
to implement the CRPD with soft resources and strategies. In doing this, it 
demonstrates the importance of adopting qualitative approaches, and it aims to 
stimulate further debates about the indicators methodologies. 
 The theoretical framework included in this chapter allows interpreting the 
structure-process-outcome indicator framework in the light of influence. This 
means that it entails uncountable factors and qualitative approaches. In line with 
this, the next chapters do not include definitive statements about cause and 
effect relationships. Instead, they show several attempts by different international 
entities to implement the CRPD and independent living rights through soft and 
unmeasurable means. This approach represents both the originality of the thesis 
and its challenging perspective. 
 Following what illustrated above, in the next chapters: (i) structural 
indicators evaluate the presence of human rights-related governance 
architectures and networks; (ii) process indicators investigate the soft work of 
relevant international entities; and (iii) outcome indicators assess the impact of 
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the considered structures and processes. Lastly, the next sub-sections illustrate 
the various layers of influence (soft power) and impact that the thesis adopts in 
its analysis. 
3.6.2 Influencing resources and strategies in practice 
The thesis argues that the EU is committed to the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights by exerting influence. Its theoretical framework 
investigated what influence is and how it can be exercised at the international 
level. The previous sections of this chapter linked three theoretical areas to 
influence: (i) soft law; (ii) international governance; and (iii) policy networks. The 
attempt was to explore the resources and strategies that international entities 
can employ to obtain desired outcomes without using coercive instruments. This 
sub-section translates some theoretical explanation into practice, and it is 
preparatory to the analytical chapters. 
 As depicted in the previous sub-section, structural indicators evaluate the 
presence of governance systems and networks. This is because they can be the 
hub of influencing relationships. As explained in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, 
governance systems and networks have several characteristics where, probably, 
the crucial one is participation. Indeed, participation allows the establishment of 
relationships that would be otherwise missed. Since influence has a relational 
nature,204 the development of soft international situations that foster participation 
is a pivotal influencing strategy that this thesis investigates.  
The Union and its entities exert influence when they successfully develop 
and lead soft international situations that promote participation. This is because 
participation entails modifying agendas and priorities. Also, it enhances 
dialogues and the establishment of common positions about issues that would 
be otherwise addressed with different approaches and sensitivities. Participating 
in soft international situations is not compulsory; therefore, there is a need for 
influencing strategies that encourage participation. This is another aspect 
enlightened in the analytical chapters. 
The establishment of structures and the development of processes need 
participation as a precondition to obtaining desired outcomes. Starting with an 
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example, Section 2.6.1 mentioned a report commissioned by the EU 
Commission that raised awareness on the conditions of institutionalised persons 
with disabilities in Europe. The Union had no formal competence to conduct that 
investigation; thus, it commissioned the study to external experts. These 
professionals used the received EU money to engage with national authorities 
that had to work with standard indicators. In short, the report achieved two 
desired outcomes: (i) it collected data about institutions that national authorities 
had not gathered and shared yet; and (ii) it persuaded on the necessity to 
develop common policies about deinstitutionalisation in order to change the 
concerning status quo. This example shows several soft resources and 
strategies that are recurrent in the analytical chapters and that are worth a 
preliminary introduction. 
First of all, knowledge is a crucial resource to exert influence and the 
establishment of processes that create and manage knowledge is a crucial 
strategy to the same end. The EU institutions have their internal research 
centres, but they can also commission studies to external experts (i.e. ANED205). 
Also, the Union has several agencies with top-level expertise on specific topics 
(i.e. the EU FRA206). The EU uses knowledge to exert influence when it 
deliberately generates data that are useful to achieve its aims. 
Knowledge reveals real situations, and it can also suggest solutions to 
face social challenges. The Union can exercise its influence by promoting 
standard solutions to similar problems. This entails that it harmonises the 
approaches of national authorities to specific social issues. To achieve this aim, 
the EU can offer opportunities to exchange best practices (i.e. the DHLG207 and 
the Work Forum208), and it can also economically support the work of CSOs (i.e. 
EDF209 and ENIL210). The underlying influencing strategy is that of developing 
processes that might indirectly promote the goals of the EU. The next chapters 
reveal several examples of this kind of soft strategy. 
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What emerges is that the EU using money to generate and manage 
knowledge is a precious strategy to increase its opportunities to influence. Even 
when dealing with shared and national competences, the Union can suggest 
valid solutions based on its expertise. Its authority might persuade the EU 
Member States on adhering to soft standards and they, de facto, harmonise their 
policies to the desired outcomes of the Union.  
With money, the EU also finances its Member States. In this case, the 
Union can establish some conditionality concerned about the use of funds. This 
is a consolidated practice of the EU external action, where it offers support to 
developing countries in exchange for internal reforms. The same reasoning 
explains the economic influence of the Union on its Member States (i.e. ESI 
Funds211). The strategy is to harmonise the use of money with soft standards 
that include the respect of fundamental rights and, as far as this research is 
concerned, the CRPD implementation. 
To conclude, the next chapters reveal influencing opportunities of the EU 
that raise from its soft capacity of aggregating actors and harmonising their 
courses of action. These goals are achieved through the establishment of 
international situations where the Union legitimately controls knowledge and 
money. Since it is impossible to depict definitive cause and effect relationships, 
the next sub-section illustrates the kinds of outcome that satisfy this thesis’ 
analysis. 
3.6.3 The impact of EU influence in practice 
As previously explained, the use of indicators tends to look at outcomes as a tick 
in a box. Such a quantitative approach was instrumental to the necessity of 
creating standards and collecting transferable and easy-to-read data. However, 
the practice of human rights implementation might be more complicated than a 
binary value. First of all, how are the CRPD States Parties’ duties met? As 
depicted, indicators can focus on the real enjoyment of human rights and the 
visible effort of governments on compliance.212  
The focus on efforts seems preferable when the principle of progressive 
realisation prevails over that of direct applicability. For instance, independent 
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living rights need progressive structural and cultural changes that might require 
decades. Therefore, it seems crucial that progressivity is somehow measured by 
indicators to confirm the correct commitment of the CRPD States Parties. 
Therefore, the establishment of processes is a crucial outcome in the short 
period by realising a step on the way of implementation. Also for this reason, the 
OHCHR started to consider qualitative indicators that can be objective (fact-
based) and subjective (judgement-based).213 
This thesis adopts a qualitative approach to analyse the EU influence on 
the CRPD implementation. This entails that its findings evaluate the EU 
progressive effort (development of structures and processes) to respect, protect 
and fulfil the rights of the Convention. The analytical evaluation considers the 
real or presumed impact on concrete situations as the realisation of desired 
outcomes. The qualitative measure of impact relies on three factors: (i) evidence; 
(ii) theoretical possibilities; and (iii) insights from interviews. 
(i) Evidence is any fact-based condition that shows EU attempts to 
influence the CRPD implementation. EU attempts to influence can take many 
forms as public pressures, the publication of reports, policy-making processes, 
and organisation of events. The next chapters reveal several situations that can 
be classified as EU attempts to influence, although their practical impact cannot 
be abstractly measured and quantified.  
For instance, the EU Commission organises the Access City Award,214 and 
the research considers the high participation of cities as a measure for the impact 
of the initiative. This is because the qualitative evaluation considers the effort of 
the EU to comply with the Convention that is remarkable, although 
unmeasurable. Another example refers to the evidence that several entities 
engaged in CRPD-related processes to achieve desired outcomes. Any 
emphasis on attempts to influence does not entail that a specific action caused 
any outcome, but that the considered entity gave its soft contribution to reach 
any desired result. 
 (ii) Theoretical possibilities link observed situations to the concepts 
investigated in the theoretical framework in order to evaluate any influencing 
opportunity. The previous sections of this chapter introduced several 
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characteristics of soft situations that might foster influence, as producing soft law 
outcomes, developing cyclical experimentalist processes, setting common goals, 
and networking destructured entities. When EU CRPD-related soft situations 
show specific characteristics, their impact can be valuable and vice versa. Also 
in this case, the cause and effect quantification is unmeasurable, but this 
limitation should not refrain from conducting this kind of evaluation.  
For instance, the EU Ombudsman215 and the PETI Committee216 produce 
soft law outcomes that are not binding instruments but represent attempts to 
influence the EU implementation of the CRPD. Also, several EU CRPD-related 
entities show different experimentalist characteristics that might suggest about 
the effectiveness of their processes. In addition, the observation of real situations 
can develop inductive reasoning about the validity of academic theories. For 
example, peer review mechanisms are expected to produce impacting 
outcomes. On one hand, the processes that include peer review can exercise 
valid influences; on the other hand, the absence of peer review (among other 
characteristics) raises critical questions that the analysis tries to formulate and 
answer. 
 (iii) Insights from interviews about the EU implementation of the CRPD 
are the qualitative and subjective data that this research generates. The OHCHR 
considers this kind of indicators as “based on information that is a perception, 
opinion, assessment or judgement”.217 Therefore, personal insights are 
intrinsically arguable. However, they are a precious resource to reveal underlying 
processes and subtle strategies. This research conducted and analysed 
interviews in order to assess the EU effort to implement the CRPD qualitatively. 
Section 1.4.3 described some challenges deriving from the sampling criteria and 
the gap between the initial design of the interviews and the final result. Despite 
these challenges, the interviews revealed several EU opportunities to influence 
the implementation of the CRPD.  
 The word of the interviewees is reliable because the interviews involved 
top-level officers working on CRPD-related issues. It follows that their insights 
are competent, although not precisely uninterested. As clarified above, the 
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revelation of influencing situations does not entail exclusive causalities but only 
the contribution to processes that concluded with desired outcomes. Generally 
speaking, the interviewees were conscious of their role. For instance, an officer 
of FRA suggested that Bulgaria may have modified a law due to their work, but 
she honestly underlined the impossibility of verifying the cause and effect 
relationship.218 In other cases, the analysis linked the interviewees’ insights to 
observed situations and theoretical ideas to provide mutual enforcement. 
 To conclude, this thesis identifies the impact of the EU influence on the 
CRPD implementation with qualitative approaches that consider the effort on 
achieving desired outcomes. Even when such an effort is not evident, the attempt 
to influence always represents a positive indicator, although unmeasurable. 
3.7 Concluding remarks 
This theoretical chapter defined influence and explained how it could be 
exercised in the international sphere to reach the national and local levels. The 
research question, of how the EU may influence the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights, has already found a theoretical reply in this 
chapter. The hypothesis is that it may happen through: (i) smart strategies; (ii) 
soft law; (iii) governance processes; and (iv) networking opportunities. The next 
analytical chapters will verify the validity of this hypothesis. 
The explanations of this chapter developed an original theoretical 
framework, within the boundaries of which different academic areas link to one 
another. This openness offers a more realistic picture of the contemporary and 
sophisticated international architecture than the adherence to one single 
academic topic would have done. In this way, the next analytical chapters will 
have the possibility to pragmatically answer the research question in light of 
different theoretical approaches. Therefore, they will provide a complete 
understanding of the EU influence on the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. 
The theoretical framework sets the boundaries of the analysis, and it also 
collocates the research in the relevant academic debates. Such debates inspired 
the study, which in turn has the ambition to complement their consolidated 
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findings. Therefore, the next analytical chapters will explain the situations 
described in the background chapter in light of the theoretical framework 
(deductive approach). Besides, they will expand the theoretical approaches 
included in this chapter, building upon the observations concerning the EU 
accession to the CRPD (inductive approach). 
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Chapter 4  
Influence of the EU CRPD-related governance on the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It assesses 
the opportunities of the EU CRPD-related governance to influence the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. Section 2.4 clarified 
that the EU and its Member States are peers in the context of the Convention. It 
also explained that the EU and its Member States mainly share the competences 
concerning the CRPD implementation. Therefore, if the EU CRPD-related 
governance wanted to pursue specific courses of action, it could not impose any 
measure on its Member States. Instead, it needs to establish influencing 
relationships with the national and local levels trying to harmonise the policies 
about the implementation of the Convention.  
Section 2.3.2 described the EU CRPD-related governance as an 
institutional effect of the EU accession to the CRPD. Due to this effect, as 
required by the Convention,1 the Union established its CRPD-related 
governance that includes: (i) a focal point; (ii) a monitoring framework; and (iii) a 
coordination mechanism. Each of these three constituent parts of the EU CRPD-
related governance is investigated in a dedicated section of the chapter. The 
attempt is to show their influence on the national and local levels. 
It is possible to define the three constituent parts of the EU CRPD-related 
governance as international entities. Chapter 3 assumed that international 
entities and their relations could be sources of influence. The chapter seeks 
verification of this general assumption exploring the existing situations. In sum, 
this chapter aims to investigate examples of EU influences as findings from: (i) 
the documentary research; (ii) the conducted interviews; and (iii) the comparison 
between pieces of evidence and theories. 
 
1 UN General Assembly Resolution, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
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The nature of this chapter’s sources is varied. Also, the availability of 
primary sources influenced the analytical approach of the different sections. The 
non-homogeneous availability and nature of sources was an issue, and the use 
of different analytical approaches was the only method to analyse the three 
entities in the same chapter. On one hand, two consequences are that the 
analytical approaches are not homogeneous throughout the chapter and that the 
available sources have forced their choice. On the other hand, the use of different 
approaches allowed studying the EU CRPD-related governance from different 
perspectives. This aspect is positive because it enriches the research. 
Furthermore, any finding can earn reliability when different approaches reach 
similar conclusions. 
4.2 The EU CRPD focal point 
This section focuses on the EU CRPD focal point exercising its influence on the 
national and local levels in implementing the Convention and independent living 
rights. The analysis is affected by a lack of available public documents as 
outcomes of the EU CRPD focal point. Also the conducted interviews obtained 
few insights about this topic. Therefore, it is possible to affirm that both the 
documentary research and the conducted interviews confirm a general tendency 
of the EU CRPD focal point towards confidentiality. As a consequence, the 
section takes this aspect into account in developing its analysis. 
The international entity EU CRPD focal point is constituted by an EU body. 
In fact, “the Commission shall be a focal point for matters relating to the 
implementation of the UN Convention in accordance with Article 33.1”.2 This 
statement is included in “the Council Decision concerning the conclusion, by the 
European Union, of the CRPD [that] designates the Commission as the focal 
point for the implementation of the Convention at EU level”.3 These quotations 
reveal that the EU Commission has been conferred the mandate to act as the 
 
2 EU Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2010 (2010/48/EC [OJ L 23/35]) Article 3. 
3 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 2014) CRPD/C/EU/1 63 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2FC%2FEU%2F1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
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EU CRPD focal point. The analysis of this section explains what this means, and 
it seeks shreds of evidence of influences on the national and local levels. The 
section includes three sub-sections that use three different approaches.  
The first sub-section suggests a meaning for implementation of human 
rights. This attempt is relevant because the CRPD does not provide any 
explanation for implementation, although it links the role of the focal point with 
“matters relating to the implementation”.4 The investigation aims to confirm if the 
implementation of human rights includes the opportunity to influence the national 
and local levels in order to reach individuals. If this assumption was confirmed, 
then the EU CRPD focal point’s matters relating to the implementation could 
include such an opportunity. 
The second sub-section explores the constituent documents of the EU 
CRPD focal point. The analysis considers three official documents in its 
explanation: (i) the Council Decision on the EU conclusion of the CRPD; (ii) the 
Code of Conduct between the EU and its Member States; and (iii) the EU report 
to the CRPD Committee. The analysis is exhaustive because there are no other 
official documents found that explain the EU CRPD focal point. Besides, the 
analysis is inductive because it investigates the contents of the considered 
documents to confirm the opportunity to influence. 
The third sub-section investigates two sets of primary sources and will 
present controversial findings. Due to the scarcity of sources, the analysis is 
abductive and suggests intuitive conclusions. In sum, while the constituent 
documents of the EU CRPD focal point identify the broad EU Commission as the 
focal point, meeting notes and interviews suggest the leading role of a specific 
unit acting under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point. The sub-section 
questions why there is no official designation, and it explains that confidentiality 
can be both a necessity and a strategy. 
4.2.1 Implementation implies influencing the national and local 
levels 
The EU CRPD focal point oversees the implementation of the Convention, but 
the CRPD itself does not clarify what the duty to implement entails. This thesis 
assumes that the EU CRPD focal point can implement the Convention also by 
 
4 UN CRPD Art 33.1. 
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exercising its influence on the national and local levels. This sub-section 
investigates such an assumption to deduce an interpretation of the matter. In 
detail, if it was possible to state that implementing UN human rights treaties may 
also mean influencing national and local policies, then it could be inferred that 
this is a strategy to implement UN human rights treaties. This deductive condition 
would confirm that the EU CRPD focal point has the legitimate opportunity to 
influence the national and local levels on the implementation of the Convention’s 
principles. As such, this sub-section establishes two theoretical links: (i) the first 
one is between implementation and influence; and (ii) the second one is between 
implementation and the national and local levels. 
4.2.1.1 The link between implementation and influence 
The link between the human rights’ implementation and influence follows the 
explanations of Chapter 3 about the exercise of influence through soft resources 
and strategies. As such, if the general understanding of implementation included 
the use of soft resources and strategies, it could be possible to assume the link 
between implementation and influence.  
For instance, Humphrey suggested exciting reasoning about the meaning 
of implementation as different from that of enforcement. He said that the latter 
implies “an element of coercion or compulsion which is lacking in” the former.5 
The author explained that the duties that follow the conclusion of international 
human rights treaties include law enforcement as well as “certain procedures 
and organized social pressures like the force of public opinion which a lawyer 
might not recognize as legal institutions [and like] periodic reporting [and] public 
exposure”.6 
The suggested difference between enforcement and implementation 
mirrors the difference between power and influence, as described in Section 
3.2.1. These differences lay on the presence or absence of coercion. Therefore, 
the parties to international treaties may be asked either to enforce or to 
implement the concluded agreement. As such, while enforcement includes hard 
(coercive) means, implementation includes soft (influencing) instruments. Also, 
Humphrey listed some of these influencing instruments, which interestingly recall 
 
5 John P Humphrey, ‘The Implementation of International Human Rights Law’ (1978) 24 New 
York Law School Law Review 31, 34. 
6 ibid. 
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some ideas of the previous chapter. For instance, periodic reporting reminds the 
third step of the experimentalist governance processes, as explained by Sabel 
and Zeitlin,7 who also address the role of transparency as necessary public 
exposure to gain accountability.8 Therefore, the duty to implement international 
human rights entails governance processes that the theories included in Chapter 
3 described as potentially influencing.  
In short, the CRPD asks its parties to implement its principles, and the 
established focal points oversee the implementation processes. The Convention 
does not ask its parties to enforce its principles because it provides no 
enforcement measures as courts and sanctions. Thus, the EU CRPD focal point 
can meet its duties on the implementation of the Convention through the exercise 
of its influence.  
As defined in Section 3.2.1, exercising influence means to make or resist 
social changes without the use of coercion. Coherently with this definition, the 
German Human Rights Institution states that “to implement human rights treaties 
domestically, duty bearers have to: 
- adapt existing laws or pass new laws; 
- change or adapt administrative or financial measures; 
- issue national action plans and similar programmes; 
- […]; 
- regularly review and evaluate the results of these measures”.9 
In sum, implementation means to promote soft processes that aim to 
make social changes. Since these processes take place without coercion, they 
represent examples of intended social influence. Also, the first three points of the 
list above suggest that: (i) adapting or passing laws is a legal effect; (ii) changing 
or adapting administrative measures is an institutional effect; and (iii) issuing 
action plans is a political effect. Section 2.3 described these three kinds of effects 
on the EU conclusion of the CRPD. This convergence confirms that effective 
implementing measures have legal, institutional, and political effects. In addition, 
 
7 See Section 3.4.3: Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New 
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 
271, 274. 
8 See Section 3.4.3: ibid 313–315. 
9 ‘How Are Human Rights Implemented and How Is This Monitored?’ <https://www.institut-fuer-
menschenrechte.de/en/topics/development/frequently-asked-questions/5-how-are-human-
rights-implemented-and-how-is-this-monitored/> accessed 30 November 2018. 
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the last point about the revision and evaluation of results reminds the idea of 
peer review processes as described in Section 3.4.3 and analysed later on in 
this chapter. 
4.2.1.2 The link between implementation and the national and local levels 
The link between the human rights’ implementation and the national and local 
levels moves from the consideration that the human rights’ holders are 
individuals.10 Therefore, human rights principles are fulfilled by individuals, and 
individuals do not live in the international level but in countries and towns. This 
consideration is a cornerstone of the thesis as it is part of the research rationale 
described in Section 1.3.1. It means that the EU CRPD focal point’s policies 
might influence the national and local levels to reach the recipients of human 
rights policies. On this, one interviewee expert in human rights affirmed that: 
the CRPD is a legal instrument that is going to be implemented at 
the domestic level. I mean there’s people, and people live in 
countries. They don’t live in the EU as governance body. Therefore, 
if the CRPD is going to make a difference to people in the EU, it is 
going to make a difference to them in their towns and cities and 
local communities. So if you are not engaging at the national level 
then you’re not going to be making much of a difference vis a vis 
the CRPD.11 
The interpretation of the duty to implement is a crucial factor in defining 
the borders of the duty bearers obligations. For instance, the Icelandic Human 
Rights Centre defines implementation “in reference to actual compliance with 
human rights standards […] as well as all initiatives […] to enhance respect for 
human rights and prevent violations”.12 It goes on suggesting that the 
implementation “depends to a large extent on the political will [and] a co-
operative network of non-state actors and international institutions all ensure the 
 
10 See Section 1.1: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993 Preamble. 
11 ‘Interviewee 1’ (1 March 2018) 2. 
12 ‘Implementation’ (Mannréttindaskrifstofa Íslands) <http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-
rights-education-project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/part-i-the-concept-of-
human-rights/implementation> accessed 30 November 2018 (emphasis added). 
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effective implementation of the international norms and standards”.13 Also, “to 
implement international human rights standards, states must affirmatively 
incorporate them into domestic law”.14 
In sum, the Icelandic Human Rights Centre suggests that the 
implementation of human rights treaties is also a matter of cooperation. It is 
interesting to note that the Centre points to the cooperation between 
disaggregated international entities, reminding the concept introduced in Section 
3.5.3 with the ideas of Slaughter. Such international cooperation aims to 
incorporate human rights principles into national and local law. This because 
national and local courts can enforce human rights principles after their 
incorporation into domestic law. Therefore, the implementation of international 
human rights treaties aims to make changes at the national and local levels also 
to confer hard power on international human rights principles. This explanation 
means that the EU CRPD focal point can exercise its influence to implement the 
CRPD in order to incorporate its principles into law provisions that can be 
enforced at the domestic level of the EU Member States. This idea recalls 
Section 2.4.2, suggesting a sequence from cooperation, to minimum standards, 
to common rules. Before establishing common rules, it is essential to cooperate 
and agree on minimum standards. 
4.2.2 The role of the EU CRPD focal point from its constituent 
documents 
The previous sub-section explained that the EU CRPD focal point efforts on the 
implementation of the CRPD might include the exercise of influence on the 
national and local levels. The previous sub-section was mostly theoretical. 
Differently, this sub-section analyses the constituent documents of the EU CRPD 
focal point to develop inductive reasoning about the opportunity to influence the 
implementation of the Convention. 
The EU Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the CRPD 
designated the EU Commission as EU CRPD focal point.15 As such, the EU 
Commission should oversee the implementation of the Convention by the EU. A 
 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Article 3. 
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Code of Conduct followed the Council Decision on the EU conclusion of the 
CRPD. It “sets out the arrangements between the Council, the Member States 
and the Commission on […] the implementation of the Convention”.16 This 
document confirms that “the Commission shall be a focal point for matters related 
to the implementation of the Convention”.17 It also asks for cooperation between 
the EU’s and the EU Member States’ focal points “whenever the matter falls 
under shared competence”,18 and during monitoring and reporting procedures.19  
Apart from the CRPD, no other international human rights treaty has 
similar institutional cooperation between the treaty parties. This peculiar situation 
is a direct consequence of the EU accession to the Convention, which requires 
coordination with the EU Member States. In addition to this consideration, the 
quotation above about shared competence matters is the only indirect link of this 
sub-section to independent living rights. This because the constituent documents 
of the EU CRPD focal point set up an institutional architecture and do not address 
any specific human rights principle. This consideration will be valid also for the 
EU CRPD monitoring framework and coordination mechanism analysed in the 
next sections. 
Generally speaking, “as focal point, the Commission promotes cross-
sectoral coordination between its departments, with the other EU institutions and 
bodies, and between the EU and the Member States”.20 This description is how 
the EU Commission summarised its role as focal point to the CRPD Committee. 
Essentially, it mentioned only one task (promoting cross-sectoral coordination) 
to be fulfilled: (i) within the Commission; (ii) within the EU institutions; and (iii) 
within the EU borders. This third point indicates that the action of the EU CRPD 
focal point should reach national and local policies. As far as coordination is 
concerned, Section 2.4.2 suggested that the relationship between the EU and 
the national level usually moves from cooperation to minimum standards and 
 
16 EU Council Communication, Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and 
the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and 
representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2010 (2010/C 340/08 [OJ C 340/11]) para 1. 
17 ibid 11 (a). 
18 ibid 11 (c). 
19 ibid 12. 
20 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 3) 64. 
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common rules. Therefore, it is possible to interpret the EU CRPD focal point 
coordination with the national level as the first step of this process. 
The EU CRPD focal point needs to use coordination and influence instead 
of coercion and power. This because the designation of the EU Commission as 
the focal point regards “matters falling within the Community’s competence and 
without prejudice to the respective competences of the Member States”.21 This 
clarification means that the conferral principle affects the establishment of the 
EU CRPD-related governance. As explained in Section 2.4, the division of 
competences between the EU and its Member States is not neat. Due to this, 
the designation of the EU Commission as the EU CRPD focal point establishes 
uncertain tasks with the risk of increasing the distribution of power.  
As explained by Sabel and Zeitlin, uncertainty and multi-polar distribution 
of power are pre-conditions of experimentalist governance processes.22 This 
consideration means that the establishment of the EU CRPD focal point creates 
a situation that can nurture the raise of experimentalist governance architectures. 
Therefore, the need for soft resources and strategies is a consequence of a 
situation where the use of hard processes is uncertain and may be 
counterproductive even. However, the research found not many public 
documents released by the EU CRPD focal point, which contrasts with the 
principle of transparency as a necessary characteristic of experimentalist 
governance processes.23 The absence of official deliverables suggests probable 
difficulties of the EU Commission in realising experimentalist governance 
processes fully.  
4.2.3 The EU CRPD focal point and the Disability Unit 
The previous sub-section explained that official documents had established the 
broad EU Commission as the EU CRPD focal point. However, a pragmatic 
approach would suggest that there may be a specific office that oversees the 
relevant tasks. The intuitive findings presented in this sub-section confirm this 
assumption. 
 
21 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Article 3. 
22 See Section 3.4.3: Sabel and Zeitlin (n 7) 280; See also: Gráinne De Búrca, Robert O 
Keohane and Charles Sabel, ‘Global Experimentalist Governance’ (2014) 44 British 
Journal of Political Science 477, 848. 
23 See Section 3.4.3: Sabel and Zeitlin (n 7) 313–315. 
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Article 33 CRPD asks the States Parties to “designate one or more focal 
points within government”.24 As the EU Commission is the “principal executive 
body of the European Union”,25 its designation seems in compliance with the 
Convention’s request. However, the request is to establish the focal point within 
the government rather than designating the whole government. The CRPD 
Committee’s guidelines themselves clarify that “focal points could be a section 
or a person within a ministry or cluster of ministries, an institution, such as a 
disability commission, or a particular ministry, such as a ministry for human rights 
or a ministry for persons with disabilities, or a combination of the three”.26 On 
this, De Beco’s study found that “in all EU member States Parties to CRPD, the 
focal points are the ministries responsible for persons with disability” 27 rather 
than the governments in full.  
Therefore, the designation of the broad EU Commission as the only EU 
CRPD focal point is an interesting choice. May it be a signal that the entire 
executive branch of the EU is committed to the implementation of the CRPD? 
How does this work in practice? Despite the documentary search found no official 
designations of any specific unit, some primary sources indicated that a specific 
unit of the EU Commission has a leading role under the mandate of the EU 
CRPD focal point. As such, the investigation of this sub-section uses an 
abductive approach and reaches intuitive conclusions from the analysed 
documents and interviews.  
As for documents, the 2016 meetings’ minutes of the Disability High Level 
Group (analysed in detail in Section 4.4.3) show the leading presence of the DG 
EMPL Unit C3.28 “As focal point, the Commission promotes cross-sectoral 
coordination”, and leading the DHLG is part of this task.29 Therefore, it is 
 
24 UN CRPD Art 33. 
25 ‘The European Commission’ (European Parliament 2018) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.8.pdf> accessed 30 November 2018. 
26 ‘Handbook for Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and Its Optional Protocol’ (Secretariat for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2007) 14 94 <http://archive.ipu.org/PDF/publications/disabilities-e.pdf> 
accessed 12 December 2018. 
27 ibid. 
28 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2016) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
29 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 3) 64. 
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reasonable to infer that the DG EMPL Unit C3 acts under the mandate of the EU 
CRPD focal point when leading the DHLG.  
Also the webpage of the DHLG indicates EMPL as “Lead DG” because 
“the senior Commission representative will normally be the Director responsible 
for disability issues in the DG (since 1.1.2015, Employment, previously 
Justice)”.30 Besides, some of the DG EMPL’s activities concerning disability 
matters are published on a webpage titled “Persons with Disabilities”.31 This 
webpage includes basic information about the EU implementation of the CRPD, 
but there is no disclosure about this being the official webpage of the EU CRPD 
focal point. As such, this assumption can only be inferred. However, an informant 
of this thesis confirmed that the webpage could be considered a public outcome 
of the DG EMPL Unit C3 acting under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point.  
As for interviews, the interviewees broadly referred to the EU Commission 
as the EU CRPD focal point. However, two interviewees mentioned EMPL C3 as 
the hub of the EU Commission’s activities as CRPD focal point. In detail, one 
civil society representative said that decisions are: 
made by the Disability Unit which is also the focal point for the 
CRPD;32 
moreover, one EU Commission officer stated that their link with the EU CRPD 
focal point: 
takes place through the relevant policy unit in EMPL, i.e. C3.33 
Also several informants of this thesis confirmed the activity of the Disability Unit. 
They also confirmed that EMPL C3 is generally considered the EU CRPD focal 
point despite the absence of official designations. This uncertain situation 
probably results from the difficulties of the EU Commission to undertake informal 
processes on matters that have unclear competences. It is probable that there 
 
30 ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (Register of Commission Expert Groups) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 17 December 2018. 
31 ‘Persons with Disabilities’ (Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1137&langId=en> accessed 9 January 2019.  
32 ‘Interviewee 7’ (25 June 2018) 13. 
33 ‘Interviewee 11’ (11 May 2018) 2. 
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are contacts, meetings, and decisions, but they remain off-the-record. As Cram 
explained, “it is argued that the Commission has always operated in ‘the shadow 
of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994), with member states able to limit the available 
capacity of formal competences”.34 This aspect represents the counter effect of 
soft governance processes, and it is a practical example of the democratic deficit 
situation described by Craig and De Búrca.35 
4.3 The EU CRPD monitoring framework  
This section focuses on the EU CRPD monitoring framework exercising its 
influence on the implementation of the Convention and independent living rights. 
The analysis of this section is supported by a more significant number of 
documents than the previous section’s one. The greater availability of documents 
means that the work of the EU CRPD monitoring framework is less confidential 
than that of the EU CRPD focal point. Among other aspects, the section 
addresses this difference between the two entities. 
Four bodies constitute the international entity EU CRPD monitoring 
framework: (i) the EU Parliament; (ii) the EU Ombudsman; (iii) the EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA); and (iv) the European Disability Forum (EDF). 
Initial discussions about the establishment of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework show that the EU Commission insisted on the informality of the new 
entity and on being part of it. On the other hand, civil society representatives 
asked for a real independent entity, and they expressed doubts about the 
presence of the focal point in the monitoring framework.36 Among the two, the 
approach of the EU Commission initially prevailed, and it “identified five separate 
EU institutions and bodies that together would form ‘the EU framework’. These 
bodies are independent of each other and have the freedom to define their 
activities related to the UNCRPD within their current mandates and resources”.37 
 
34 Laura Cram, ‘In the Shadow of Hierarchy: Governance as a Tool of Government’ in Renaud 
Dehousse (ed), The ‘Community Method’: Obstinate or Obsolete? (Palgrave Macmillan UK 
2011) 151. 
35 See Section 3.3.2: Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 28–31. 
36 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group’ (EU Commission 2012) 5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
37 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
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The EU Commission was one of the five. However, after the formal concerns of 
the CRPD Committee about the inclusion of the EU CRPD focal point in the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework,38 in 2016, the EU Commission withdrew the 
framework39 without being replaced by any other member. Therefore, the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework now includes four members. 
The section includes three sub-sections that analyse the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework with different approaches. The first sub-section analyses 
the constituent documents of the framework to reach inductive conclusions. The 
second sub-section compares the design of the framework with the theoretical 
characteristics of international networks to develop deductive reasoning. Lastly, 
the third sub-section investigates the available primary sources to suggest 
intuitive considerations.  
4.3.1 The role of the EU CRPD monitoring framework from its 
constituent documents 
This first sub-section analyses the EU CRPD monitoring framework’s constituent 
documents. The analysis aims to explain that the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework’s mandate offers opportunities to influence the national and local 
levels on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
Generally speaking, the Convention states that the monitoring frameworks shall 
“promote, protect and monitor implementation”.40 As the previous section 
concluded that the implementation of the CRPD entails a certain level of 
influence on the national and local levels, then the effort to promote, protect and 
monitor implementation should concern the influence on the domestic level of 
the EU Member States. The sub-section explores this assumption. 
 
 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2012 1. 
38 ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the European Union’ (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/CO/1 paras 76–77 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2fC%2fEU%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
39 ‘Minutes of the EU High Level Group on Disability Meeting’ (EU Commission 2016) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 10 October 2018. 
40 UN CRPD Art 33.2. 
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4.3.1.1 Soft stance and independence of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework 
The constituent document of the EU CRPD monitoring framework is the 2012 
Commission Non Paper.41 In 2013, a Council Note made the framework 
operative.42 The Non Paper states that the members of the framework shall work 
in autonomy within their current mandates and resources.43 For this reason, 
“there does not appear to be a need for any new legal instrument in order to set 
up the framework”.44 Coherently, a document called Non Paper can be hardly 
classified as a hard legal instrument: it has not been published on the EU Official 
Journal, and it has no reference number even. It could be defined as a soft law 
instrument instead. Therefore, the soft document Non Paper constituted the soft 
entity EU CRPD monitoring framework. Following the conclusions of Chapter 3, 
soft governance entities exercise influence. 
This section’s introduction referred to meeting notes that show different 
preferences about providing independence to the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework as an international entity. It is evident that if the members of the 
framework “are independent of each other and have the freedom to define their 
activities related to the UNCRPD within their current mandates and resources”,45 
the framework is not independent of its members. The independence of its 
members can prevent the independence of the framework, which would not be 
free to promote peculiar activities. However, Dowding and Nye suggested that 
international entities usually tend to acquire independence from their constituent 
members and that their independence is proportional to their capacity to exert 
influence.46 This statement will be verified later on in this section in relation to the 
EU CRPD monitoring framework. 
 
41 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
42 EU Council Note Set up of the EU-level Framework required by Art. 33.2 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2013. 
43 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 1. 
44 ibid 2. 
45 ibid 1. 
46 See Section 3.5.1: Keith M Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power (Edward Elgar 
1991) 118; Joseph S Nye, The Future of Power (1st edn, PublicAffairs 2011) 108. 
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The analysed constituent documents show four matters of fact: (i) the EU 
Commission is the EU CRPD focal point; (ii) the monitoring framework should 
monitor the focal point; (iii) the EU Commission decided to be included in the 
framework against the opposition of other actors; and (iv) the EU Commission 
decided on the independence of the framework’s members. These four matters 
of fact describe the exercise of a situational strategy as defined by Dowding.47 It 
is probable that the EU Commission recognised the potential influence of the 
constituting EU CRPD monitoring framework, and it tried to join the situation 
either to resist or to take advantage of the potential influence of the new entity. 
As such, the CRPD Committee asking and obtaining the withdrawal of the EU 
Commission from the EU CRPD monitoring framework can be explained in terms 
of influencing relationships. 
Also some interviewees expressed concerns about the few independence 
of the EU CRPD monitoring framework. For instance, one interviewee who 
participated in the framework activities held the view that the framework’s 
members have no new mandates, which means that:  
[their] role within the framework is merely an extension of [their] 
main mandate.48  
In addition to independence and mandate, also the availability of resources is a 
pivotal condition to perform additional tasks. On this, two interviewees 
highlighted that neither the framework nor the four members had additional 
resources, affecting their possibilities to produce outcomes.49  
As suggested in Section 3.3.1, control over economic resources can be a 
strategy to exercise influence. This consideration allows inferring that the EU 
Commission wanted to maintain its control over the economic resources of the 
EU CRPD monitoring framework as a strategy to preserve its leading stance. On 
this, Nye talked about economic power as different from hard and soft power.50 
Therefore, any dispute about the resources of the EU CRPD monitoring 
 
47 See Section 3.2.3: Dowding (n 46) 47–49. 
48 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 11) 1. 
49 ibid 3; ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 2. 
50 See Section 3.3.1: Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 
(Public Affairs 2004) 2. 
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framework could be an influencing relationship that affects the balance of power 
between different entities.  
With limited independence and resources, the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework needs other means to exercise its influence. For instance, it might 
promote networking processes. Sabel and Zeitlin suggested that networking 
under common aims is the first step to establish experimentalist governance 
processes.51 The authors argued that weak independence and resources entail 
uncertainty, which is pre-condition for experimentalist governance.52 The need 
for soft processes increases the dispositional opportunities to exercise influence, 
and the following sub-sections will seek verification of this assumption. 
4.3.1.2 The complementarity of the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
The constituent documents of the EU CRPD monitoring framework conferred few 
independence and resources on the new entity. Despite this, they included two 
fields of action in the mandate of the framework: (i) within the areas where the 
EU has competence; and (ii) within the EU administration.53 The first field of 
action includes the areas of shared competence, which involve the EU Member 
States. Therefore, the activities of the EU CRPD monitoring framework should 
somehow interact with their domestic level. For this reason, the Non Paper states 
that the EU and the EU Member States CRPD monitoring frameworks are 
complementary.54 Besides, one interviewee who participated in the EU 
framework’s meetings clarified that: 
[also the framework members’] complement each other’s work.55  
This part of the sub-section investigates the effects of these two kinds of 
complementarity: (i) external between the EU and the EU Member States 
monitoring frameworks; and (ii) internal between the four members of the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework. 
 
51 See Section 3.4.3: Sabel and Zeitlin (n 7) 274. 
52 See Section 3.4.3: ibid 280. 
53 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 3. 
54 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
55 ‘Interviewee 5’ (14 March 2018) 1. 
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(i) The external complementarity between the EU and the EU Member 
States monitoring frameworks promotes an influencing relationship where the 
EU has a leading role. Generally speaking, to complement means to make 
something better by adding anything that was formerly lacking. Therefore, the 
interaction between the EU and the EU Member States CRPD monitoring 
frameworks should add value to their individual action. 
The idea of complementarity is mentioned several times in the 2012 Non 
Paper56 that describes the role of the EU CRPD monitoring framework. 
Previously, the 2010 Code of Conduct57 stated the importance of cooperation 
between the EU and its Member States, especially to reach common positions 
for shared competence matters. Therefore, it is probable that the idea of 
complementarity is an evolution of the stated need for cooperation to reach 
common positions. As such, common positions between the EU and the EU 
Member States CRPD monitoring frameworks would be the added value 
resulting from their complementarity.  
The previous section explained that the cooperation to reach common 
positions could be an influencing relationship in which the EU has a leading role. 
What explained for the EU CRPD focal point can be valid also for the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework. Therefore, this can lead to common positions when 
complementing the EU Member States CRPD monitoring frameworks. Leading 
common positions is a strategy to influence the national and local levels, and it 
is a pre-condition to set minimum standards first and then common rules. 
(ii) The internal complementarity between the four members of the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework limits the independence and influence of the 
framework itself. In fact, leading to common positions would mean to deliver 
public outcomes. However, an interviewee activist for disability rights revealed 
that: 
[from the EU CRPD monitoring framework] you don’t hear any joint 
kind of statement, there’s no communication, something public […] 
they simply meet and then brief each other on what each part of 
 
56 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
57 EU Council Communication 2010/C 340/08. 
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the mechanism has done in the period between then and the last 
meeting.58  
This situation happens because the EU CRPD monitoring framework is not an 
independent entity, and its members act under their separate mandates. For this 
reason, the previous interviewee wondered:  
[if the four members of the framework] would have done it whether 
they were part of [the framework] or not.59  
This idea means that if the members of the EU CRPD monitoring framework act 
under their usual mandates, they would probably undertake the same actions 
despite being or not part of the framework. On the same matter, another 
interviewee who was involved in the framework activities confirmed that: 
independently from [the members’] role in the CRPD monitoring 
framework for the EU, [they] have a role in terms of supporting 
Member States to implement the CRPD within the context of the 
CRPD as this is a mixed agreement.60  
Which confirms the concerns of the previous interviewee. However, working 
together should provide positive outcomes. Lastly, a third interviewee who was 
an EU officer participating in the framework’s meetings explained that:  
these organisations come together in the European monitoring 
framework and what [they do] is kind of complement each other’s 
work.61 
In short, these three interviewees explained that the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework’s mandate does not prevail over the single mandate of its members. 
This condition is because the Non Paper is a soft law instrument, and it cannot 
prevail over the EU Treaties stating the hard mandate of the EU Parliament and 
Ombudsman, for instance. This situation causes issues because the four 
 
58 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 2. 
59 ibid. 
60 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 11) 1. 
61 ‘Interviewee 5’ (n 55) 1. 
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members of the EU CRPD monitoring framework work within their different 
official mandates. For this reason, EDF raised the concern that “the mandate of 
the framework as set out in the note endorsed by the Council does not seem to 
correspond to the mandates of the individual members”,62 and this may affect 
the role of the framework itself. This situation prevents the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework from publishing its peculiar outcomes because any outcome would 
include issues on which some of its members have no competence. However, 
the members complement each other’s work. This consideration means that the 
outcomes of the framework are its four members’ separate outcomes when 
deriving from previous coordination within the framework.  
This issue explains why an EU-officer interviewee pointed out that the 
mandate of any framework’s member is a barrier for the member itself to exercise 
the broad mandate of the EU CRPD monitoring framework.63 Therefore, while 
the members cannot commit to the framework’s broad mandate, the realisation 
of the framework’s broad mandate depends on the complementarity of the four 
members. Coherently, another interviewee confirmed that:  
unfortunately, the EU framework has no mandate to really –how to 
say?– to really independently look at the implementation of for 
example Article 19 within the European Union, so this will be the 
work that the separate members are doing separately.64  
The Non Paper states that each member of the framework “will be able to 
maximise the effectiveness of its own relevant activities and to co-ordinate them 
with the other participants”,65 which summarises the clear will to avoid the 
establishment of an independent entity. On the other hand, coordinated activities 
should maximise the effectiveness of the single members’ efforts on the 
monitoring of the CRPD implementation. 
 
62 ‘Meeting of the EU Framework to Promote, Protect and Monitor the UN CRPD’ (EU CRPD 
Framework 2015) 5 <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/people-disabilities/eu-crpd-
framework/resources> accessed 11 December 2015. 
63 ‘Interviewee 3’ (7 March 2018) 3. 
64 ‘Interviewee 5’ (n 55) 1. 
65 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 3. 
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As for the focal point, De Beco explained that also the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework is very different from the solutions adopted by the EU Member States. 
In detail, these have adopted two alternatives: either (i) they have expanded the 
mandate of their NHRIs, equality bodies, and Ombudsmen; or (ii) they have 
established a new body with the univocal mandate of monitoring the 
implementation of the CRPD.66 As such, the informality of the EU CRPD focal 
point and monitoring framework seems to adhere to the same strategy that has 
been preferring soft governance instruments to hard solutions. 
4.3.2 Networks’ features of the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
The previous sub-section presented the concerns of some interviewees about 
the EU CRPD monitoring framework not being a formal and independent 
governance entity. Also the documentary investigation confirmed that the 
framework coordinates the outcomes of its four members instead of producing 
distinctive outcomes. However, this coordinative work can offer opportunities to 
exercise some influence. For instance, the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
shows characteristics of international networks, and Section 3.5 explained that 
these could exercise influence on the national and local levels. As such, this sub-
section assesses the framework’s opportunities to influence through its 
comparison with the influencing features of international networks. 
Section 3.5 described international networks as independent and 
deliberative entities that exercise influence. However, the previous sub-section 
explained that the EU CRPD monitoring framework is neither independent nor 
deliberative. Therefore, the framework cannot be adequately described as an 
international network, even if it shows some characteristics of international 
networks. For instance, the Non Paper establishes horizontal relationships 
between four international entities in order to share information,67 and this aspect 
recalls Slaughter’s description of horizontal information networks.68 Besides, the 
 
66 Gauthier De Beco, ‘Study on the Implementation of Article 33 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Europe’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner on 
Human Rights 2014) 47 
<https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/ICC/GeneralMeeting/25/Meeting%20Documents/Study%20on%
20the%20Implementation%20of%20Article%2033%20of%20CRPD.pdf> accessed 10 
October 2018. 
67 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 3. 
68 See Section 3.5.3: Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 
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importance of information sharing was addressed by Warschauer and Maoz 
when stating that it promotes horizontal relations69 and supports the control of 
the flow of influence.70 This is because access to information is a resource to 
exercise soft power, as explained by Nye.71 This means that although the Non 
Paper does not create an independent international network, it establishes a 
horizontal relationship between different entities that handle an influencing 
resource as information. 
On the other hand, the fact that the EU CRPD monitoring framework is not 
an independent entity is the principal limit to define it as an international network. 
This limit affects its vertical effects. Slaughter explained that the vertical effects 
of international networks could promote enforcement and harmonisation.72 If the 
framework cannot deliberate, the attempt to enforce and harmonise policies 
remains on its members’ activities. However, the coordination promoted by the  
EU CRPD monitoring framework exercises a positive influence on its members’ 
complementary work. The Non Paper states that “by acting within a coordinated 
work plan […] each of them will be able to maximise the effectiveness of its own 
relevant activities”.73 
As said in the previous sub-section, the Non Paper denies additional 
resources to both the EU CRPD monitoring framework and its members. Also 
the CRPD Committee expressed its concerns about this issue.74 The lack of 
resources is an evident limit to the exercise of influence. However, Lukes, Wrong, 
and Dowding pointed out that the availability of resources does not guarantee 
any exercise75 of influence but only its latency76 and relevant dispositional 
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properties.77 This consideration means that the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
networking opportunities to influence are affected by a lack of resources, but they 
are present and latent. For instance, Galbraith and Zaring suggested that 
international networks tend to gain independence from the entities that establish 
and constitute them.78 Therefore, the EU CRPD monitoring framework may try 
to improve its independence as a resource to exert influence. The verification of 
this assumption is part of the next sub-section’s analysis. 
As said, the EU CRPD monitoring framework cannot be appropriately 
defined as an international network. However, it networks. This characteristic 
means that it establishes relationships between international entities. For 
instance, the Non Paper mentions the four members of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework as well as other international bodies that are part of the established 
monitoring net. Nye explained that the opportunity to create and manage social 
networks is a strategy to exercise influence.79 Therefore, it is possible to argue 
that the EU CRPD monitoring framework creates and manages networking 
opportunities to influence. 
For instance, the Non Paper states that COHOM discussed the design of 
the EU CRPD monitoring framework.80 COHOM is the Working Party on Human 
Rights of the EU Council. It “handles all human rights aspects of the external 
relations of the European Union and supports the Council’s decision-making 
process in this area”.81 COHOM promotes, protects, and monitors human rights 
as a mandate. Also, it has direct links with the United Nations, the EU institutions 
and bodies, and the EU Member States governments. The next sub-section will 
show that COHOM actively engages with the EU CRPD monitoring framework. 
In addition to COHOM, “while not formally a part of the EU framework in order to 
respect its judicial independence, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(ECJ) contributes […] complementing the role of the EU framework”.82 
 
77 See Section 3.2.3: Dowding (n 46) 4–5. 
78 See Section 3.5.2: Jean Galbraith and David Zaring, ‘Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law’ 
(2014) 99 Cornell Law Review 735, 746. 
79 See Section 3.5.1: Nye (n 46) 17–18. 
80 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
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81 ‘Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM)’ (EU Monitor) 
<https://www.eumonitor.eu/9353000/1/j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vh7ej5swx01d> accessed 5 
December 2018. 
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Furthermore, the Non Paper mentions several international networks as: (i) 
the European Disability Forum (member of the framework); (ii) the Network of 
European Ombudsmen83 (established by the EU Ombudsman); and (iii) the 
Fundamental Rights Platform84 (led by FRA). In this case, the framework seems 
like Slaughter would define a network of networks.85  
4.3.3 The reported work of the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
This sub-section includes an analysis of the primary sources that report the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework activities. It aims to show evidence that supports 
the deductive and inductive reasoning of the previous two sub-sections. The 
investigation of this third sub-section is possible because a member of the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework acts as the official secretariat, and it publishes 
some outcomes of its activity. FRA was the secretariat of the framework at the 
time of this research. The published outcomes can be divided into two groups: 
(i) meetings’ minutes; and (ii) work programmes. As such, the sub-section 
includes this brief introduction and two parts: (i) the first part analyses the 
meetings’ minutes; and (ii) the second part focuses on the work programmes of 
the EU CRPD monitoring framework. 
The previous sub-section assumed that the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework tries to gain independence from the entities that established and 
constitute it. This because the framework has some dispositional properties of 
international networks. These properties can promote processes that improve 
independence and influence. The first evidence that supports the assumption is 
that the members of the EU CRPD framework agreed on standard Operational 
Provisions, which include hierarchic roles. In synthesis, “the Chair of the EU 
Framework is appointed for two years and is subject to a rotation system […] 
FRA is currently Chair of the Framework. The EU Framework Secretariat, also 
appointed for two years, coordinates the organisation and preparation of 
meetings. FRA is currently Framework Secretariat”.86 This internal organisation 
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is an evident attempt to set a minimum of independence, which can be a 
resource to influence. 
On the other hand, the Operational Provisions state that “the role of the 
Chairperson shall not go beyond tasks related to the conduct of its meetings”, 
and that “the Secretariat will […] carry out organisational tasks”.87 This means 
that the two roles have the only function to coordinate the meetings of the 
framework’s members, without further mandates to represent the framework 
itself. This clarification limits the independence of chairperson and secretariat, 
and that of the EU CRPD monitoring framework as a consequence. However, 
the framework’s members coordinate their activities through work programmes 
that result from meetings that are organised by the chairperson and the 
secretariat.88 Lastly, the secretariat has the task to maintain the webpage of the 
framework.89 This webpage includes the documents analysed in this sub-section. 
 
 
Figure 4-1 - Comparison between the webpages of the EU CRPD focal point and 
the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
The presence of a webpage that is explicitly dedicated to the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework and that includes reported outcomes represents an 
essential difference with the EU CRPD focal point.90 The screenshots above 
 
87 ‘Operational Provisions’ (EU CRPD Framework) 1–2 <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/people-
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90 See Section 4.2.3. 
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visually compare the two webpages. On the one left, the figure does not indicate 
the belonging to the EU CRPD focal point. On the other right, there is a clear title 
that names the EU CRPD monitoring framework, and also a banner with links to 
documents concerning the same entity. 
This difference may represent a different strategy on transparency. Also, 
the publication of a dedicated webpage could be proof of independence. In turn, 
the presence of a dedicated webpage can improve the independence of the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework as well as the transparency of its outcomes. 
Besides, independence and transparency can improve the framework’s 
opportunities to influence.  
On the other hand, the structure of the webpage does not mirror the 
independence of the framework. In fact, it includes an introductory home page91 
and five thematic pages: (i) promotion;92 (ii) protection;93 (iii) monitoring;94 (iv) 
review process;95 and (v) resources.96 The first three thematic pages have the 
same sub-structure, including four sub-pages: one for each of the four 
framework’s members. This division shows that promotion, protection, and 
monitoring are not tasks of the framework, but they are duties of its members 
singularly taken in the remits of their different mandates. Therefore, the question 
is: what are the tasks of the EU CRPD monitoring framework? 
The documents uploaded on the webpage include: (i) the framework 
meetings’ agendas and minutes; and (ii) the work programmes as agreed during 
those meetings. The documentary search of this research concluded in 
December 2018, when there were 17 reports and two work programmes 
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uploaded on the website and available for consultation. As the framework’s 
constituent meeting took place the 23 January 2013, the framework’s members 
had met three times a year so far. Among the 17 meetings, 2 involved the EU 
Member States’ CRPD monitoring frameworks and 1 involved the EU CRPD 
focal point.97 The following inductive analysis includes an investigation of all 
these documents, and it is exhaustive of the available sources as a 
consequence. 
Lastly, the minutes of the framework’s meetings include the name of the 
participants. These names had been included in the list of possible interviewees 
for the research. 
4.3.3.1 The EU CRPD monitoring framework meetings’ minutes 
This part of the sub-section analyses the meetings’ minutes of the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework. The documentary search concluded in December 2018; 
as a consequence, it includes the 17 meetings’ minutes published until that date. 
The investigation is exhaustive because it considers all the documents available 
at the time of the research. The exposition respects the chronology of the 
meetings in order to show the development of specific issues. The analysis aims 
to find shreds of evidence that support the assumptions of the previous sub-
sections about the EU CRPD monitoring framework opportunities to influence. 
During the 2013 constituent meeting of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework, the EU Commission’s opinion was that the Non Paper would have 
strengthened the role of the framework’s members rather than enforced a new 
entity. The EU Commission stated that “working together as EU framework these 
bodies will create synergies and enhance the impact of their individual 
activities”.98 The view of the EU Commission was that the framework’s actions 
“would have to be as ‘light’ as possible”.99 On the contrary, the other participants 
in the meeting would have preferred a different approach. For instance, “the PETI 
Committee […] emphasised its preference for a pragmatic approach”, “the 
 
97 As far as the meeting with the focal point is concerned, it took place the 3 October 2017 but 
only the agenda is available, whereas the minutes are not.  
98 ‘Minutes of the Constituent Meeting of the EU Framework to Promote, Protect and Monitor 
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99 ibid 4. 
 
 
 133 
Ombudsman welcomed the opportunity to work with the other bodies”, and “FRA 
and EDF emphasised the significance of appropriate coordination in the 
Framework in order for the EU to become a best practice example for other state 
parties”.100 
These short quotations show the exercise of situational influence101 on 
the establishment of the new entity.102 For instance, it is possible to read the 
word light with the meaning of soft, which links to influence. As such, it might be 
argued that the EU Commission preferred to establish a non-independent entity 
to confer only light (soft) power on it. In addition, FRA and EDF explicitly referred 
to the opportunity to influence national authorities declaring that the framework 
should have become a best practice example. This idea reminds Newman and 
Posner when classifying best practices as a soft law instrument,103 as well as 
Slaughter in stating that information networks spread best practices.104 It also 
recalls the experience of the OMC as an instrument to identify and spread best 
practices.105 On this, EDF showed a piece of evidence of this kind of influence 
because it “noted that a member State had used the membership of the 
European Commission in the EU framework to justify its government 
participation in the national framework”.106 
Also during the second meeting of the EU CRPD monitoring framework, 
some members expressed their concerns about the non-independence of the 
new entity. As suggested in the previous parts of this section, independence can 
be a resource for influencing. Therefore, increasing independence is a strategy 
to improve influencing opportunities. For instance, “PETI asked to put more 
emphasis on the principle that members contribute collectively to the 
Framework’s tasks, [and] EDF suggested the publication of an annual report of 
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Framework’s activities”.107 It seems that EDF would have liked to have public 
outcomes authored by the framework as an independent entity, and the probable 
reason for this was to increment its independence and consequent opportunities 
to influence.  
As explained in Section 4.3.1.2, this is not possible due to the internal 
complementarity of the framework. This explanation finds confirmation through 
the inductive investigation of the 2014 meeting minutes. In fact, “the EO and FRA 
underlined that their respective mandates do not allow them to issue 
recommendations and opinions as part of the Framework”.108 However, this limit 
should have been clear from the outset because the Non Paper established a 
non-independent entity. 
Section 4.3.2 included the hypothesis that the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework might have tried to emancipate itself from its members due to its 
properties as an international network. The 2015 meetings’ minutes document 
an attempt to gain independence. These show a proposal about the possibility 
of a joint press release. However, the framework’s members found it challenging 
to deliberate on the proposal because they were unsure about the logo(s) to 
include in the document.109 As such, the attempt failed, but the theoretical 
tendency to gain independence has been verified and explained as a strategy to 
increase influencing opportunities.  
In addition, “FRA underlined that although elaborating a common position 
is difficult, it is in favour of organising a discussion between different actors. FRA 
added that it is the implementation of existing legislation at national and local 
level across the EU that is problematic”.110 Therefore, “the members agreed that 
contacts with national monitoring mechanisms should be more structured and 
frequent”.111 In line with the explanation of the previous sub-section, what FRA 
seems to suggest is to take advantage of the networking opportunities of the 
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framework to gain independence and exercise influence on the national and local 
levels. 
Moreover, the meetings also focused on the lack of resources. On this, 
already in 2013, “EDF pointed out that without additional funding it is difficult […] 
to have the capacity to carry out this role, and noted that the option to establish 
funding for this had not been considered”.112 Two years later, once again, “EDF 
highlighted [that] the secretariat function should be provided with sufficient 
resources”.113 Without independence and resources, the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework might hardly exercise its influence. On the other hand, it can try to 
improve its independence and resources by promoting soft processes. As 
explained by De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel, the need for soft resources and 
strategies is a pre-condition to undertake experimentalist governance 
processes.114 
The 2016 meeting involved the national CRPD monitoring frameworks. 
The participants agreed that it would have been significant “prioritising certain 
thematic areas [and] concentrating their work on these issues [and] collaborating 
with partners […] to pool resources and increase impact”.115 Sabel and Zeitlin 
suggested that networking and sharing common aims is the first step to establish 
experimentalist governance processes.116 Also, the quotation shows a clear will 
to pool resources in order to increase influence. This finding means that the 
participants wanted to take advantage of their collaboration as a resource to 
influence. This consideration confirms the pre-condition of intentionality to define 
any influencing relationship, as suggested by Scott.117 
This meeting with the EU Member States CRPD monitoring frameworks 
influenced the EU CRPD monitoring framework. This deduction is because the 
2016 meeting minutes include suggestions to focus on thematic areas in order 
to improve cooperation. Furthermore, the participants decided on a joint 
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newsletter.118 Finally, the EU CRPD monitoring framework had its first distinctive 
outcome. The winter 2016-2017 newsletter was “the first of what will be a regular 
newsletter giving updates on the EU Framework’s activities”.119 This means that 
the EU CRPD monitoring framework considered to produce independent 
activities. 
In 2017, the “EU Framework members discussed options for a thematic 
focus for the meeting. Given that the CRPD Committee has just adopted a draft 
General Comment on Article 19 of the CRPD, it was proposed to focus on the 
theme of independent living”.120 This thematic meeting involved the national 
frameworks. During the meeting, a member of the CRPD Committee introduced 
the Draft General Comment on Article 19. In addition, the participants agreed on 
reaching a common position on specific topics of the Draft. Furthermore, a civil 
society activist talked about ESI Funds to support independent living, and the 
participants agreed that “it would be useful for national frameworks to be 
informed of how the monitoring of the funds functions”.121 This meeting is a real 
example of influence from the EU CRPD monitoring framework on the national 
level. In detail, the framework took advantage of its networking prerogatives to 
organise a meeting with experts and national representatives. Then it used the 
meeting to share information. Lastly, it led the sharing of common positions on 
the matters at stake. This episode seems a smart strategy122 that uses the 
available resources to exercise influence. 
For the first time, the minutes of the 2017 meeting include an action point 
that refers to the EU CRPD monitoring framework individually. It says that “the 
Framework met with the Council’s working group on human rights (COHOM) to 
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discuss the EU’s ratification of the Optional Protocol. It also provided a CEPOL 
webinar on how EU agencies and bodies can better implement the convention 
in their work”.123 This finding means that there are off-the-record activities of the 
framework. Also, this action point emphasises that the use of technology is an 
essential resource for the EU CRPD monitoring framework. On this, it created its 
webpage, its newsletter, and a webinar to train EU staff members. This 
consideration confirms Burkhardt and Brass describing technology as a resource 
that shapes smart strategies to exercise influence.124 
4.3.3.2 The EU CRPD monitoring framework work programmes 
This part of the sub-section analyses the work programmes of the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework. The documentary search concluded in December 2018; 
as a consequence, it includes documents published until that date. The 
documentary search found two work programmes as well as other primary 
sources about the work programmes themselves. The two available work 
programmes are biannual planning, and they cover two two-year periods: 2015-
2016,125 and 2017-2018.126 Their analysis aims to find shreds of evidence that 
support the assumptions of the previous sub-sections about the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework opportunities to influence. 
 The Operational Provisions state that “the members of the Framework 
undertake to share information about their respective work programmes with a 
view to identify relevant activities for a coordinated annual work programme of 
the Framework”.127 They add that “the members will carry out their respective 
activities and tasks individually within their remit and under their sole 
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responsibility”.128 The Provisions mention “activities that will be implemented by 
[…] the Framework as a whole [but only] on a case-by-case basis”.129 Lastly, 
they add that “the complementarity of the EU Framework with national 
Frameworks and monitoring mechanisms will also be reflected in the work 
programme”.130 These passages emphasise issues like the independence of the 
framework and its networking opportunities.  
 The meetings’ minutes of the EU CRPD monitoring framework show 
several discussions about the work programmes and an evolution of the 
approach on the work programmes themselves. For instance, in 2013, the EU 
Commission stated that “the annual work programme should not be too formal 
but rather reflect the effort of dovetailing the agenda of the different members”.131 
Instead, in 2018, the members agreed on implementing their coordinated work 
programme during “a political meeting of the EU Framework […] to discuss 
modalities for possible Framework engagement in key files”.132 This different 
approach to the work programme entails the attempt to gain independence by 
increasing the opportunities to influence as a consequence. 
It is interesting to highlight that the EU Commission withdrew the 
framework in 2016.133 Therefore, it is probable that the 2018 attempt to engage 
in key files was an opportunity enabled by the EU Commission leaving the 
framework. This because the EU Commission left the situation and the 
opportunity to exercise its outcome influence.134 
As said, discussions about the work programme are included in several 
meetings’ minutes.135 These show three main lines of discussion: (i) decisions 
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on action points; (ii) evaluation of implemented actions; and (iii) decisions on new 
action points. These lines of discussion remind the scheme with which Sabel and 
Zeitlin described experimentalist governance processes.136 As such, this verifies 
what assumed in Section 4.3.1 about the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
showing similarities to experimentalist governance processes. 
 The work programmes are based on the framework’s mandate. As stated 
in Article 33 CRPD, the framework’s mandate is to promote, protect, and monitor 
the implementation of the Convention.137 Based on this mandate, “the members 
discussed their ideas for a work programme […] divided between the three main 
functions of Article 33 of the Convention”138 in order “to reflect the CRPD 
Committee’s designation of promotion, protection and monitoring activities”.139 
For this reason, the two work programmes have the same structure, which 
includes three parts: (i) promotion; (ii) protection; and (iii) monitoring. However, 
the 2017-2018 work programme also includes a fourth part about the 
“coordination and operation of the framework”.140 This addition can be 
interpreted as another attempt to increase the independence of the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework. 
The three different parts of the two work programmes (promotion, 
protection, and monitoring) include four items: (i) framework’s activities; (ii) 
responsible member(s); (iii) timeframe; and (iv) updates and notes. The figure 
below illustrates this organisation. 
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Two considerations on the first and fourth items seem interesting. First, 
some of the framework’s activities included in the work programmes can be 
classified following the classification of international networks as suggested by 
Slaughter: (a) inform; (b) enforce; and (c) harmonise.141 For instance: (a) the 
maintenance of the website aims to inform; (b) the analysis of EU legislation “to 
ensure compliance with the CRPD” is an enforcing measure; and (c) “develop 
and disseminate information and training material” is a strategy to harmonise 
relevant policies. This correspondence verifies that the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework takes advantage of its networking opportunities as resources to 
increase its independence and influence. 
Second, updates and notes explain more in detail what the responsible 
member(s) should do to perform their activities. The need for these more in-depth 
explanations is a consequence of the fact that the work programmes are 
widespread. In fact, the framework’s activities do not address any specific topic 
of the Convention. For instance, the 2017-2018 work programme suggests the 
activity to “collect data on and assess the application of EU law related to the 
implementation of the CRPD”.142 Under this activity: (i) the EU Parliament will 
screen documents; (ii) EDF will produce a human rights report; (iii) FRA will 
publish its “indicators on implementation of Article 19 CRPD in all 28 EU Member 
States”; and (iv) the EU Ombudsman is not mentioned, probably because it has 
no mandate on this activity.143 The quotation of Article 19 represents the only 
case in which the work programmes refer to a specific right of the Convention. 
The fact that the work programmes are not detailed can be a missed 
opportunity to exercise influence. On this, an interviewee was concerned about 
the lack of focus on specific topics of the Convention. In particular, this civil 
society activist said that: 
[the EU CRPD monitoring framework’s members] should be more 
proactive to identify some issues that require more attention, that 
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are problematic and then they should pursue that together, to have 
a correct plan.144  
Figure 4-2 - Organisation of the analysed EU CRPD monitoring framework’s work 
programmes 
The critical point is that each right included in the CRPD should be 
promoted, protected, and monitored. As such, the work programmes should be 
more specific and explain the engagement of the framework on each principle of 
the Convention. This alternative organisation (see figure below) could strengthen 
the role of the framework and lead the internal complementarity of its members. 
In this way, each member would engage in every CRPD principle within the 
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remits of its mandate. With this alternative organisation, the members would 
complement their activities with regard to each right of the Convention. 
 This alternative organisation might enhance the influencing role of the 
framework by clarifying the tasks of each member about every principle of the 
Convention. However, it is unlikely that the EU CRPD monitoring framework 
could perform a similar organisation without increasing its independence and 
resources. 
Figure 4-3 - Alternative organisation of the EU CRPD monitoring framework’s 
work programmes 
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4.4 The EU CRPD coordination mechanism 
This section focuses on the EU CRPD coordination mechanism exercising its 
influence on the implementation of the Convention and independent living rights. 
Four bodies constitute the international entity EU CRPD coordination 
mechanism: (i) the EU Commission’s Inter-Service Group on Disability; (ii) the 
EU Council Human Rights Working Group; (iii) the Disability High Level Group; 
and (iv) the Work Forum. 
The analysis of these four bodies is affected by the availability of public 
documents, which is not uniform. In fact, the EU CRPD coordination mechanism 
does not produce distinctive outcomes. On the other hand, only the Disability 
High Level Group and the Work Forum share public outcomes about their 
coordination on the Convention. This consideration means that the EU CRPD 
coordination mechanism’s members have different levels of confidentiality. 
Among other aspects, the section addresses this characteristic. 
 In 2014, the EU Commission communicated to the CRPD Committee that: 
(i) “the Commission’s Inter-Service Group on Disability plays an important 
coordination role” within the Commission itself; (ii) “formal coordination with the 
Member States is ensured through the human rights working group (COHOM) of 
the Council”; (iii) “issues relating to the implementation of the CRPD are also 
regularly discussed at the DHLG with representatives of the Member States and 
their national focal points”; and (iv) “to facilitate the exchange and mutual learning 
between the EU and the Member States on the governance of the CRPD, the 
Commission has since 2010 hosted a Work Forum on the Implementation of the 
UN Convention”.145 The EU Commission included these four bodies under the 
heading “coordination mechanism”. Therefore, it seems possible to infer that the 
totality of their CRPD-related activities represents the activities of the EU CRPD 
coordination mechanism, even if this has not been officially established. As such, 
this section includes four sub-sections, one for each of these bodies. 
 A preliminary remark seems interesting. The CRPD asks its Parties to 
establish “a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related 
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action in different sectors and at different levels”.146 The CRPD Committee 
explained that these different levels involve three dimensions: (i) intra-
governmental; (ii) inter-governmental “coordination at the local, regional and 
national/federal levels”; (iii) and extra-governmental involving civil society 
actors.147 Therefore, the EU CRPD coordination mechanism should involve the 
national and local levels based on the second dimension. This mandate is 
broader than that of the EU CRPD monitoring framework, which has a limited 
interference on those levels.148 The section investigates if this different mandate 
develops opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights.  
4.4.1 The EU Commission’s Inter-Service Group on Disability 
This first sub-section analyses the contribution of the EU Commission Inter-
Service Group on Disability (DISG) on the EU CRPD coordination mechanism. 
As no outcomes of the DISG are public and available, the following abductive 
analysis focuses on other kinds of sources.  
The EU Commission explained to the CRPD Committee that the role of 
the DISG is “ensuring that the needs and rights of people with disabilities are 
taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of legislative 
proposals and policy initiatives”.149 The EU Parliament states that “the 
Commission is the EU institution that has the monopoly on legislative 
initiative”,150 on the bases of Art 17.2 TEU. Besides, they establish five legal 
instruments that bind and influence national governments.151 Therefore, if the 
DISG influences the legislative initiatives of the EU Commission on respecting 
the CRPD, then any direct influence of the DISG on EU legislation represents an 
indirect influence on the implementation of the Convention. However, the 
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absence of public documents that confirm any attempt of the DISG to influence 
the EU Commission’s legislative initiative prevents any verification of the 
suggested intuitive reasoning. 
 “The first meetings of the Inter Service Group on Disability started 
approximately in 1996”.152 The establishment of this Group probably resulted 
from the renewed commitment of the EU Commission on disability issues.153 
Also, the DISG was a tool of the 2003 EU Disability Action Plan to reinforce the 
structures of the EU Commission and mainstream disability issues.154 In 2009, 
an evaluation of the Action Plan was published.155 This report includes several 
positive evaluations about the coordinative action of the DISG. Lastly, the 2012 
Non Paper about the EU CRPD framework briefly mentioned the DISG about its 
mainstreaming role of the Convention principles within EU law and policy-
making.156 In the same year, the EU Commission mentioned the DISG in its 
report to the CRPD Committee, as quoted in the first paragraph of this sub-
section.  
The EU Commission’s Inter-Service Group on Disability has no official 
webpages, and no public document reports its activities. Unfortunately, the 
interviews did not add any substantial information about the activities of the DISG 
either. The confidentiality and informality of this Group remind some of the 
characteristics of the EU CRPD focal point that were explained in Section 4.2. 
On this, the Disability Unit may have a leading role within the DISG due to its 
specific expertise. Unfortunately, this intuition cannot be verified due to the 
absence of pieces of evidence. The fact that both the DISG and the Disability 
Unit concern the EU Commission’s internal governance shows the preference to 
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confidentiality and informality as a recurring strategy of the EU Commission 
about its CRPD-related governance.  
To conclude, it is reasonable to explain the DISG as an informal group 
that includes representatives of the different Commission’s Directorates-General 
in order to assure that the CRPD principles are always respected in the 
legislative initiatives of the EU Commission itself. This interpretation suggests 
that the DISG gives its contribution to the implementation of the CRPD with a 
potential indirect influence on the national and local levels when respecting EU 
law. 
4.4.2 The EU Council Human Rights Working Group 
This second sub-section explores the role of the EU Council Human Rights 
Working Group (COHOM) as part of the EU CRPD coordination mechanism. As 
for the DISG, also COHOM has no published outcomes about its coordinative 
role on the CRPD. For this reason, the following analysis focuses on other kinds 
of sources. 
The EU Commission explained to the CRPD Committee that “formal 
coordination with the Member States is ensured through the human rights 
working group (COHOM) of the Council”.157 Besides, the webpage of COHOM 
states that “the Working Party on Human rights [is a working group of the EU 
Council that] deals with human rights aspects of the external relations of the EU 
and supports the Council’s decision-making process in this area”.158 “This body 
is composed of experts from each member state and is chaired by the delegate 
of the country holding the rotating six-month presidency of the Council”.159  
These general descriptions show a formal link between COHOM and the 
national level. In short, the working group networks experts from each member 
state. This characteristic reminds Slaughter and her ideas about the international 
networking of disaggregated national entities based on their expertise.160 Also 
Sabel and Zeitlin talked about the importance of consulting experts in 
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international governance processes.161 Experts are so crucial that they can 
influence policy and law-making processes, as suggested by Cullen, Harrington, 
and Renshaw.162 Therefore, the coordination promoted by COHOM can exercise 
influence because it entails expertise and knowledge, which are precious 
resources, as explained by Nye.163 
The coordination promoted by COHOM with national experts is vertical as 
it connects the EU with the national level. Moreover, COHOM is part of the EU 
CRPD-related governance, which entails horizontal coordination. This peculiarity 
can support the achievement of common positions on the implementation of the 
CRPD. This assumption finds confirmation in the Code of Conduct explaining the 
role of COHOM under the section about the “establishing of positions”.164 As 
explained about the EU CRPD focal point and monitoring framework, common 
positions are the first step to establish political strategies and to set minimum 
standards. Therefore, COHOM can influence national and local authorities on 
the implementation of the CRPD due to its coordinative role in reaching common 
positions on the Convention itself. 
 Such a possibility finds confirmation in the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework meetings’ minutes that mention COHOM several times. For instance, 
they report that COHOM consulted the EU Member States about the EU report 
to the CRPD Committee that was written by the EU Commission.165 Also, 
COHOM invited the EU CRPD monitoring framework in a meeting that “would be 
an opportunity to orientate Member States” about their cooperation with the 
framework itself.166 The mentioned meeting was scheduled for the 12 July 
2016,167 and the framework members met beforehand to agree on the topics to 
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raise, among which “the importance of the EU Framework acting as a positive 
example, additional resources for the EU Framework to fulfil its role, and a 
possible legal basis”.168 As the previous section explained, these three topics 
affect the opportunities of the EU CRPD monitoring framework to exercise 
influence. Therefore, if the framework wanted to discuss such topics with 
COHOM, it implies that COHOM has the opportunity to exercise its influence to 
support the framework itself. 
Another informal meeting between COHOM and the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework took place the 7 April 2017 focusing, among other topics, on “updating 
the declaration of EU competence with respect to the CRPD”.169 Besides, “the 
Framework met with the Council’s working group on human rights (COHOM) to 
discuss the EU’s ratification of the Optional Protocol”.170 Unfortunately, no 
minutes of any meeting between the EU CRPD monitoring framework and 
COHOM are available for consultation. However, findings suggest that these 
kinds of meetings took place with the probable attempt to influence the updating 
of the Declaration of Competence and the ratification of the Optional Protocol. 
 The EU Monitor website dedicates a webpage to COHOM, on which the 
agenda of the group’s meetings are uploaded.171 These show that COHOM 
meets two or three times a month. Unfortunately, the minutes of these meetings 
are not available. While searching such minutes, the documentary research 
found a denied request of access to these documents.172 The EU Council replied 
this request that “these reports include information, that is intended to be 
discussed internally, on preparation or assessment of negotiations […] release 
of the information contained in these documents would prejudice the EU’s ability 
to negotiate effectively in these multilateral fora”.173 This documentary finding is 
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the evidence that COHOM uses confidentiality and informality as resources that 
increase its opportunities to influence. 
This evidence reveals that transparency may be counterproductive in 
specific governance processes. The quotation above of the EU Council seems 
to state that they do not want any public exposure because it may affect their 
opportunities to exercise influence. A possible explanation is that the publication 
of informal talks could expose participants to national and international 
pressures. In theory, pressures may stimulate governance processes. In 
practice, pressures may discourage participation in meetings that touch 
politically sensitive issues. 
4.4.3 The Disability High Level Group 
This third sub-section focuses on the contribution of the Disability High Level 
Group (DHLG) to the EU CRPD coordination mechanism. Differently from the 
DISG and COHOM, the DHLG publishes documents that are available on the 
web. Similarly to the EU CRPD monitoring framework, there are two kinds of 
published outcomes. In detail, the DHLG produces: (i) meetings’ minutes; and 
(ii) annual reports. As such, this sub-section includes a brief introduction and two 
parts that analyse the two kinds of available primary sources. 
 The EU Commission explained to the CRPD Committee that “issues 
relating to the implementation of the CRPD are also regularly discussed at the 
DHLG with representatives of the Member States and their national focal points, 
the Commission and CSOs and DPOs”.174 Therefore, the coordination of the 
DHLG entails coordination with the national and local levels. 
Information about the DHLG is available on a specific webpage of the EU 
Commission website.175 This webpage explains that: (i) the group has its bases 
in the 1996 Equality of Opportunities Resolution;176 (ii) it was a useful tool to 
implement the EU Disability Action Plan;177 and (iii) it now focuses on the CRPD 
principles. As said in Section 4.4.1, also the EU Commission DISG was 
 
<https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/minutes_of_cohom_meetings> accessed 17 
December 2018. 
174 ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of the Convention - 
Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 3) para 221. 
175 ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (n 30). 
176 Equality of opportunity for people with disabilities pt III. 
177 EU Commission Communication, COM (2003) 650. 
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established in 1996. It is possible to assume that the two bodies have had a 
similar evolution with a mandate that focused on EU disability law first, and then 
on the EU implementation of the CRPD. This evolution is an example of the 
institutional effect of the EU accession to the Convention, as described in Section 
2.3.2. 
 The evolution of the DHLG emerges from the analysis of primary sources. 
For instance, the 2003 EU Disability Action Plan described the DHLG as “an 
expert group chaired by the Commission and gathering Member States 
governmental disability experts [that] should exchange information”.178 On the 
other hand, the 2010 EU Disability Strategy stated that “the implementation of 
this Strategy and of the UN Convention will be regularly discussed at the DHLG 
with representatives of the Member States and their national focal points, the 
Commission, disabled people and their organisations and other stakeholders”.179 
Therefore, the DHLG mandate has changed from sharing disability-related 
information to discussing the implementation of the CRPD. Also, the inclusion of 
DPOs in the DHLG is a probable institutional effect of the EU conclusion of the 
CRPD because the Convention asks to include DPOs in its monitoring and 
coordinative mechanisms.180 
4.4.3.1 The DHLG meetings’ minutes 
This part of the sub-section analyses the DHLG meetings’ minutes. The 
documentary search concluded in December 2018; as a consequence, it 
includes documents published until that date. What follows results from the 
exhaustive investigation of the ten meetings’ minutes that were available on the 
DHLG webpage at the time of this research.181 The exposition respects the 
chronology of the meetings in order to show the development of specific issues. 
The analysis aims to find pieces of evidence about possible influences of the 
DHLG on the implementation of the CRPD. 
 
178 ibid 4.1.2. 
179 EU Commission Communication, European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed 
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe (COM(2010) 636 final) para 2.2.4. 
180 UN CRPD Art 33.3. 
181 ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (n 30). 
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As explained on its webpage, the Group meets two times a year, but the 
literal “minutes of meetings are not public”.182 However, the meetings’ agenda 
and the minutes’ summaries are uploaded on the webpage and available for 
consultation. The available documents refer to the years from 2012 to 2016; 
hence, the 2017 and 2018 ones were missing. The 2012 and 2013 ones include 
a presence list that suggested names as possible interviewees of this research. 
The following exposition tries to respect the chronology of the meetings in order 
to show developmental aspects. 
The analysis of the DHLG meetings’ minutes shows that the meetings 
usually last two days. The first day welcomes EU institutions and bodies together 
with EU Member States representatives, while the second day also welcomes 
members of civil society. This aspect shows that although the process appears 
to be transparent, the institutions have maintained a space for themselves only. 
Building upon the conclusions of Section 4.4.2 about the strategy on 
transparency, it is possible to assume that although the institutions are available 
for confrontation with non-state actors, they prefer to avoid excessive pressures 
setting up two separate meetings on the same issues.   
Almost all the minutes show that the exchange of practices is one of the 
main activities during the meetings. This finding reminds Slaughter stating that 
information networks spread best practices.183 In short, the DHLG seems like an 
international network. A similar consideration was formulated about the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework. However, there is an essential difference between 
the two entities: the DHLG produces a distinctive outcome, which is an annual 
report. The next part of this sub-section will analyse the annual reports. At this 
stage, it is crucial to affirm that the DHLG can take advantage of its networking 
with the national and local levels to exercise influence on the implementation of 
the CRPD. Besides, several minutes show that the DHLG exercises its influence 
on the agenda of the Work Forum, which is the focus of the next sub-section. 
An essential difference between the minutes of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework and the DHLG is that the latter ones include specific topics. The final 
part of Section 4.3 suggested that the potential influence of the framework is 
affected by the fact that it does not address specific principles of the Convention. 
 
182 ibid. 
183 See Section 3.5.3 and 4.3.2: Slaughter (n 68). 
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Therefore, if addressing specific topics is directly proportional to the opportunities 
to exercise influence, it could be assumed that the DHLG has more opportunities 
than the framework to influence because it addresses specific topics. This 
assumption is verified by the following analysis of the available DHLG meetings’ 
minutes. In fact, these reveal that several meetings focused on the drafting of 
the ESI Funds Regulation and, in particular, on the CRPD-related ex-ante 
conditionalities. Section 2.3.3 mentioned this finding as an example of political 
discussions that influenced a matter concerning the implementation of the 
CRPD. The following analysis shows the influence of the DHLG on this specific 
topic. 
The May 2012 DHLG meeting minutes state that the “ex-ante 
conditionalities on disability and accessibility were removed from the latest draft 
of the general regulation in a compromise text negotiated by the Danish 
Presidency. The Members noted the merit of the ex-ante conditionalities as a 
mainstreaming tool [and] the Commission stressed the importance of supporting 
preservation of the horizontal ex-ante conditionalities in the General 
Regulation”.184 This quotation shows an attempt to exercise situational influence, 
as defined by Dowding.185 This finding means that national governments tried to 
avoid constraints deriving from the developing ESI Funds situation. However, the 
DHLG exerted influence on the EU Commission to maintain the CRPD-related 
ex-ante conditionalities in the new Regulation. The influence of the DHLG was 
valid because the EU Commission confirmed its commitment to the inclusion of 
the CRPD-related ex-ante conditionalities in the ESI Funds Regulation during 
the April 2013 meeting.186 One year later, within the DHLG, the EU Commission 
finally presented the new Regulation, which includes the CRPD-related ex-ante 
conditionalities.187 
The described three-year-long sequence of events demonstrates the 
direct influence of the DHLG on the drafting of the ESI Funds Regulation. As the 
 
184 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group’ (n 36) 6–7. 
185 See Section 3.2.3: Dowding (n 46) 47–49. 
186 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2013) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
187 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2014) 6–7 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
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EU Member States shall respect this Regulation, the DHLG direct influence on 
the EU Commission can be considered an indirect influence on their domestic 
level. Therefore, this is a crucial finding of the research.  
Figure 4-4 - General ex-ante conditionality No 3: Draft 6 October 2011 
Figure 4-5 - General ex-ante conditionality No 3: Adopted 20 December 2013 
It is possible to develop a more profound step of the analysis concerning 
the DHLG influence on the ESI Funds Regulation. This further passage derives 
from the comparison between the CRPD-related general ex-ante conditionality 
included in the 2011 draft of the Regulation (Figure 4-4)188 with the 2013 final 
version of the Regulation (Figure 4-5).189 Such a comparison reveals differences 
 
188 EU Commission Communication, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and 
the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (COM(2011) 615 final) 
152. 
189 EU Parliament and Council Regulation, laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and 
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between the two texts that are the result of the influences exercised during the 
drafting process. 
These differences result from negotiations on the contents of the ex-ante 
conditionality. As dialogues take regularly place within the DHLG, it is probable 
that also some of those negotiations developed during the meetings of the 
DHLG. In detail, the 2011 draft is stronger than the 2013 final version. For 
instance, the 2011 draft referred to “the existence of a mechanism which ensures 
effective implementation and application […]”, while the 2013 final version asks 
for “the existence of administrative capacity for the implementation and 
application […]” which is a softer provision than the previous one. 
As explained in Section 3.3.2, national governments may prefer to avoid 
international situations that require substantial commitments. For instance, the 
described example confirms that EU national governments did not want to 
commit to a rule that was too hard for them. After having softened the same rule, 
they gave their approval to the new Regulation. Furthermore, this example 
supplements what described in Section 3.3. While the theoretical descriptions 
divided between hard and soft instruments, this example shows that hard 
instruments have different levels of hardness that depend on how law-makers 
draft them. 
So, the DHLG focuses on specific topics, and this allows the Group to 
exercise its influence effectively. This interpretation arises from the analysis 
above concerning the drafting of the ESI Funds Regulation. In addition to the 
new ESI Funds Regulation, the DHLG meetings minutes show a specific interest 
in independent living rights. As such, the following part of the DHLG meetings 
minutes’ analysis explores possible influences of the Group on independent 
living rights.  
For instance, during the May 2012 DHLG meeting, FRA presented its “draft 
report on involuntary placement”.190 The probable aim of this presentation was 
to take advantage of the Group to share information about a bad practice to 
tackle. In October 2014, once again, FRA “informed about its new project on the 
 
Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
(1303/2013 [OJ L 347/320]) 455. 
190 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group’ (n 36) 7. 
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right to live independently and to develop human rights indicators on Article 19 
of CRPD”.191 This time, the Agency tried to spread good practice instead. The 
strategy aims to use the networking opportunities of the Group as a resource to 
increase the possibility to exercise influence.  
The same 2014 meeting’s minutes show that also civil society took 
advantage of the Group’s networking opportunities to raise awareness on 
independent living rights. For instance, three DPOs presented their shadow 
reports to the CRPD Committee, among which ENIL’s one focused on 
independent living rights.192 During this meeting, there were also new 
discussions about ESI Funds concerning deinstitutionalisation193 and personal 
assistance schemes.194 The debate on the ESI Funds Regulation probably 
moved from its drafting to its application. Therefore, the DHLG can focus on the 
use of ESI Funds about specific principles of the Convention, as 
deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance. 
Also during the April 2015 DHLG, both EASPD and ENIL took the 
opportunity to denounce that “because of austerity measures there are 
tendencies to re-institutionalisation and thus the Article 19 (on independent 
living) of UNCRPD is not being implemented satisfactory”.195  
In sum, the DHLG is a vital arena to raise awareness on specific topics of 
the Convention. Within this arena, the DHLG participants want to exercise their 
influence on relevant matters. The example of the ESI Funds Regulation reveals 
that their influence can be tangible sometimes. Other times their influence is 
impossible to evaluate as the examples concerning independent living topics 
show. However, as explained in Section 3.2.3, the verification of the presence of 
intentional influencing relationships is enough to prove that influence is exerted, 
although impossible to measure. Lastly, this consideration allows classifying the 
DHLG as an influencing situation. 
 
191 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2014) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
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195 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2015) 3 
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ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
 
 
 156 
4.4.3.2 The DHLG Annual Reports 
The DHLG also publishes Annual Reports.196 The documentary search 
concluded in December 2018 and found nine Annual Reports. The available 
versions were from 2008 to 2016. These include a contact-details section that 
suggested names as possible interviewees of this research. The following 
analysis is exhaustive because it investigated all the available Annual Reports at 
the time of the research. It maintains the chronological order of the reports to 
highlight developmental aspects. The analysis aims to show and explain 
opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD. Two brief remarks 
precede the analysis of the available DHLG Annual Reports. 
 The first remark is that the available Annual Reports are not uploaded on 
the DHLG dedicated webpage together with the meetings’ minutes. This 
difference is remarkable, and there are no official explanations for this choice. 
On the other hand, there is also a similarity between Reports and minutes: in 
both cases, the 2016 version is the last one available. This similarity suggests 
that some policy has changed since then. On this, the documentary search found 
an administrative change that can be relevant to explain the new policy on 
transparency. In fact, documents show that the chair of the Group has changed 
since 2016. Although the DHLG is always leaded by the EU Commission, the 
DHLG meetings’ presence lists reveal that the responsible DG Units have been: 
(i) JUST D3 until 2014;197 (ii) EMPL D4 in 2015;198 and (iii) EMPL C3 since 
2016.199 Has EMPL C3 modified the previous policy on transparency as a 
deliberate strategy?  
 The second remark is that the DHLG Annual Reports on implementation 
of the CRPD started in 2008. This data is interesting because it means that the 
Group started its CRPD-related coordinative effort before the EU formal 
accession to the Convention in January 2011.200 Due to this, the EU Member 
States cooperated in drafting the Annual Reports despite some of them and the 
EU itself were not CRPD Parties yet. For instance, Ireland  ratified the CRPD in 
 
196 ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (n 30). 
197 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (n 192) 1. 
198 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (n 196) 1. 
199 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (n 28) 1. 
200 See Section 2.3. 
 
 
 157 
2018201 (the last among the EU Member States), but it was explaining how it was 
implementing the Convention already in 2009.202 This situation results from the 
leading role of the EU, and it is a piece of evidence of DHLG’s influencing 
processes on the EU Member States. 
 Generally speaking, the DHLG Annual Reports include four topics: (i) 
state of the play on signature, ratification, reporting and examination of the 
Convention; (ii) actions undertaken to implement and monitor the Convention; 
(iii) thematic chapter; and (iv) contacts and links. The Annual Reports investigate 
these four topics comparing the data of the EU Member States. They share 
information and spread good practices, and this characteristic of the DHLG is in 
common with the international networks described by Slaughter.203 Besides, the 
national governments’ reporting to the Annual Reports looks like a sort of 
coordinated peer review. As suggested by De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel “peer 
review is thus a mechanism for both learning systematically from diverse 
experience and holding actors accountable for their actions”.204  
As a coordinative international entity, the DHLG deliberates on publishing 
informative reports. However, Sabel and Zeitlin referred to deliberative 
processes when these decide on the goals of the new cycles of the process 
itself.205 Therefore, the possibility of deliberating is essential, but the matter of 
the deliberation is pivotal to understand processes. The DHLG informative 
reports are prerogative of the Group; in fact, the CRPD does not ask for anything 
like that. Thinking about the different strategies on transparency, the DHLG 
Annual Reports promote best practices and expose bad practices to public 
pressures. This process can be enough to exercise the influence of soft 
international law, as explained by Newman and Posner.206 
 
201 ‘Status of Treaties, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (United Nations, 
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 The 2008 DHLG Annual Report207 is an example of how new soft 
governance processes can start. Coherently with Sabel and Zeitlin’s 
explanations,208 the Report describes that different actors get together around a 
common topic to decide shared courses of action and agree on being reciprocally 
peer-reviewed. In this specific case, the common topic is the implementation of 
the CRPD. Also, the Report identified some priorities for the national 
governments. Among such priorities, there was the implementation of 
independent living rights.209  
As said in the analysis of the DHLG meeting minutes, the Group tends to 
focus on specific topics, and this first Report confirms such a tendency. The 
result of this coordination is that the EU Member States are influenced on the 
promotion of domestic consultations about the agreed topics. Furthermore, the 
domestic efforts should be peer-reviewed as a way to share the results but also 
as an incentive to commit and produce outcomes. 
Following this last consideration, a piece of positive evidence is that the 
2009 Annual Report describes “progress in implementation of UN Convention in 
areas identified as priorities in the first HLG Report pointing at various actions 
undertaken on different levels”.210 As independent living rights were one of these 
priorities, the Report includes the submissions of each EU Member State plus 
the EU and civil society representatives about their commitment on the matter. 
On the whole, the submissions were very detailed in presenting data and 
describing projects on deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance. This 
reporting is an example of sharing best practices and peer review that could 
exercise influence due to its networking and governance dispositional properties. 
It is possible to say that the 2009 Annual Report shows a coordinated effort on 
specific independent living topics as nowhere else in this chapter and in the EU 
CRPD-related governance as a consequence. Without the coordination of the 
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DHLG, the EU Member States would not have probably produced these kinds of 
outcomes. 
 Unfortunately, independent living rights are a secondary topic in the 
2010211 and 2011212 Annual Reports. These are mainly focused on the “progress 
in national implementation and monitoring of UNCRPD, containing both 
governance aspect as covered by Article 33, as well as information on national 
strategies”.213 Although this exchange of information was relevant because the 
CRPD-related governances were on their planning phase at that time, it 
substituted the just started coordination on independent living rights. As such, 
the DHLG strategically changed its priorities. This change was either intentional 
or forced. It may have been due to a lack of resources to effectively discuss 
several topics altogether. Therefore, the DHLG chose to focus on the constituting 
CRPD-related governances because of a matter of timing and opportunity. As 
such, scarcity of resources caused the interruption of the coordinated focus on 
independent living rights, and the initial efforts remained without follow-ups as a 
consequence.  
 From 2011 on, the DHLG Annual Reports have included a thematic 
chapter: (i) the Europe 2020 Headline Targets, in 2011;214 (ii) Article 9 CRPD, in 
2012;215 (iii) Article 32 CRPD, in 2013;216 (iv) the Europe 2020 Strategy, in 
2015;217 and (v) the participation in employment, in 2016.218 Therefore, this is a 
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new attempt to focus on specific topics. However, it is possible to assume that 
this strategy had a fatal flaw to exercise influence. Looking at the explanations 
of Sabel and Zeitlin, any governance cycle should include the revision of the 
previous cycle to develop new aims and improve the process.219 Without this 
revision, it is impossible to assess the impact of any activity, and the upcoming 
cycle does not build upon the previous experience. In simple words, it is not a 
process, it does not include revisions, and it is not a cyclical governance.  
As such, although focusing on important specific issues, the thematic 
chapters of the 2011-2016 DHLG Annual Reports are disconnected from one 
another and do not critically engage with the national and local levels. Due to the 
absence of cyclical build-up, the DHLG Annual Reports’ thematic chapters do 
not take advantage of all the potential influencing opportunities of peer-reviewed 
cyclical governances. However, the positive result is that the EU Member States 
develop research and report on topics that would have had a different interest 
and exposure without the coordination to publish the DHLG Annual Reports. 
These considerations supplement what previously assumed about the 
importance of focusing on specific topics to increase the opportunities to 
influence. In fact, the potential advantages of focusing on specific topics are less 
practical without the correct strategies and governance processes. This 
consideration confirms the authors cited in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 about the 
importance of using resources with the right strategies to effectively exercise 
influence. 
Lastly, the 2016 Eighth Annual Report includes a focus on the EU Member 
States that received the CRPD Committee Concluding Observations.220 In detail, 
the EU Member States are asked to comment on the Observations they received 
in the Annual Report. Therefore, when the Concluding Observations raise 
concerns about the implementation of independent living rights (which always 
happens because the Concluding Observations usually dedicate a paragraph for 
each Article of the CRPD), the EU Member States should report on their action 
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points in the DHLG Annual Report. The Convention does not require this kind of 
follow-up, but it is a new coordinative strategy which is distinctive of the DHLG. 
As such, the 2016 one starts a new phase of the DHLG Annual Reports 
with an attempt of integration with the CRPD Committee Concluding 
Observations. The strategy probably aims to fill the previously mentioned 
absence of follow-ups processes. In fact, due to its scarce resources, the DHLG 
builds upon the work of the CRPD Committee and acts as an additional step of 
the Concluding Observations process. This additional step is a peer-review 
process that engages with the national level. Therefore, the DHLG leaves the 
revision process to the CRPD Committee and saves resources. Then, it builds 
upon the Concluding Observations and uses its resources to develop potentially 
influencing activities on the national and local authorities. Nye defined this kind 
of effective use of resources as a smart strategy.221 
Unfortunately, the unavailability of the 2017 and 2018 Annual Reports 
prevents to analyse developments of this new strategy. However, their absence 
raises one question: may this new phase of the DHLG Annual Reports have 
suggested a different strategy on transparency, increasing their level of 
confidentiality? The analysis of the DHLG meeting minutes has already revealed 
that the EU Member States tend to maintain a certain level of confidentiality when 
involved in the EU CRPD-related governance processes. Has this aspect been 
exported in the Annual Reports due to their new peer review process on the 
CRPD Committee Concluding Observations? 
4.4.4 The Work Forum 
This fourth sub-section investigates the activities of the Work Forum (WF) as part 
of the EU CRPD coordination mechanism. After a brief introduction, the following 
analysis builds upon the available primary sources of the Forum. The EU 
Commission explained to the CRPD Committee that “to facilitate the exchange 
and mutual learning between the EU and the Member States on the governance 
of the CRPD, the Commission has since 2010 hosted a Work Forum on the 
Implementation of the UN Convention”.222 As such, the EU Commission has 
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been promoting an international entity that appears like an information network. 
It aims to spread information from the EU to the national and local levels with the 
probable attempt to harmonise courses of action. 
The EU Commission clarified that “the Forum gathers representatives of 
the governance mechanisms established under Article 33 CRPD, CSOs, DPOs, 
NHRIs, EU institutions and relevant international bodies. Civil society, in 
particular DPOs, is involved in the preparation of the conference, including the 
agenda setting”.223 As such, the WF seems the enlarged version of the DHLG. 
While the DHLG gathers the bodies that oversee the CRPD implementation, the 
WF assembles the entities that deal with the implementation and monitoring of 
the Convention. As an interviewee who participated in the WF stated:  
of course, one of the very good things that the EU does is to bring 
together the Member States […] like [during] the Work Forum.224  
In short, the WF offers networking opportunities that would be missed without 
the effort of the EU Commission to promote this getting together. This situation 
is unusual because the previous sections affirmed that the EU Commission has 
strategies that use confidentiality as a resource. On the other hand, the WF looks 
like an instrument to encourage transparency. It is probable that different kinds 
of situations handle different kinds of information that require different strategies 
on transparency.  
4.4.4.1 The Work Forum web contents 
The documentary search concluded in December 2018, and it revealed that six 
Work Forums had taken place since 2013. Each of the six WFs’ meetings has a 
dedicated webpage hosted on the EU Commission website. Generally speaking, 
each webpage includes: (i) a brief explanation of the WF; (ii) the programme of 
the meeting; (iii) the presentations of the leading conference; and (iv) a summary 
report. The following analysis respects the chronological order of the meetings 
with the attempt to show the development of similar matters. 
Although the minutes do not provide complete lists of the participants, the 
names of the presenters are mentioned, and they suggested possible 
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interviewees for the research. This part of the sub-section analyses the primary 
sources that are available on the WF webpages. It seeks shreds of evidence 
about any opportunity to influence the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. 
The 2013 WF webpage describes the Forum as “a great opportunity to 
share experiences in order to find solutions to similar questions that Member 
States and the EU face in the implementation of the UNCRPD”.225 There is an 
explicit purpose stated that is to find solutions to similar questions. On one hand, 
the establishment of common aims represents the first step to start governance 
processes.226 On the other hand, the aim of promoting standard solutions is 
different from the aim of sharing information. On this, the promotion of shared 
solutions reminds Slaughter’s idea of harmonisation networks,227 which fits better 
with the mentioned WF’s aims.  
Therefore, the EU Commission promotes a network that aims to harmonise 
national and local policies. As suggested in Section 3.3.3, soft instruments can 
influence and harmonise the attitudes on specific principles. On this, Waddington 
stated that the EU shows the tendency to pre-empt its Member States action in 
order to lead harmonisation processes.228 Besides, Craig explained that 
governance processes could harmonise policies.229 In sum, these considerations 
suggest that the EU Commission promotes the WF to stimulate harmonised 
policies. Therefore, the Forum has been probably established to offer 
opportunities to influence national and local authorities on harmonising their 
policies concerning the implementation of the CRPD. 
The 2014 WF webpage emphasises that “the Work Forum allowed to share 
experiences on the practical implementation and monitoring of the 
 
225 ‘2013 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UNCRPD in the EU’ (Employment, Social 
Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1026&furtherEvents
=yes> accessed 21 December 2018. 
226 See Section 3.4.3: Sabel and Zeitlin (n 7) 274. 
227 See Section 3.5.3: Slaughter (n 68). 
228 See Section 2.4.2: Lisa Waddington, ‘The European Union and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared 
Competences’ (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 431, 448. 
229 See Section 2.4.2: Paul Craig, ‘Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance’ in Paul Craig 
and Gráinne De Búrca (eds), The evolution of EU law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2011) 63. 
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Convention”.230 The word practical suggests that the 2014 WF discussion 
addressed concrete courses of action on specific topics. As stated in the previous 
sections, the focus on specific topics can increase the opportunities to influence. 
In addition to this, the summary report of the 2014 WF states the importance “to 
ensure that implementation of the Convention is harmonious across all States 
Parties [there is] the need for complementarity and structured cooperation 
[because] without such cooperation, there is a great risk that many of the 
obligations contained in the Convention will not be implemented in a proper 
manner”.231 Once again, the aim to promote harmonisation appears at the core 
of the WF. 
The quotation suggests that harmonisation results from complementarity 
and structured coordination. Complementarity has already been explained as a 
vital principle of the EU CRPD monitoring framework; cooperation is the principal 
mandate of the WF itself as part of the EU CRPD coordination mechanism. 
Section 4.2 explained that cooperation is also an essential resource for the EU 
CRPD focal point to implement the Convention. Also, Section 2.4.2 introduced 
the idea that the EU policy and law-making processes start with cooperation, and 
move to minimum standards and common rules. As such, the WF gathers entities 
that have different kinds of opportunities to influence the implementation of the 
CRPD. Therefore, the WF promotes harmonisation processes that use 
complementarity and coordination as resources to exercise influence. 
The 2015 WF webpage explains that “the Work Forum aimed at ensuring 
that the UN Convention is fully implemented”.232 This is a definite purpose for the 
meeting, at the limits of any realistic expectation even. However, it is interesting 
that such a statement appears on the website of the EU Commission, which is 
usually very careful when matters touch on competence issues. Since the WF 
 
230 ‘2014 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UNCRPD in the EU’ (Employment, Social 
Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1025&furtherEvents
=yes> accessed 21 December 2018. 
231 Andrea Broderick, ‘Report on the 2013 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UN 
CRPD in the EU’ (EU Commission) 21–22 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1025&furtherEvents
=yes> accessed 21 December 2018. 
232 ‘Work Forum on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1038&furtherEvents
=yes> accessed 21 December 2018. 
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uses soft strategies, the EU Commission expectations on the Forum reflect its 
expectations on the opportunity to influence through soft harmonisation policies. 
As such, this description of the WF by the EU Commission is interesting as it 
implies the existence of soft strategies. 
Among other topics, the April 2015 Forum focused on “improving synergies 
between the EU and the national level in the implementation of the UN 
Convention [because] the implementation of the UN Convention is a shared 
task”.233 Thus, the implementation of the CRPD is here explained as a shared 
task. This idea reminds the shared competence issue, but the consideration of 
the CRPD implementation as a shared task goes beyond the limits of the 
conferral. In October of the same year, during the DHLG, the EU Commission 
stated that “the implementation of the Convention is a shared responsibility of 
the EU and its Member States which requires close cooperation between the two 
levels”.234 It is possible to infer that the EU Commission tries to find an alternative 
soft principle to the hard principle of the conferral. Therefore, the EU and its 
Member States should cooperate because they share the task and the 
responsibility of implementing the CRPD. Lastly, such cooperation encourages 
influencing processes promoting harmonisation policies. 
The 2016 WF webpage revealed that EDF supported the EU Commission 
in the organisation of the Forum.235 This finding shows that the setting up of a 
coordinative body is managed by implementing and monitoring bodies in 
synergy. It also reveals that the WF is not an independent entity with all the limits 
of the case, as already outlined about the EU CRPD monitoring framework. In 
addition, during her welcome speech of the Forum, an EU Commission DG 
EMPL Director emphasised to “know that the implementation of the Convention 
is a continuous process. And governance is an essential part of this process. Not 
only is governance required by Convention. It is also necessary to ensure proper 
implementation, coordination and cooperation between the different levels and 
 
233 ibid. 
234 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2015) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
235 ‘2016 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ (Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1112> accessed 21 
December 2018. 
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players like national authorities”.236 This statement confirms that the EU 
Commission officers know they need to play with soft cards to meet their duties. 
However, Section 4.2 showed that the hard mandate of the EU Commission 
forces its officers to play under the table and to maintain confidential their soft 
and informal activities. 
The quoted Director refers to the need to use soft governance processes 
as well as to engage with different levels. She also defined the process as 
continuous. This terminology is significant because it reminds Figure 3-5 
summarising the circularity of EU governance processes, as suggested by 
Zeitlin. Also De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel assumed that experimentalist 
governance promotes open-ended processes.237 The question is: is the Work 
Forum an open-ended governance process? It seems so because it calls on 
further activities. However, is it an experimentalist governance process? It does 
not seem so because the experimentalist meaning for open-ended is that the 
process evolves from the revision of reached aims to the establishment of new 
goals. On the other hand, the Forum is more like a conference where selected 
presenters expose their papers. If the WF were like an experimentalist 
governance process, it would include any instrument to review the efforts to 
harmonise CRPD and independent living policies.  
To conclude the round-up, the 2017238 and 2018239 WF webpages include 
nothing that adds anything to what already explained. In short, the Work Forum 
is a vital instrument to exercise influence. However, getting together without 
establishing and revising common goals may limit the possibility to effectively 
harmonise national and local policies concerning the CRPD and independent 
living rights. 
 
236 Manuela Geleng, ‘Welcome Speech to the Work Forum’ (Work Forum, Charlemagne 
Building, 10 June 2016) 2 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88&langId=en&eventsId=1112&moreDocume
nts=yes&tableName=events> accessed 22 December 2018. 
237 See Section 3.4.3: De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (n 22) 477. 
238 ‘2017 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities in the EU and the Member States’ (Employment, Social Affairs & 
Inclusion) <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=1207> 
accessed 22 December 2018. 
239 ‘2018 Work Forum on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities in the EU and Its Member States’ (Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1137&eventsId=1326&furtherEven
ts=yes#navItem-presentations> accessed 22 December 2018. 
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4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter is the first of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It explored 
the international entities that shape the EU CRPD-related governance with an 
attempt to show their opportunities to influence the implementation of the CPRD 
and independent living rights.  
Generally speaking, the analysis explained that the EU CRPD-related 
governance has different opportunities to exercise its influence. However, the 
EU CRPD-related governance tends to address general topics and barely 
focuses on specific principles. Probably, independent living rights is the most 
cited CRPD principle in the analysed documents. Despite this, it appears 
sporadically, and the analysis found no coordinated projects on its 
implementation and monitoring. Besides, the two topics of independent living 
rights (deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance) are almost absent from the 
analysed discussions. This peculiarity shows that the more specific the topic, the 
less probable its mention in the EU CRPD-related governance. Despite this, the 
analysis showed several attempts to focus on independent living rights. 
However, the scarcity of resources forces a focus on priorities, which change 
quite often. 
 The impact of the EU CRPD-related governance opportunities to exercise 
influence has been assessed with three different methods: (i) the confrontation 
between the observed situations and the theoretical framework of the thesis; (ii) 
the use of the interviews; and (iii) the search for evidence. 
 (i) The confrontation between the observed situations and the theoretical 
framework of the thesis clarified that the EU CRPD-related governance is a soft 
instrument that produces soft law material and takes advantage of some 
dispositional influencing properties of experimentalist governance processes 
and international networks.  
 (ii) The interviews confirmed the intentionality to develop the EU CRPD-
related governance opportunities to influence. The interviewees revealed that 
the division of competences between the EU and its Member States promotes 
the establishment of soft procedures, which increase informality but cause a drop 
in the level of transparency. 
(iii) The search for evidence was affected by the low level of transparency. 
Despite this, the analysis showed findings of real and attempted influences of 
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the EU CRPD-related governance on the national and local levels. Probably, the 
most crucial evidence is that of the DHLG influence on the inclusion of the CRPD-
related ex-ante conditionality in the ESI Funds Regulation. 
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Chapter 5  
Influence of the EU CRPD-related governance’s members on 
the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the second of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It focuses 
on the four EU institutions and bodies that are part of the EU CRPD focal point 
and monitoring framework. In particular, the chapter investigates their 
opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD and independent 
living rights. The four EU institutions and bodies analysed in this chapter are: (i) 
the EU Commission; (ii) the EU Parliament; (iii) the EU Ombudsman; and (iv) the 
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).  
Each of these four EU institutions and bodies is investigated in a dedicated 
section of the chapter, aiming to reveal opportunities to influence. Every section 
includes a brief description of the institutional mandate and one or more 
analytical sub-sections. 
As the previous chapter focused on the EU CRPD-related governance in 
itself, this chapter focuses on four of its members singularly taken. As the 
previous chapter explained how the EU CRPD-related governance exercises its 
influence on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights, this 
chapter develops a similar explanation about four members of that governance. 
This chapter aims to show examples of EU influences as findings of: (i) the 
documentary research; (ii) the conducted interviews; and (iii) the comparison 
between pieces of evidence and theories. 
The analysis of this chapter is mainly inductive. As such, it explains 
situations building upon the available primary sources. Besides, it uses 
observations to develop conclusions that expand the theoretical framework of 
the research. On several occasions, the interviews will be essential in 
understanding the explored processes. 
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5.2 The EU Commission 
This section focuses on the EU Commission, which is the established EU CRPD 
focal point.1 While the previous chapter explained the designed role of the EU 
CRPD focal point, this section investigates the individual contribution of the EU 
Commission to the implementation of the Convention. The analysis seeks pieces 
of evidence concerning the EU Commission’s opportunities to influence the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. This section includes 
two sub-sections. The first sub-section is an overview of the EU Commission and 
its governance. The second sub-section explores the role of the thematic unit of 
the EU Commission that oversees CRPD-related issues. 
The EU Commission is one of the seven institutions of the EU.2 The EU 
Commission is the “principal executive body of the European Union”.3 The EU 
Parliament elects the President of the Commission.4 The EU Council and the 
President of the Commission “shall adopt the list of the other […] members of 
the Commission”.5 The President appoints Vice-Presidents6 as well as allocates 
responsibilities among the members of the Commission.7 Also, the President of 
the Commission is a member of the European Council.8 As established by the 
EU Treaties, the EU Commission “shall oversee the application of Union law”.9 
On this matter, the EU Commission shall oversee the application of the CRPD, 
 
1 EU Council Decision of 26 November 2009 concerning the conclusion, by the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
2010 (2010/48/EC [OJ L 23/35]) Article 3. 
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union 2012 (OJ C 326/13) Art 13.1. 
The seven institutions of the European Union are: (i) the European Parliament; (ii) the 
European Council; (iii) the Council; (iv) the European Commission; (v) the Court of Justice 
of the European Union; (vi) the European Central Bank; and (vii) the Court of Auditors.  
3 ‘The European Commission’ (European Parliament 2018) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.3.8.pdf> accessed 30 November 2018. 
4 TEU Artt 14.1, 17.7. 
5 TEU Art 17.7. 
6 ibid Art 17.6. 
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 (OJ C 
326/47) Art 248. 
8 TEU Art 15.2. 
9 ibid Art 17.1. 
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within the remit of its mandate,10 since the EU conclusion of the CRPD has made 
the Convention a source of Union law.11 
Also, the EU Treaties state that the EU Commission “shall execute the 
budget and manage programmes”.12 In exercising these tasks, budget and 
programmes should respect the CRPD due to the EU accession to the 
Convention.13 Lastly, the EU Commission has the monopoly of the legislative 
initiative.14 Following the EU conclusion of the CRPD, any of its legislative 
initiatives should comply with the Convention because the EU Commission must 
respect the international treaties to which the EU has acceded.15 This last aspect 
is deepened in the following sub-section. 
5.2.1 An overview of the EU Commission’s governance 
As explained in Section 4.2.1, the incorporation of human rights principles into 
hard law is an implementation strategy that aims to change the legislative nature 
of those principles themselves. Generally speaking, human rights are stated by 
international treaties that are classified as international law. As explained in 
Section 3.3, several authors interpret international law as a soft instrument with 
opportunities to exercise influence on the national and local levels. Section 4.2.1 
suggested that this influence is part of the duties to implement the treaties. 
Therefore, one way to realise the duty to implement human rights treaties is by 
influencing the incorporation of their principles into domestic hard law. This 
because human rights principles can be enforced at the domestic level after 
becoming hard law. 
As a consequence, the process to incorporate the CRPD principles into EU 
law is an implementation duty that derives from the EU conclusion of the 
 
10 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2012 6. 
11 Helga Stevens, ‘Report on Implementation of the European Disability Strategy 
(2017/2127(INI))’ (European Parliament 2017) A8-0339/2017 6 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-0339+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 10 October 
2018; ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group’ (EU Commission 2012) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
12 TEU Art 17.1. 
13 TFEU Art 216.2. 
14 TEU Art 17.2. 
15 TFEU Art 216.2. 
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Convention. The EU Commission shall meet this duty because it has been 
established as the EU CRPD focal point. Besides, as stated in the introduction 
of this sub-section, the EU Commission can meet this duty also because it is the 
EU institution with the legislative initiative. In brief, any CRPD principle can be 
incorporated into EU law through legislative proposals of the EU Commission. 
The legislative proposals of the EU Commission must be approved by the EU 
Parliament and Council to become EU law, but any legislative initiative officially 
starts from the EU Commission. Once incorporated into EU law, any CRPD 
principle can be enforced because subject to the Court of Justice jurisdiction and 
binding on the EU Member States as a consequence.  
Influencing relationships govern the process that develops the EU 
Commission legislative proposals. Therefore, the influencing relationships that 
take place within the EU Commission can reach the national and local levels 
through EU law. This sub-section includes an inductive analysis of the process 
that develops the EU Commission legislative proposals to show the actors 
involved and their relevance to the EU CRPD-related governance. 
Generally speaking, the governance of the EU Commission includes a 
political level and an operational level, and it is described as an example of 
corporate governance.16 The political level regards the President and the 
Commissioners, and it takes overall political responsibility. The operational level 
refers to the institutional departments, and it has to implement the political 
decisions.17 The policy departments of the EU Commission are called 
Directorates-General (DGs). At the time of conducting this research, these are 
31 in total,18 and each of them oversees a different policy area of the EU 
Commission.19 The political and operational levels have an advisory body each 
(within the dotted ellipses in the figure below) that supports their work, which is 
 
16 EU Commission Communication, Streamlining and strengthening corporate governance 
within the European Commission 2018 (C(2018) 7704 final) 2–4. 
17 ibid. 
18 ‘The European Commission’ (n 3) 3. 
On the whole, there are 31 policy departments (DGs), 16 special departments (services), and 6 
executive agencies.  
19 ‘Departments and Executive Agencies’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/departments_en> accessed 7 January 2018. 
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also subject to independent scrutiny.20 Figure 5-1 shows this general 
description.21 
The figure also shows the presence of a Corporate Management Board, 
established in 2018.22 Its role is a consequence of the fact that the decentralised 
decision-making model of the EU Commission governance needs overall 
coordination on corporate management issues.23 Coordination is necessary 
because there are specific issues that should be correctly mainstreamed within 
the political and operational processes. Other groups and sub-groups were 
already performing this coordinative effort, and they now support the Corporate 
Management Board.24 For instance, “the Group of Directors-General […] meets 
regularly to discuss issues of horizontal interest”.25 
Figure 5-1- The Commission’s Governance Model 
Among the issues of horizontal interest, there is the implementation of the 
CRPD because the whole EU Commission governance should respect the 
 
20 Streamlining and strengthening corporate governance within the European Commission 4. 
21 ibid 3. 
22 EU Commission Decision on the Corporate Management Board 2018 (C(2018) 7706 final). 
23 ibid. 
24 EU Commission Communication, Governance in the European Commission 2018 (C(2018) 
7703 final) 6. 
25 Streamlining and strengthening corporate governance within the European Commission 13. 
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Convention. The coordination on the implementation of the CRPD within the EU 
Commission governance is officially performed by the Inter-Service Group on 
Disability (DISG), which is part of the EU CRPD coordination mechanism, as 
explained in Section 4.4.1. The previous explanation of the DISG included the 
intuition that the Group itself is supervised by the coordinative work of the DG 
EMPL Disability Unit, which acts under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point. 
The previous chapter already emphasised that the DISG and the Disability 
Unit publish few official outcomes. Also the interviewees had difficulties in talking 
about the confidential and informal processes of the EU Commission. 
Fortunately, this research is also supported by informants, who confirmed the 
intuitions of the previous paragraph. 
As such, the process that summarises the EU Commission legislative 
initiative to include CRPD principles into EU law can be described as it follows: 
(i) “the Commission [is] the focal point for the implementation of the Convention 
at EU level”;26 (ii) one of the duties to implement international human rights is to 
“adapt existing laws or pass new laws”;27 (iii) the DISG shall ensure that the 
CRPD is “taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of 
legislative proposals [of any DG]”;28 and (iv) the DG EMPL Disability Unit 
supervises the DISG to support the inclusion of CRPD principles into the 
legislative proposals of the EU Commission. 
Although the EU legislative initiative is a prerogative of the EU Commission, 
official invitations to start legislative initiatives can be sent to the EU Commission 
by: (i) the EU Council; (ii) the Council of the EU; (iii) the EU Parliament; and (iv) 
the EU citizens.29 Besides, it is reasonable to assume that informal pressures 
can reach and influence the EU Commission legislative initiative. Therefore, the 
 
26 See Section 4.2: ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of 
the Convention - Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ 
(Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2014) CRPD/C/EU/1 63 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2FC%2FEU%2F1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
27 See Section 4.2.1: ‘How Are Human Rights Implemented and How Is This Monitored?’ 
<https://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/topics/development/frequently-asked-
questions/5-how-are-human-rights-implemented-and-how-is-this-monitored/> accessed 30 
November 2018. 
28 See Section 4.4.1: ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 35 of 
the Convention - Initial Report of States Parties Due in 2012 - European Union’ (n 26) para 
222. 
29 ‘Planning and Proposing Law’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
making-process/planning-and-proposing-law_en> accessed 19 August 2019. 
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previously described process aiming to include CRPD principles into the EU 
legislative proposals is a formal monopoly of the EU Commission but is also 
informally open to the influence of other actors. 
5.2.1.1 The internal and external dimensions of the EU Commission 
governance 
The contents of the previous paragraphs suggest that the implementation of the 
CRPD by the EU Commission develops in two dimensions: internal and external. 
It is internal when it concerns the institution’s organisation and employees. It is 
external when it regards the EU Member States.  
Besides, the legislative initiative of the EU Commission is linked with the 
competence issue because it must concern matters on which the EU can 
legislate.30 The Declaration of Competence clarifies that the EU “has an 
exclusive competence […] with respect to its own public administration”, but it 
“shares competence with Member States as regards action to combat 
discrimination on the ground of disability”.31 
 This principle means that the EU Commission has different opportunities 
to implement the CRPD in its internal and external dimensions. In detail, it can 
fully implement the Convention when producing legislative proposals on its 
organisation. However, it needs to consider the competence issue when its law 
involves the EU Member States. This situation can create issues when the EU 
Commission has an internal approach to the CRPD that it cannot use in 
legislative initiatives that involve its Member States.  
For instance, the EU has full competence on the European Schools and 
it is responsible for their correct implementation of the Convention. However, the 
EU Member States have exclusive competence on national education systems 
where the EU Commission cannot initiate CRPD-related hard legislation. In 
similar cases, the EU Commission can use informal instruments to influence 
national and local authorities.32 In turn, the need for informal instruments to 
influence might explain the confidentiality of the relevant processes. What follows 
 
30 See Section 2.4. 
31 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Annex II. 
32 As for education and other areas, Art 6 TFEU states that the Union shall “support, coordinate 
or supplement the actions of the Member States”, which entails the use of soft 
instruments.  
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is an analysis that builds upon the few available primary data that the research 
has collected about the (i) internal and (ii) external EU Commission CRPD-
related governance. 
(i) The internal governance of the EU Commission seems characterised 
by confidentiality because the documentary search found few primary sources 
explaining its organisation in detail. For this reason, internal procedures and 
processes can be only inferred combining the few available information. 
Interviewees and informants have been essential to depict how the EU 
Commission internally works. In sum, the implementation of the CRPD is a 
horizontal issue of the EU Commission’s internal dimension that needs specific 
coordination to reach any DGs and all their units. The internal implementation of 
the CRPD is necessary to set the conditions to exercise influence on other 
entities in implementing the Convention.  
The difficulties in finding documents about the internal organisation of the 
EU Commission forced to ask a relevant question during the interviews. 
However, the interviewees were careful about sharing this kind of information. In 
turn, their difficulty is a possible confirmation of the existent friction between the 
official and unofficial activities of the EU Commission. Despite this, some 
interviewees’ insight helped to fill some gaps in the inductive analysis. For 
example, an EU Commission policy officer explained that: 
[the Directorates-General have] geographic units and thematic 
units. It can sometimes be useful to think of one as vertical and one 
as horizontal. The integration of both is of course key, and thus we 
also have coordination units!33  
This clarification is significant. For instance, it allows classifying the 
Disability Unit as a thematic unit that oversees CRPD-related issues. The 
Disability Unit supervises the DISG’s horizontal effort to mainstream the CRPD 
in the EU legislative initiatives, as previously explained. The interviewee also 
mentioned geographic units and vertical activities. This mention entails that the 
Disability Unit could be vertically connected with the national and local levels 
through geographic units as well as through specific activities. Such a connection 
 
33 ‘Interviewee 13’ (30 April 2018) 1. 
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is not hierarchical because it does not entail a power relation. Instead, it may 
involve authority and exercise influence. 
An informant of this research confirmed the explanation of the previous 
paragraph. He added that the horizontal effort of the Disability Unit includes 
training the EU Commission’s staff, as he was involved in a training session 
some years ago as an external expert. Training sessions are an authoritative 
way to exert influence. This informal insight confirms that international entities 
need to consult external experts about complex topics. Due to their peculiarity, 
experts become part of the internal governance of such international entities and 
can influence them, as suggested by Sabel and Zeitlin34 as well as by 
Slaughter.35  
The same informant was concerned when asked to comment on the 
declaration of an interviewee who talked about her geographic unit saying that: 
for the majority of us the meaning of the acronym ‘CRPD’ is 
unknown.36 
The concern of the informant reflected what was previously affirmed about the 
need for effective internal implementation of the CRPD as a pre-condition to 
influence other entities on the implementation of the Convention itself. The 
informant tried to explain this situation with the consideration that the staff of the 
EU Commission is subject to a periodic rotation, which may cause the need for 
constant training. 
 This kind of periodic rotation was also mentioned by an interviewee talking 
about the Disability Unit. This interviewee was concerned that some officers of 
the Disability Unit used to work in different fields and were relocated despite 
having no specific expertise on the CRPD.37 Unfortunately, this insight by a third 
party had not the possibility to be verified. 
 
34 See Section 3.4.1: Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The 
New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 European Law 
Journal 271, 278. 
35 See Section 3.5.3: Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 
2004) 5–6. 
36 ‘Interviewee 9’ (15 May 2018). 
37 ‘Interviewee 7’ (25 June 2018) 13. 
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The critical point is that a periodic rotation of staff makes continuous 
training essential. As such, the support of external experts is a constant need. 
As a consequence, the influence of external experts on the EU Commission 
should be considered an integral part of the EU Commission’s internal 
governance. 
(ii) The external governance of the EU Commission seems as confidential 
as the internal one because the documentary search found few primary sources 
explaining its organisation in detail. The documentary search included an 
investigation of the organisational charts of the DGs for General and Urban 
Policy (REGIO),38 and for Employment Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL)39 to 
identify possible interviewees.40 The idea was that the interviewees could have 
explained existing links between the EU Commission CRPD-related internal 
governance with the national and local levels. Unfortunately, the interviewees 
were not so inclined to talk about their governance processes. They tended to 
suggest to look at reports, but reports do not focus on processes and do not 
explain informal activities either. As such, what follows is a paraphrase of four 
EU Commission officers’ interviews that try to explain how the CRPD-related 
activities of the EU Commission can reach the national and local levels.  
The implementation of the CRPD is an internal horizontal theme within the 
EU Commission. Internal activities can reach the national and local levels 
through geographic units that are like institutional bridges between the EU and 
its Member States.41 These bridges allow the flow of information from the EU 
Commission to national governments and vice versa. This flow of information 
brings EU policies at the national and local levels, and it gathers domestic 
concerns to the EU Commission.42 This flow of information may be either formal 
or informal. This aspect means that it can produce either formal outcomes or 
informal dialogues. Formal outcomes can be reports, which are analysed by the 
 
38 ‘DG REGIO Organisational Chart’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/dgs/organigramme_en.pdf> accessed 8 
January 2019. 
39 ‘DG EMPL Organisational Chart’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2796&langId=en> accessed 8 January 
2019. 
40 See Section 1.4.1. 
41 ‘Interviewee 12’ (4 June 2018) 2; ‘Interviewee 11’ (11 May 2018) 2. 
42 ‘Interviewee 13’ (n 32) 1. 
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thematic units to prepare evaluative analyses that are useful to work on new 
policy cycles.43 On the other hand, informal dialogues are something about the 
interviewees did not talk in detail. However, these take regularly place, and the 
previous chapter mentioned several occasions for the EU Commission to 
develop informal dialogues, as the Disability High Level Group and the Work 
Forum. 
5.2.2 The EU Commission Disability Unit 
Sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.2 indicated that the DG EMPL C3 is the EU Commission 
Disability Unit acting under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point, at the time 
of conducting this research. Section 4.2.3 explained that, officially, the EU 
Commission had been established as the EU CRPD focal point. This designation 
is included in the Council Decision on the conclusion of the CRPD, which states 
that “the Commission shall be a focal point”.44 The documentary search found 
no official documents declaring that a specific unit oversees the tasks of the EU 
CRPD focal point. However, Section 4.2.3 included intuitive conclusions and 
insights of interviewees and informants confirming that the Disability Unit is like 
the centre of influence of the EU CRPD focal point and that it was relocated from 
DG JUST to DG EMPL. 
The study found no official document that confers the mandate to act as 
the EU CRPD focal point on the Disability Unit. This non-finding means that this 
unit has an institutional role that is an informal mandate towards the CRPD. This 
kind of informality can promote the use of strategies that aim to influence. In turn, 
it may limit the possibility to publish outcomes. Why has the Disability Unit an 
informal mandate?  
De Beco stated that “in all EU member States Parties to CRPD, the focal 
points are the ministries responsible for persons with disabilities. These 
ministries are almost always either the ministries of social affairs or ministries 
with broader competences including that of social affairs”.45 Also, “the United 
 
43 ‘Interviewee 12’ (n 40) 1–2. 
44 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Art 3. 
45 Gauthier De Beco, ‘Study on the Implementation of Article 33 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Europe’ (UN Office of the High Commissioner on 
Human Rights 2014) 42 
<https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/ICC/GeneralMeeting/25/Meeting%20Documents/Study%20on%
20the%20Implementation%20of%20Article%2033%20of%20CRPD.pdf> accessed 10 
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Kingdom designated the Office for Disability Issues (ODI), which is a cross-
governmental body working with different ministries”.46 Differently, the Council 
Decision on the conclusion of the CRPD states that “the Commission shall be a 
focal point”,47 without mentioning any DG or specific unit. 
Differently, in the Non Paper that established the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework, the EU Commission indicated the EU Parliament PETI Committee 
as a member of the EU CRPD monitoring framework instead of the broad 
institution.48 Such designation means that a specific office was formally entrusted 
with the mandate of representing its institution in the EU CRPD-related 
governance. This suggests that the designation of a specific DG or unit as the 
EU CRPD focal point could have been a feasible option. Therefore, the EU 
Commission chose to remain vague officially, and then to informally confer the 
mandate on the Disability Unit.  
One probable explanation for this choice is that the EU Commission had 
the strategy to preserve flexibility. Several authors cited in Chapter 3 explained 
that flexibility is a crucial characteristic of international soft law and governance. 
Coherently, the CRPD asks its parties to establish forms of governance. Also, 
Section 4.2.1 explained that the implementation of the CRPD entails the exercise 
of influence, and Section 3.2.1 clarified that influence is exercised through soft 
resources and strategies. Therefore, the strategy to establish a flexible focal 
point seems coherent with the duty to implement the Convention. In turn, the 
flexibility of a formal institution is an informal resource that incentives 
confidentiality, which complicates the evaluation of the Disability Unit activities. 
The DHLG Annual Reports’ analysis included in Section 4.4.3.2 showed 
that the chair of the Group had changed three times so far: (i) JUST D3 until 
 
October 2018. 
46 ibid. 
47 EU Council Decision 2010/48/EC Art 3. 
48 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 1. 
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2014;49 (ii) EMPL D4 in 2015;50 and (iii) EMPL C3 since 2016.51 This change is 
the evidence that the mandate to act under the EU CRPD focal point has been 
informally conferred on different DG units over time. Thus, this is an example of 
how the EU Commission has taken advantage of the flexibility with which it 
established its CRPD focal point. 
The following part of this sub-section explores possible reasons for and 
presumed consequences of the institutional position of the Disability Unit within 
the EU Commission governance. The assumption is that the position of the 
Disability Unit in different DGs can modify the EU Commission approach to the 
CRPD and to its implementation as a consequence. 
5.2.2.1 The institutional position of the Disability Unit 
The EU Commission Disability Unit appears to act under the mandate of the EU 
CRPD focal point, and it can be explained as a thematic unit that collects and 
spreads CRPD-related issues in order to support the coordination of the CRPD 
implementation. At the time of developing this research, the unit DG EMPL C3 is 
the EU Commission Disability Unit.  
Some of the activities of the Disability Unit are published on a webpage 
titled “Persons with Disabilities”.52 Due to the informality and confidentiality that 
characterise the work of the Disability Unit, it is probable that the information 
uploaded on this webpage are not exhaustive. Some of the uploaded activities 
will be investigated in the last part of this sub-section. However, this part includes 
reasoning about the institutional position of the Disability Unit within the EU 
 
49 See Section 4.4.3.2: ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU 
Commission 2014) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
50 See Section 4.4.3.2: ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU 
Commission 2015) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
51 See Section 4.4.3.2: ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU 
Commission 2016) 1 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
52 See Sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3: ‘Persons with Disabilities’ (Employment, Social Affairs & 
Inclusion) <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1137&langId=en> accessed 9 
January 2019.  
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Commission governance and the consequent possible influence on the approach 
to the CRPD.  
May the institutional position of the Disability Unit be relevant to the EU 
implementation of the CRPD and influence the national and local levels? For 
instance, the institutional position of the Disability Unit under DG EMPL could 
suggest that the EU Commission considers the implementation of the 
Convention as a social matter rather than as a human rights issue. Otherwise, 
the Disability Unit would have been placed within DG Justice and Consumers 
(JUST), which focuses explicitly on the respect, protection, and fulfilment of 
human rights.53 An EU Commission’s social approach to the CRPD 
implementation could be considered a best practice by the EU Member States, 
which could be influenced and follow the EU Commission example as a 
consequence. 
An example of the best-practice EU Commission influence on national 
governments emerged during an EU CRPD monitoring framework meeting. In 
that occasion, EDF “noted that a member State had used the membership of the 
European Commission in the EU framework to justify its government 
participation in the national framework”.54 Thus, the 2014 conclusion of De Beco 
about the EU Member States’ CRPD focal points being in the ministries 
concerning social affairs55 may show the result of influence from the best-
practice EU on the national level. Since, in 2015, the Disability Unit was flexibly 
relocated from DG JUST to DG EMPL,56 also the opposite is possible: that the 
EU Commission modified its initial preference after being influenced by the 
establishment of the CRPD focal points in the ministries concerning social affairs. 
The following analysis investigates the impact of the harmonisation to a 
social approach on the CRPD implementation. This aspect is essential because 
 
53 ‘Justice and Fundamental Rights’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/topics/justice-and-fundamental-rights_en> accessed 8 January 
2019. 
54 See Section 4.3.3.1: ‘Meeting of the EU Framework to Promote, Protect and Monitor the 
UNCRPD’ (EU CRPD Framework 2013) 3 <http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/people-
disabilities/eu-crpd-framework/resources> accessed 11 December 2018. 
55 See above: De Beco (n 44) 42. 
56 See above and Section 4.2.3: ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (Register of Commission 
Expert Groups) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 17 December 2018. 
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a purely social approach to the Convention contradicts the Chair of the CRPD 
Committee, who hoped for a “understanding of the CRPD […] that […] goes 
beyond the social model of disability and codifies the human rights model of 
disability”.57 The choice between the social-based and human rights-based 
approach to disability may have practical consequences on the implementation 
of several CRPD principles, like independent living rights.  
The comparison between Denmark and Sweden can infer an example of 
practical consequences that the approach to the CRPD implementation has on 
independent living national policies. The former has a social-based while the 
latter has a human rights-based approach to independent living policies. One of 
the differences is the fact that complaints go to the national social board in 
Denmark and to the court in Sweden.58 The previous quotation of the CRPD 
Committee Chair suggests that the Swedish approach would be the preferred 
one. Also the explanation of Section 4.2.1 about implementation as the 
incorporation of human rights into hard law enforced by courts supports the 
Swedish approach. 
However, the institutional position of the EU Commission Disability Unit 
suggests a social-based approach of the Union to the CRPD and independent 
living policies. Due to the usual consideration of the EU example as a best 
practice to follow, the Danish system would be endorsed while Sweden could 
gradually change its approach. Similarly, any EU Member State would probably 
tend to consider the EU Commission’s social-based approach when starting new 
domestic independent living policies. This is because the EU example pre-empts 
national choices and leads harmonisation processes, as explained by 
Waddington.59 Harmonisation would promote minimum standards, which are 
pre-conditions to set common rules.60 Thus, the institutional position of the EU 
Commission Disability Unit promotes a social approach to the CRPD 
 
57 Degener Theresia, ‘Disability in a Human Rights Context’ (2016) 5 Laws 3 
<https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/5/3/35> accessed 7 January 2019. 
58 Karen Christensen, Ingrid Guldvik and Monica Larsson, ‘Active Social Citizenship: The Case 
of Disabled Peoples’ Rights to Personal Assistance’ (2014) 16 Scandinavian Journal of 
Disability Research 19, 24–26. 
59 See Section 2.4.2: Lisa Waddington, ‘The European Union and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared 
Competences’ (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 431, 448. 
60 See Section 2.4.2. 
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implementation that can influence national and local policies on independent 
living rights.  
 Some concerns of the CRPD Committee prove the importance of this 
issue. In fact, in 2015, it asked the EU to “indicate what practical initiatives the 
European Union is taking to ensure the understanding and use of the human 
rights-based approach to disability at all levels”.61 In its reply, the EU Commission 
did not deepen this aspect.62 Its reply was followed by the CRPD Committee 
Concluding Observations on the EU, which stated that “the Committee is 
concerned at […] the lack of human rights indicators”,63 and it “recommends that 
the European Union develop an approach to guide and foster 
deinstitutionalisation”.64 In line with the CRPD, the approach to guide and foster 
deinstitutionalisation should be a human rights-based approach. However, can 
the EU develop a correct human rights-based approach to deinstitutionalisation 
if a social-based unit oversees the relevant policies? Would it be different if the 
Disability Unit had remained under DG JUST? 
Shreds of evidence show that the Disability Unit was under DG JUST, and 
then it was relocated to DG EMPL. Also the webpage of the DHLG explains that 
“the senior Commission representative will normally be the Director responsible 
for disability issues in the DG (since 1.1.2015, Employment, previously 
Justice)”.65 This means that the Director responsible for disability issues has 
changed DG, and the Disability Unit was relocated. The DHLG meetings’ 
attendance lists confirm the mentioned relocation.66 Lastly, the fact itself that the 
relocation of the Disability Unit took place is the evidence that its institutional 
position somehow matters. 
 
61 ‘List of Issues in Relation to the Initial Report of the European Union’ (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/Q/1 1 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/098/84/PDF/G1509884.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 7 
January 2019. 
62 ‘Replies of the European Union to the List of Issues’ (Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/Q/1/Add.1 5–8 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/151/57/PDF/G1515157.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 7 
January 2019. 
63 ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the European Union’ (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/CO/1 para 72 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2fC%2fEU%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
64 ibid 51. 
65 ‘High Level Group on Disability’ (n 55). 
66 See above. 
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The reasoning included in this part was outlined by Waddington already in 
2011. In fact, she wrote that “the EU disability policy was primarily an element of 
social policy – and for a long time the Disability Unit was included within DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion”. However, “with the conclusion of the 
CRPD by the EU, [the] EU disability policy must be seen from the perspective of 
a human rights policy. This is […] reflected in the recent move of the Disability 
Unit to the newly created DG Justice”.67 Waddington had a limpid expectation 
from the move of the Disability Unit that mirrors the concerns expressed in these 
last pages. 
5.2.2.2 The DG EMPL activity plans  
The activities of the Disability Unit are mostly informal and confidential. This is 
the reason why there are few deliverables, and the interviewees were cautious 
about providing insights on the matter. However, having placed the Disability Unit 
within DG EMPL offers the opportunity to analyse the documents of this DG to 
find and deduct information that can be relevant to the Disability Unit itself. Such 
an investigation is the purpose of this part of the sub-section. 
For instance, all the EU Commission Directorates-General prepare: (i) 
multi-annual plans; (ii) annual plans; and (iii) annual reports.68 Therefore, it is 
possible to consult these documents to see if and how DG EMPL plans and 
reports its activities under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point. As the 
documentary search concluded in December 2018, the ensuing investigation 
considers the most recent documents on that date. 
(i) The DG EMPL Strategic Plan 2016-2020 barely mentions disability.69 
The Plan states that DG EMPL is committed to protecting persons with 
disabilities in their workplace,70 and on improving social policies and social 
protection for persons with disabilities.71 The CRPD is mentioned only once 
 
67 Lisa Waddington, ‘The European Union and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: A Story of Exclusive and Shared Competences’ (2011) 18 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 431, 452. 
68 ‘Strategy Documents’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategy-
documents_en> accessed 10 January 2019. 
69 ‘Strategic Plan 2016-2020 - Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion DG’ (EU Commission 
2016) Ares(2016)1275012 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/strategic-plan-2016-
2020-dg-empl_march2016_en.pdf> accessed 11 January 2019. 
70 ibid 4. 
71 ibid 16. 
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without clarifying the planned contribution to the implementation of the 
Convention.72 
(ii) Also the DG EMPL Management Plan 2018 includes few items about 
disability.73 In detail, the Plan schedules an evaluation of the Disability Strategy,74 
the financial support of disability-related CSOs (i.e. the European Network of 
Academic Experts),75 and the promotion of the European Day of Persons with 
Disabilities and the Access City Award.76 
(iii) Lastly, the DG EMPL 2017 Annual Activity Report summarises the 
realisation of the previous year’s planned activities. As the planned disability-
related activities were a few, it is comprehensible why also the Report includes 
few mentions on disability.77 
Therefore, the analysis of the DG EMPL planned and reported activities 
shows that, officially, there is no clear commitment to the respect, protection, and 
fulfilment of the human rights of persons with disabilities. This finding is surprising 
after having said that the DG EMPL hosts the EU Commission Disability Unit, 
which acts under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point. However, the 
probable explanation for this finding is that the promotion of informal activities 
counterbalances a few mentions in official documents. Once again, the 
informality and confidentiality of the EU Commission governance affect this 
research’s analysis, which needs to deduct its conclusions.  
 As suggested by the DG EMPL Management Plan 2018, the DG EMPL 
can finance CSOs, NGOs, and DPOs. The Plan expressly referred to ANED, 
which shows the tendency of the EU Commission to consult external experts, as 
mentioned in Section 5.2.1.1. In addition to experts, often “the Commission 
 
72 ibid. 
73 ‘Management Plan 2018 - Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion DG’ (EU Commission 
2017) Ares(2017)6261754 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/management-plan-empl-2018_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 January 2019. 
74 ibid 13. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid 24. 
77 ‘Annual Activity Report 2017 -  Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion DG’ (EU 
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financially supports […] organisations’ advocacy capacity and their EU-wide 
network”,78 as confirmed in the Non Paper.  
During the interviews, several questions focused on the use of funding 
because the control of money can be a resource to influence, as suggested by 
Nye.79 Replying to one of these questions, a civil society activist interviewee 
explained that: 
[when it comes to financing disability-related CSOs] the decision 
about the funding is made by the Disability Unit, which is also the 
focal point for the CRPD.80  
This point is exciting, and it is a finding of the research because this is the 
evidence that the Disability Unit is a deliberative entity. The interviewee’s insight 
inspired a documentary search about the allocation of funding. For instance, 
documents show that: on one hand, the European Disability Forum (EDF) 
received more than one million euros both in 201781 and in 2018;82 on the other 
hand, the European Network on Independent Living (ENIL) received two hundred 
thousand euros in 201783 and nothing in 2018.84  
In one of its newsletters, ENIL expressed its concerns and stated that “a 
number of MEPs have sent a written question to the European Commission, 
asking the Commission why it stopped funding ENIL at the end of 2017”.85 
Probably, this means that ENIL had previously asked some MEPs to put 
pressure on the Disability Unit about the issue. As a result, seven MEPs wrote 
the EU Commission asking “[…] why has the Commission cut its support to the 
only fully user-led cross-disability network at EU level, given that ENIL is a well-
 
78 EU Commission Non Paper Setting-up at EU level of the Framework required by Art. 33.2 of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 9. 
79 See Section 3.3.1: Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 
(Public Affairs 2004) 2. 
80 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 36) 13. 
81 ‘Grants Awarded as a Result of the Call for Proposals VP/2016/013’ (EU Commission 2017) 
2–3 <https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=17843&langId=en> accessed 10 
January 2019. 
82 ‘Grants Awarded as a Result of the Call for Proposals VP/2016/013’ (EU Commission 2018) 
5–6 <https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19758&langId=en> accessed 10 
January 2018. 
83 ‘Grants Awarded as a Result of the Call for Proposals VP/2016/013’ (n 80) 1. 
84 ‘Grants Awarded as a Result of the Call for Proposals VP/2016/013’ (n 81). 
85 ‘ENIL’s Members Mailing #3’ (16 January 2019). 
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respected organisation, and that hundreds of thousands of persons with 
disabilities in the EU still live in long-stay residential institutions or without 
adequate support […]?”.86 The DG EMPL Commissioner replied that “[…] ENIL’s 
application was carefully evaluated by a committee against pre-announced 
criteria related to relevance, quality, EU added value, results and cost-
effectiveness. ENIL’s application did not reach the minimum score for award and 
was rejected”.87 
However, the civil society activist interviewee observed: 
that the evaluation is not done by independent evaluators but by 
the same unit who is meant to implement the CRPD.88  
In sum, the interviewee is suggesting that the EU Commission Disability 
Unit uses its economic power89 to exercise its influence on entities that have the 
mandate to monitor its work as EU CRPD focal point. The research has already 
reached a similar conclusion in Section 4.3.1.1 about the EU Commission that 
assigned no additional resources to the EU CRPD monitoring framework and its 
members. Therefore, the research has revealed two situations where the EU 
Commission tries to exert its legitimate control over resources to influence 
entities that concern the implementation and monitoring of the CRDP. 
It would be interesting to understand what was the work of ENIL that could 
have been affected by this suspension of funding. Such an understanding would 
suggest what the real target of the EU Commission’s attempt to influence was. It 
is possible to infer its real target by the October 2015 DHLG meeting’s analysis. 
In fact, during this meeting, ENIL presented its outcomes as a result of the EU 
Commission sponsorship. These were two reports on independent living rights, 
one of which focused on the use of ESI Funds.90 Since ENIL was using the EU 
 
86 ‘Parliamentary Questions - Question for Written Answer E-005505/2018 to the Commission’ 
(European Parliament, 29 October 2018) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2018-005505_EN.html> accessed 
16 January 2019. 
87 ‘Parliamentary Questions - Answer given by Ms Thyssen on Behalf of the European 
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accessed 16 January 2019. 
88 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 36) 13. 
89 See Section 3.3.1: Nye (n 78) 31. 
90 ‘Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2015) 4 
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Commission funding to monitor the EU Commission itself on the use of ESI 
Funds, did ENIL’s funding suspension aim to avoid external monitoring on the 
ESI Funds governance?  
This intuition might be just speculative if it was not supported by the feeling 
of the previously quoted interviewee who admitted that: 
since [ENIL] launched this EU Funds For Our Rights campaign, I 
think that was the nail in the coffin. [ENIL’s activists] were 
consistently really criticising [the Disability Unit].91 
These pieces of evidence prove the existence of influencing relationships that 
can be harsh, although belonging to soft governance processes. 
5.2.2.3 The Disability Unit’s events 
As suggested by the DG EMPL Management Plan 2018, the DG EMPL can 
finance CSOs and events. Among the events, the Plan emphasises the 
European Day of Persons with Disabilities and the Access City Award.92 The 
relevant Budget Report shows that these two events cost seven hundred 
thousand euros in 2017.93 Since the previous part of this sub-section concluded 
that the Disability Unit tends to use money as a resource to influence, it is 
probable that it invests in these two events with the attempt to exercise its 
influence. This part of the sub-section seeks verification of this assertion. 
The following inductive analysis suggests that the two events are soft 
instruments that promote the implementation of the CRPD at the national and 
local levels. As such, their organisation is a strategy of the EU Commission 
Disability Unit to exercise its influence. The DG EMPL thematic webpage on 
disability includes information about: (i) the European Day of Persons with 
Disabilities; and (ii) the Access City Award.94  
(i) The European Day of Persons with Disabilities was mentioned by 
Priestley, revealing that “in 1993 a Disabled People’s Parliament was held to 
 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
91 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 36) 13. 
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mark the first European Day of Disabled People, at which around 500 
participants agreed recommendations to the Commission”.95 Since that first time, 
3 December celebrates the European Day of Persons with Disabilities. This 
initiative took inspiration by the United Nations, which “proclaim[ed] 3 December 
as the international Day of Disabled Persons” the previous year.96 
The DG EMPL thematic webpage on disability includes information about 
the European Day of Persons with Disabilities for the years from 2014 to 2018.97 
Mostly, these are conferences that focus on disability-related vital issues. The 
available documents include the conferences’ programmes and reports. These 
show the names of the conference speakers, which have been included in this 
thesis’ list of potential interviewees.98 
Although independent living rights were not among the significant issues of 
the last five conferences, several panellists talked about them. In particular, the 
2018 event hosted a seminar of FRA that “provid[ed] an opportunity to discuss 
how policymakers and practitioners can implement successful 
deinstitutionalisation processes”.99 The pictures of the event show that several 
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hundreds of persons attended the conference. They also show urgent attention 
to accommodate any linguistic difference in order for everyone to properly 
understand the issues at stake.100  
The event is an occasion to share best practices and to harmonise the 
approach to similar issues. The European Day of Persons with Disabilities seems 
the enlarged version of the Work Forum, which in turn looks like the enlarged 
version of the Disability High Level Group.101 This scaling up aims to involve 
different actors, and they have both horizontal and vertical effects. The horizontal 
effect enlarges the public to any disability-related organisation. The vertical effect 
enlarges the public to any local level organisation. 
This consideration means that, for instance, the mentioned seminar offered 
by FRA trained national and local organisations about implementing and 
monitoring deinstitutionalisation policies. In turn, this is the first step of 
harmonisation processes, which represent an opportunity to influence the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights.  
Lastly, as explained in Section 4.3.2 about the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework, the European Day of Persons with Disabilities offers networking 
opportunities that other entities can exploit to supplement their scarce resources 
and increase their chances to exercise influence. Therefore, the creation and 
management of international networks is a constant strategy of the EU CRPD-
related governance to reach and possibly influence the national and local levels. 
 (ii) The European Day of Persons with Disabilities hosts the prize-giving 
ceremony of the Access City Award. The EU Commission clarified that “the 
Access City Award is one of the actions foreseen in the EU disability strategy102 
that aims at making Europe barrier-free for persons with disabilities”.103 The 
planning of an award is a different strategy from the establishment of a network. 
Generally speaking, while networks spread best practices, contests reward best 
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practices. As the Award targets cities, the measure is specifically designed to 
involve the local level. 
The local level shows interest in the initiative, as proved by the fact that 
“more than 250 EU cities have participated in […] 6 editions of the Access City 
Award”.104 A 2016 study revealed that “there are over 800 cities with more than 
50,000 inhabitants in the European Union”,105 which implies that almost one out 
of three EU cities participated in the Access City Award. “The Access City Award 
recognises and celebrates efforts by European cities to improve accessibility and 
promote inclusion”.106 Such efforts are published and represent examples of best 
practices upon which European cities can build their experience.107  
Therefore, the Access City Award is a new and exciting strategy of the EU 
Commission to influence the local level on the correct implementation of the 
CRPD. First of all, the initiative reaches the local level bypassing national 
governments and the competence issue. Second, cities focus on CRPD-related 
issues not because obliged but because stimulated. Third, the competition 
promotes an intense production of original outputs that are shared as best 
practices. Lastly, every city involved in the Award starts domestic processes that 
go beyond the event itself. Probably, the best result of the Access City Award is 
a positive influence on the disability-sensitive culture. It is not a matter of EU 
funding; it regards culture and values instead. 
Lastly, it is interesting to mention the 2019 attempt of the Disability Unit to 
create an Access City Award Network.108 As pointed above, the establishment 
of international networks is a constant strategy of the EU CRPD-related 
governance. This new network confirms such a tendency. In fact, although the 
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Award is a different kind of strategy, it offered the opportunity to create a network, 
and the Disability Unit took advantage of the opportunity. In turn, this newly 
established international network will probably increase the opportunities of the 
Award to exercise its influence on the local level. 
5.3 The EU Parliament 
This section focuses on the EU Parliament, which is a member of the 
established EU CRPD monitoring framework. While the previous chapter 
explained the role of the EU CRPD monitoring framework in the EU CRPD-
related governance, this section investigates the individual contribution of the EU 
Parliament to the implementation of the Convention. The analysis seeks pieces 
of evidence about the EU Parliament’s opportunities to influence the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. This section includes 
two sub-sections. The first sub-section is a brief overview of the EU Parliament 
and its governance. The second sub-section investigates the role of the principal 
EU Parliament’s committees and intergroups that oversee CRPD-related 
matters. 
The EU Parliament is one of the seven institutions of the EU.109 “The 
European Parliament is the EU’s law-making body”.110 “As an institution 
representing the citizens of Europe, Parliament forms the democratic basis of 
the European Union”.111 The EU Parliament is composed of Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) who represent the Union’s citizens.112 These elect 
MEPs for five-year terms.113 “The European Parliament shall, jointly with the 
Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions”.114 This means that while 
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the EU Commission has the monopoly of the legislative initiative,115 its proposals 
must be voted by the EU Parliament and Council in order to become EU law. 
Once approved, the EU Commission shall implement EU law.116 The process 
about the Parliament and Council jointly voting legislative proposals is the 
“ordinary legislative procedure”,117 also known as “co-decision procedure”.118 
Besides, the EU Treaties establish that “any citizen of the Union […] shall have 
the right to address […] a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which 
comes within the Union’s fields of activity”.119 Furthermore, the EU Parliament 
elects the EU Ombudsman.120 Lastly, following the EU conclusion of the CRPD, 
any outcome of the EU Parliament should comply with the Convention because 
the EU Parliament has the duty to respect the international treaties the EU has 
acceded to.121 
5.3.1 The EU Parliament governance: committees and intergroups 
“The organisation and operation of the European Parliament are governed by its 
Rules of Procedure.122 The political bodies, committees, delegations and political 
groups guide Parliament’s activities”.123 An understanding of the Parliament’s 
institutional organisation is essential to explain how its activities could influence 
the implementation of the CRPD.  
As the EU Commission, also the EU Parliament includes a political level 
and an operational level. While the elected MEPs represent the political level, 
the operational level regards the institutional secretariat that shall assist 
MEPs.124 However, the operational levels of the EU Commission and Parliament 
have very different missions. In fact, while the EU Commission’s operational level 
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shall support the political level and oversee the implementation of EU law, the 
EU Parliament’s Secretariat has no implementation duties. This because only 
the EU Commission has the mandate to implement and monitor EU legislation. 
As such, while the previous section investigated the operational level of the EU 
Commission, this section primarily focuses on the EU Parliament’s political level. 
 The governance of the EU Parliament’s political level includes: (i) political 
bodies; (ii) committees and sub-committees; (iii) delegations; (iv) political groups; 
and (v) intergroups. (i) The political bodies are offices with specific institutional 
mandates that are led by MEPs.125 (ii) The committees are groups of MEPs that 
focus on specific policy areas, for which they “examine proposals for legislation, 
and […] can put forward amendments or propose to reject a bill”.126 (iii) The 
“delegations are official groups of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) 
who develop relations with the parliaments of non-EU countries, regions or 
organisations”.127 (iv) Political groups128 include MEPs according to their political 
affinities.129 Lastly, (v) Intergroups unofficially gather MEPs with “the purpose of 
holding informal exchanges of views on specific issues across different political 
groups, drawing on members of different parliamentary committees, and of 
promoting contact between Members and civil society”.130  
An interviewed MEP was asked to clarify the difference between 
committees and intergroups, and the following explanation summarises her 
reply. Intergroups have no formal mandate or power. They gather MEPs from 
different committees to discuss topics that have horizontal consideration. After 
having discussed within intergroups, MEPs bring the outcomes of these 
discussions to the committees they belong to. The result is that the law-making 
work of the committees includes and considers previous discussions taken within 
the different intergroups. This process entails that any intergroups’ topic should 
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be mainstreamed within any committees’ draft law. Therefore, although not 
having a formal mandate or power, intergroups have an important soft role.131  
In short, intergroups are like corporativist networks132 that try to lobby and 
influence the work of committees. In turn, committees work on the legislative 
proposals of the EU Commission,133 and they can influence the co-decision 
procedure.134 Therefore, intergroups and committees can exercise their 
influence to include CRPD principles into EU law. As explained in Section 4.2.1, 
the incorporation of human rights principles into hard law is an implementation 
strategy. Section 5.2.1 explained that this strategy starts with the official 
legislative initiative of the EU Commission. Therefore, the work of EU Parliament 
intergroups and committees is another step of the same strategy. This strategy 
is pivotal to influence the national and local levels because, as the interviewed 
MEP pointed: 
all of the rules and regulations and laws which are adopted, 
included the ratification of the CRPD, will have an impact on the 
national level.135 
Also the documentary search has gathered interesting information about 
committees and intergroups, which are the main focus of the following parts of 
this section. The documentary investigation found 23 EU Parliament 
committees,136 and 28 EU Parliament intergroups.137 Only a few of them focus 
on CRPD-related issues. 
As far as committees are concerned, the Non Paper entrusted the Petition 
(PETI) Committee with the task of representing the EU Parliament in the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework.138 In addition, the framework’s meeting minutes 
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show that, in 2013, PETI was substituted by the Employment and Social Affair 
(EMPL) Committee.139 Therefore, this is evidence that these two committees are 
related to the EU CRPD-related governance more than others. For this reason, 
the analysis narrows its focus on these two committees. Lastly, as the PETI140 
and EMPL141 Committees’ members’ identities are in the public domain, they 
have been included in this thesis’ list of potential interviewees.142 
 As far as intergroups are concerned, the documentary search discovered 
that one EU Parliament intergroup focuses explicitly on disability issues. For this 
reason, the following analysis explores the activities of this Disability Intergroup. 
Its list of members is public,143 and they have been included in this thesis list of 
potential interviewees.144 Besides, it is possible to consult a “declaration of 
financial interest” stating that the Disability Intergroup has its expenses covered 
either by MEPs or by the European Disability Forum.145 This link between EDF 
and the EU Parliament is actual because the Forum “cooperates closely with the 
Disability Intergroup and acts as its Secretariat”.146 Therefore, it will be 
interesting to explore also this cooperation. 
5.3.2 The EU Parliament EMPL Committee, PETI Committee, And 
Disability Intergroup 
This sub-section includes three parts that analyse the opportunities to influence 
the implementation of the CRPD of: (i) the EMPL Committee; (ii) the PETI 
Committee; and (iii) the Disability Intergroup. Also, this introduction presents two 
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preliminary remarks about the EMPL and PETI Committees. The two remarks 
are about the relocation of the EU Parliament delegate within the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework from the PETI to the EMPL Committee. Reasoning on this 
is interesting because the situation is similar to the relocation of the Disability 
Unit from DG JUST to DG EMPL.147 
The first remark starts with the consideration that the Non Paper 
designated the PETI Committee as a member of the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework.148 Then, the EU Parliament Conference of Presidents149 entrusted 
the EMPL Committee with the task.150 As suggested in Section 4.3.1.1, the Non 
Paper can be described as a soft law document. Thus, the unilateral decision to 
relocate the delegate has been possible only due to the soft nature of the Non 
Paper. In fact, the soft Non Paper set up a soft governance architecture, which 
is characterised by flexibility. As theorised by Sabel and Zeitlin, flexibility is a 
crucial characteristic of the new EU governance.151 The relocation revealed how 
the EU Parliament used this flexibility. 
Sections 5.2.2 and 4.2.3 emphasised that the EU Council Decision 
entrusted the broad EU Commission with the EU CRPD focal point mandate.152 
On the other hand, the Non Paper designated a specific body of the EU 
Parliament to represent the institution in the EU CRPD monitoring framework.153  
The opportunity for the Non Paper to include more specific provisions is a 
consequence of its soft stance. The EU Council Decision is hard law, and the 
relocation of the Disability Unit could not have been decided on soft bases if the 
Decision had been more specific. As Newman and Posner suggest, soft law is 
simpler to ratify because it can be infringed.154 This case shows that infringe may 
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mean that a situation is flexible and easy to adapt. Therefore, this inductive 
analysis has explained that the need for flexibility can be satisfied with hard 
norms when not too specific, as well as with soft norms in any case. 
 The second remark is about the reasons underpinning the decision to 
substitute the PETI with the EMPL Committee as a delegate in the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework. Since the research found no official document explaining 
such a decision, any reason can be only inferred. For instance, one possible 
reason is that the relocation of the task to the EU Parliament EMPL Committee 
was an attempt to harmonise with the relocation of the EU Commission Disability 
Unit within the DG EMPL. This possibility is supported by the fact that the two 
institutional changes occurred in the same year. Informal agreements with the 
two institutions probably took place beforehand. Section 5.2.2.1 suggested that 
the institutional position of the offices with CRPD-related mandates can reflect 
the approach to the implementation of the Convention. Therefore this 
harmonisation between the EU Parliament and Commission confirms the EU 
tendency to approach the implementation of the Convention with a social 
prerogative. 
The previous section showed that the approach of the EU could influence 
the national and local levels. In addition to this, there is also a competence issue 
that derives from the approach to the Convention. For instance, an interviewed 
European parliamentarian was asked how the EU Parliament can influence the 
implementation of independent living rights, and the reply was that: 
[independent living rights are considered social affairs, as such] the 
Council and all the Member States say that social affairs are our 
competence […] with social affairs it’s national competence, [the 
EU Parliament] can’t touch it, [the EU Parliament] can try to 
influence it.155  
The interviewee said that they could not force, but they can influence the 
implementation of independent living rights. Indeed, this idea is at the basis of 
this research. 
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This finding entails that the EU social approach to the CRPD 
implementation: on one hand (i) can exercise influence through suggesting best 
practices to import; on the other hand (ii) can affect the interpretation of the 
conferral about the duties to implement the Convention. On this, the interviewee 
was clear: 
the barriers to my work are the EU Treaties saying that social affairs 
are a national competence.156  
The interviewee is right. However, does the EU interpretation of the CRPD 
implementation as a social matter instead of as a human rights issue increase or 
decrease the opportunities of the EU-CRPD related governance to influence the 
implementation of the Convention? 
This question suggests the exercise of situational influence.157 In fact, the 
harmonised approach to the CRPD implementation sets a situation within which 
influencing relationships take place. The borders of these influencing 
relationships are affected by the approach to the CRPD implementation because 
social affairs are national competence. As such, the EU social approach to the 
CRPD implementation can be: either (i) the successful strategy of the EU to 
increase its influence on the EU Member States; or (ii) the successful strategy of 
the EU Member States to resist the EU influence. Therefore, it is probable that 
the decisions to relocate the EU Commission and Parliament CRPD-related 
centres of influence under their EMPL departments are part of the same strategy.  
5.3.2.1 The EMPL Committee’s opportunities to influence 
This part of the sub-section focuses on the EMPL Committee of the EU 
Parliament with the attempt to show its opportunities to influence the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. The following 
inductive analysis considers the available documents as well as the relevant 
passages of the conducted interviews.  
The EMPL Committee has a dedicated webpage, which revealingly states 
the aim “to influence and to determine the legislative framework in the areas for 
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which it is responsible”.158 As for any committee, the Rules of Procedure of the 
European Parliament lists such areas. Surprisingly, the EMPL list of areas of 
competence mentions neither disability nor the CRPD.159 However, this thesis’ 
documentary search has already established the relevance of the EMPL 
Committee for CRPD-related matters due to its mandate within the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework.  
The EMPL Committee’s on-line tool160 includes two reports on disability 
issues: the 2016 report focuses on the EU implementation of the CRPD,161 and 
the 2017 one is about the implementation of the Disability Strategy.162 As these 
two reports seem to be the most important and official outcomes of the EMPL 
Committee about disability, they are worth an investigation.  
 The 2016 report recommends a Parliamentary Resolution163 on the 2015 
CRPD Committee Concluding Observations on the EU.164 For the purposes of 
this thesis, the report’s key passages are: (i) the recognition of the CRPD as EU 
law hierarchically superior to secondary legislation;165 (ii) the need for a human-
rights approach to disability;166 (iii) the recognition of ESI Funds as a means for 
implementing the Convention and independent living rights;167 (iv) the urgency 
to foster deinstitutionalisation;168 (v) the need for a stronger EU CRPD-related 
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governance;169 and (vi) the recognition of the importance of the PETI Committee 
in protecting EU citizens against a wrong implementation of the Convention.170 
 The 2017 report recommends a Parliamentary Resolution171 on the 
implementation of the European Disability Strategy.172 For the purposes of this 
thesis, the report’s key passages are: (i) the recognition of the CRPD as an 
instrument of EU secondary legislation;173 (ii) the recognition of a human rights 
approach to disability and independent living;174 (iii) the recognition of ESI Funds 
as a means for implementing the Convention and independent living rights;175 
(iv) the need for deinstitutionalisation as well as for alternative measures;176 and 
(v) the narrow linkage between the Disability Strategy and the CRPD.177 
 In addition to the listed vital passages, the 2016 and 2017 reports have 
two crucial common points.  
(i) The first common point is that both the reports show a monitoring 
prerogative because they stress and urge the EU Commission to implement 
CRPD-related measures. On this matter, Section 4.3 explained that the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework does not author reports because it is not an 
independent entity. Also Priestley, Raley, and De Beco pointed out that “the 
Framework has no competence to formulate any significant joint opinion or 
initiative since each member may act only in accordance with their respective 
individual mandate”.178 As such, the mentioned two reports are an example of 
the individual monitoring initiative of an EU CRPD monitoring framework’s 
member. In fact, the framework meetings’ minutes show that these two reports 
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were discussed during the meetings themselves. On those occasions, the 
reports were presented as monitoring measures under the framework work 
programme.179 Therefore, the mentioned two reports are essential not only for 
their contents but also for showing how the broad mandate of the EU CRPD 
monitoring framework is practically exercised through the individual initiative of 
its members. 
(ii) The second common point between the two reports is that they call on 
both the EU and its Member States to correctly implement the CRPD. This finding 
is significant because it shows that also the external complementarity of the EU 
CRPD monitoring framework (explained in Section 4.3.1.2) passes through its 
members’ individual activities. This consideration is striking also because the 
interviewee quoted above suggested that the EU Parliament can’t touch it. 
However, the reports show that at least it tries to touch the CRPD implementation 
at the national level. Probably, the fact that Parliamentary Resolutions are not 
binding allows the EU Parliament to address topics of national competence. 
Coherently, the same interviewee clarified that: 
[the EU Parliament Resolutions are a means to] put pressure on 
the Member States.180  
Therefore, they cannot coerce, but they can try to influence. In sum, the EU 
Parliament can exercise its influence on the national level, either directly 
addressing its Resolutions to the EU Member States or indirectly addressing its 
Resolutions to the EU Commission. 
How can the influence of Parliamentary Resolutions be exercised? The 
EU Parliament Resolutions are not legislative acts; thus, they are not binding. 
Not being EU law, the EU Commission does not monitor their implementation. In 
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addition, the EU Parliament is not an executive branch, so it does not monitor 
their implementation either. This unclear situation is not explored in any official 
document. For this reason, an interviewed MEP was asked to explain how they 
monitor and evaluate the efficacy of their Resolutions. 
In sum, the interviewee clarified that they do not monitor and evaluate the 
efficacy of their Resolutions because it is not their mandate. However, this is 
done by civil society organisations. 
That’s actually EDF’s responsibility and their member 
organisations to follow up. So, we did our part. And then it’s up to 
them to follow up with their national governments saying to look at 
these two Resolutions that were passed by the European 
Parliament. […] There should be that sort of interaction in terms of 
how things move forward, right. So we take a step, they take a step, 
and then we take another step. So it’s a collaborative effort.181 
In sum, the interviewee’s explanation depicted a kind of cycle: (i) CSOs 
put pressure on MEPs about specific topics; (ii) MEPs agree on the raised topics’ 
urgency and take action; (iii) CSOs monitor that the MEPs’ actions are followed 
up; and (iv) CSOs report to MEPs and ask for new actions. This cycle is similar 
to the EU experimentalist governance represented in Figure 3-5.182 It explains 
how the EMPL Committee can exercise its influence on the national and local 
levels in implementing the CRPD through its cooperation with CSOs. An example 
of this cooperation was the ENIL’s funding issue when MEPs wrote the EU 
Commission asking why they suspended financing ENIL.183 
At the end of the interview, the MEP revealed that: 
I just want to add a thing related to the CRPD follow up: we also 
have set up a CRPD Network. So the European Parliament has I 
think three representatives and then there are individuals from the 
Commission and the Council, but I think the Commission has 
withdrawn because their role is quite different. So this network is 
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another way that we’re trying to follow up on the CRPD 
implementation. Yeah, we meet two times a year. And it’s from the 
Employment Committee.184 
The interview had no time left to deepen the topic. However, this has been 
investigated with a supplementary documentary search because it is interesting 
that a CRPD-related outcome of the EMPL Committee is the establishment of a 
network.  
The CRPD Network was created in 2015 “in order to promote public 
debate and the political role of the EP in the implementation of the CRPD [and it 
is] assisted by the Committee Secretariats”.185 The EU “Parliament has – 
independently of its role in the Framework –, set-up an inter-committee CRPD 
Network at political level […]. The CRPD Network is, by analogy to Parliament’s 
membership of the Framework, chaired by EMPL”.186 Therefore, the CRPD 
Network’s organisation is like that of the DISG of the EU Commission, which was 
explored in Sections 4.4.1 and 5.2.1. Probably their role is similar as well. 
Differently from the DISG, the CRPD Network has a dedicated webpage (subject 
file) from which grabbing information.187 This webpage includes the list of MEPs 
who are members of the CRPD Network.188 These have been included in this 
thesis list of potential interviewees.189 
The CRPD Network webpage includes its meetings’ minutes. Generally 
speaking, the analysed minutes are concise, preventing to evaluate any 
discussion. However, they show that CRPD matters are drawn from the EU 
CRPD-related governance to the attention of the different EU Parliament 
Committees. The minutes of the first meeting include an explanation of the CRPD 
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Network activity as it follows: “committees participating in the CRPD Network 
should send information on their disability related activities […] to the EMPL 
Secretariat […]. Information received will be summarised by the EMPL 
Secretariat and sent to the Members of the CRPD Network. This first database 
will be updated four times per year”.190 
The described process aims to create a database. This archive classifies 
the CRPD Network as an information network, following the classification of 
networks by Slaughter.191 In fact, the CRPD Network webpage shares five 
inherent kinds of documents: (i) adopted reports; (ii) adopted opinions; (iii) 
adopted resolutions; (iv) studies – hearings – petitions; and (v) ongoing – 
planned activities.192 Probably, this is a useful tool to verify the correct 
mainstreaming of the CRPD within the work of all the EU Parliament committees. 
As the EMPL Committee can influence the CRPD implementation with its soft 
and law-making activities, the CRPD Network aims to export this practice to all 
the other EU Parliament Committees. 
In sum, the CRPD Network is an innovative and promising initiative of the 
EU Parliament EMPL Committee. As Priestley, Raley, and De Beco suggested, 
“the Parliamentary CRPD Network should be encouraged to continually update 
and maintain its webpage highlighting the ongoing work of Members in such 
summaries, as well as planned activities”.193 
5.3.2.2 The PETI Committee’s opportunities to influence 
This part of the sub-section analyses the activities of the PETI Committee of the 
EU Parliament in order to find opportunities to influence the implementation of 
the CRPD and independent living rights. The inductive analysis considers 
primary and secondary sources to find pieces of evidence that confirm the role 
of the PETI Committee in the EU CRPD-related governance. 
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“The Petitions Committee is the bridge between the EU citizens and the 
EU institutions”.194 Therefore, it has a direct link with the national and local levels 
by mandate. The PETI Committee is responsible for: (i) petitions; (ii) citizens’ 
initiatives’ public hearings; and (iii) relations with the EU Ombudsman.195 The 
relations with the EU Ombudsman are emphasised by the PETI membership to 
the European Network of Ombudsmen,196 which will be described in the next 
section.  
The Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament explain the petitions’ 
process.197 This process can be summarised as it follows: (i) EU citizens can 
address a petition about any EU topic that affects them;198 (ii) the PETI 
Committee considers the admissibility of petitions and opens a public procedure 
for each of them; (iii) the PETI Committee may involve the Commission, the 
Council, and the petitioners’ EU Member State in answering the petition; and (iv) 
the PETI Committee may either reply to the petitioner with its opinion or decide 
to take further initiatives like motions and reports. Figure 5-2199 summarises the 
described process. 
 
Figure 5-2 - Stages in the petition process 
 It is essential to clarify the nature of the EU topics that can be the object 
of a petition. These mainly regard matters of EU law implementation. “The 
petition may present an individual request, a complaint or observation 
concerning the application of EU law or an appeal to the European Parliament to 
adopt a position on a specific matter”.200 The application of EU law concerns both 
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the EU and its Member States. This principle means that EU citizens can address 
a petition to the EU Parliament because concerned about how their government 
implements EU legislation. As the EU legislation shall be consistent with the 
CRPD principles, petitions might complain about the national and local 
implementation of CRPD principles mediated via EU law. This consideration is 
the critical point of investigation in this second part of the sub-section.  
 While it was previously affirmed that the EU Parliament does not monitor 
the implementation of EU law, the PETI Committee’s mandate seems to have 
this monitoring prerogative. In reality, the monitoring initiative is on citizens. In 
fact, the PETI Committee does not take any initiative, but it executes the 
monitoring activities as requested by citizens in their petitions. This process is a 
bottom-up link between civil society and the EU Parliament. Differently, the 
previous explanation of the EMPL Committee showed a top-down connection 
between the EU institution and the national and local levels. 
As the EU law implementation involves both the EU and its Member 
States, “such petitions give the European Parliament the opportunity of calling 
attention to any infringement of a European citizen’s rights by a Member State 
or local authorities or other institution”.201 Therefore, the possibility to influence 
the national and local levels is intrinsic to the PETI Committee’s mandate. It is 
essential to highlight that the outcomes of the PETI Committee are not binding. 
For this reason, its possibilities to affect the national and local levels regard 
influence instead of coercion. In other words: when EU citizens think that there 
is any infringement of EU law, they can choose to complain either to the PETI 
Committee with a petition or to the ECJ with litigation. These two opportunities 
are very different from one another with different procedures and outcomes. 
Among the two, the outcomes of the PETI Committee represent a powerful kind 
of soft law, which can exercise influence. 
This brief introduction has explained that the PETI Committee can 
influence the EU Member States’ implementation of EU legislation. May the PETI 
Committee also influence the implementation of the CRPD? Since the EU 
Parliament seems to consider the CRPD as an instrument of EU secondary 
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legislation,202 the answer to this question might be consequentially positive. The 
analysis of various reports of the EU Parliament Think Tank can support the 
investigation of this assumption. Among the key findings of these reports, it is 
stated that “petitions to the EP are one of several mechanisms for raising CRPD 
concerns”,203 and that “PETI has referred to disability equality issues throughout 
the past year, while providing a strong focus for discussion in specific events and 
reports”.204 Therefore, if petitions address CRPD-related issues and the petition 
process can exercise influence, it can be deduced that the PETI Committee can 
exercise its influence on CRPD-related issues. Probably, this is the main reason 
for which the PETI Committee was initially entrusted with the membership in the 
EU CRPD monitoring framework. Coherently, the Council Note clarified that 
PETI “contributes to the protection against Member States breaches of the 
Convention when implementing EU law”.205  
The PETI Committee receives a significant number of petitions on 
disability issues. Priestley quantified them as it follows: 19 in 2012;206 45 in 2013; 
37 in 2014; 28 in 2015; 37 in 2016; and 13 in 2017.207 The author confirms that 
between 2012 and 2014, 17 petitions concerned the EU, and 92 were about 
alleged EU Member States’ infringements.208 This finding means that, between 
2012 and 2017, there were 92 bottom-up attempts to use the PETI Committee 
in order to exercise influence on the national and local levels in CRPD-related 
issues.  
Priestley, Raley, and De Beco stated that “examples of relevant petitions 
illustrate […] how the EU’s participation in the CRPD may expand the scope of 
the EP’s concern with disability issues in areas of shared competence”.209 The 
independent living principle belongs to this area. On this, Priestley’s analysis 
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revealed that 11 petitions concerned Article 19 CRPD.210 As such, their 
investigation can show opportunities to influence the implementation of 
independent living rights. 
Among the 11 petitions about independent living rights:211 (i) Petition 
0475/2012 addressed the national home care system;212 (ii) Petition 1459/2012 
denounced the national use of ESI Funds to develop institutions;213 (iii) Petition 
0355/2013 argued against the national habit on institutionalisation;214 (iv) Petition 
1576/2013 complained about inefficient local social housing support;215 (v) 
Petition 2137/2013 denounced the worsening of national legislation;216 (vi) 
Petition 1912/2014 linked national parking permits with independent living;217 (vii) 
Petition 2260/2014 complained about inefficient local social housing support;218 
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and (viii) Petition 1394/15 asked for persons with disabilities to have a voice on 
the services they receive.219 
As Priestley explained, this last petition “claimed that national 
interpretation resulted in disability discrimination in the provision of housing 
choices and support services for community living. In this example, the 
Commission took the view that they could not evidence a breach of EU law while 
PETI Members were greatly concerned by the disability rights issues”.220 As 
such, this episode reveals disagreement between the EU Commission and the 
PETI Committee. Besides, it deserves a more profound investigation because it 
confirms some findings of this research. 
“The petitioner states that the EU’s Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU) 
allows for erroneous interpretations at national level regarding the organisation 
of housing services for the disabled”.221 In short, the petitioner argued that some 
Finnish private personal assistance services did not respect the rights included 
in the CRPD. As a consequence, she asked the EU to influence the Finnish 
government on changing the national Procurement Act by clarifying the meaning 
of the EU Directive. 
First, the topic of the Petition is coherent with the concern (held in Section 
2.6.2) that private services may be too market-oriented and risk to underestimate 
the rights of persons.222 Second, the EU Commission affirms that this social issue 
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is a national competence,223 which recalls the importance of the approach to 
disability.224 Third, the missed mediation of the Convention via EU law is a crucial 
element of this case. 
In fact, although Article 19 CRPD affirms that “persons with disabilities 
have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and where and with 
whom they live on an equal basis with others and are not obliged to live in a 
particular living arrangement”,225 the EU Commission replied to the petitioner that 
the service recipients’ “consultation [about their living arrangements] is not 
expressly provided for by the EU legal framework”.226 This means that the EU’s 
Procurement Directive (2014/24/EU) seems not correct to implement Article 19 
CRPD, and the national level is not bound under EU law to respect it as a 
consequence.  
This situation could represent an EU indirect infringement of the 
Convention. For this reason, “the petitioner wishes that the EU would influence 
the revising of Finland’s current procurement act so that the disabled people’s 
right to be heard can be considered”.227 In accordance with the petitioner, the 
PETI Committee stressed “the importance to comply with the UNCPRD”.228 
The presence of disagreement between the PETI Committee and the EU 
Commission is a pre-condition of reciprocal attempts to influence. Slaughter 
explained that informed divergence could be a decisive factor in the international 
sphere because it highlights issues that need attention.229 With regard to this 
case, the PETI Committee could include the matter in its political agenda and try 
to exercise its influence (i.e. through EDF and the EP Disability Intergroup) 230 to 
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satisfy the petitioner. In sum, this example represents an EU opportunity to 
influence the implementation of independent living rights. 
5.3.2.3 The Disability Intergroup’s opportunities to influence 
This part of the sub-section explores the opportunities that the Disability 
Intergroup of the EU Parliament has to influence the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights. Also in this case, the analysis is inductive and 
moves from the available sources.  
Priestley, Raley, and De Beco explained that “members of the European 
Parliament interact also in a Disability Intergroup, first established in 1980 and 
re-launched in January 2015 […]. This cross-cutting forum of more than one 
hundred Members from eight political groups reflects the broad consensus in 
support of disability rights”. Besides, the authors highlight that “the Intergroup 
holds no formal status in the EU’s CRPD Framework”.231 Despite this, the 
Disability Intergroup of the EU Parliament is an important instrument to 
implement and monitor the CRPD, as explained here below. 
The introduction of this sub-section examined the difference between 
committees and intergroups following the clarification of an interviewed MEP. 
The same interviewee added two exciting considerations on the Disability 
Intergroup, which are worth mentioning because they show opportunities to 
influence CRPD-related topics.  
(i) Her first consideration focused on the importance of the presence of 
MEPs that are disabled and experts on disability-related matters. They might 
preferably constitute a group of interest because this would be the best way to 
take advantage of the Disability Intergroup. At the time of the interview, their 
presence was small232 but sufficient to exert influence on CRPD-related issues. 
Coherently, the interviewee was sure that: 
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[their presence is already] challenging [the non-disabled MEP’s] 
attitudes and opinions.233  
(ii) Her second consideration explained that attitudes and opinions are 
difficult to influence and change. For example, the interviewee stated that the 
Disability Intergroup tried to enter into the discussion about the European 
Disability Act without satisfactory results because the law-making process of the 
Act was given to the IMCO234 instead of to the EMPL Committee. The interviewee 
explained that: 
the Disability Intergroup then tried to influence colleagues in 
relation to the European Disability Act, we tried to talk with the 
rapporteur and some other MEPs about that file. But it very much 
depends on the attitude of those involved. The rapporteur on that 
file […] refused to engage with the Disability Intergroup. Refused to 
engage with the European Disability Forum until the very last 
moment when there wasn’t any possibility to implement any 
change. My feeling was that he knowingly kept us at bay until the 
very end of the process so that he could then just tick the box and 
say yes I did consult with the various interest groups.235  
In sum, the interviewee described a real influencing relationship where 
the Disability Intergroup tried to exercise its influence on a target, which opposed 
resistance. Several authors quoted in Section 3.2 have defined influence as a 
social relationship that causes or resists changes. The episode of the IMCO 
rapporteur that resisted the influence of the Disability Intergroup is the practical 
evidence of such a kind of social relationship. The interviewee who illustrated the 
episode was conscious of the fact that: 
our influence was not very strong because of the attitude of some 
of the policymakers and they frankly didn’t want to listen.236 
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On one hand, the use of the term influence by the interviewee is coherent 
with the definition of influence that is promoted by this thesis. On the other hand, 
the consideration that they didn’t listen is probably too simplistic because it does 
not consider the willingness to resist the influence. Section 3.2 described the 
intentionality of the action as a pre-requisite to identifying influencing 
relationships. Therefore, instead of saying that the rapporteur didn’t listen, it 
would be better to think about the rapporteur as a member of a group of interest 
that wanted to exercise its influence on the European Disability Act. It is also 
probable that the influencing relationship started beforehand, entrusting the 
IMCO instead of the EMPL Committee with the revision of the Act. In fact, this 
probable situational influence set the basis to limit the influence of the Disability 
Intergroup on the Act in favour of other groups of interest.  
As observed about the EMPL and PETI Committees, also the Disability 
Intergroup has an active link with civil society. In particular, EDF officially acts as 
the secretariat of the Disability Intergroup. It is interesting to remind that EDF is 
financed by the Disability Unit of the EU Commission.237 There again, the EU 
CRPD focal point has a kind of economic control over entities that are expected 
to monitor its activities. 
The EDF website hosts a page that is dedicated to the Disability 
Intergroup.238 Such a webpage shows that the Disability Intergroup has an 
established bureau as well as planned activities and annual plans. For instance, 
the 2017-2019 work plan includes a commitment to independent living rights and 
on the new EU multiannual financial framework.239 The same document also 
shows the Rules of Procedure of the Disability Intergroup. These explain that the 
cooperation between the Intergroup and EDF does not regard secretarial tasks 
only. Instead, it is a proactive effort among peers aimed at both mainstreaming 
the CRPD principles within all the EU Parliament committees, and generally 
promoting and monitoring the implementation of the CRPD.240 
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When asked about this relationship between the Disability Intergroup and 
EDF, an interviewed MEP confirmed that: 
that’s correct, and it works vice-versa as well. It’s a win-win 
situation both for the Disability Intergroup and EDF. Because we 
depend on their inputs and through our work we can feed them to 
follow up certain things on a national level. So we try to send out a 
coherent message between the Disability Intergroup and EDF, so 
that all the national governments are getting the same message.241 
Therefore, the relationship between the Disability Intergroup and EDF is an 
opportunity to reach and influence the national level. The interviewee explained 
the role of EDF in terms of its networking opportunities with national 
organisations. Thanks to these, national governments can receive the same 
inputs from the EU level and their domestic level. The strategy to take advantage 
of networks and increasing the opportunities to influence has been explained by 
Nye,242 and verified in several parts of the thesis. 
The Disability Intergroup itself can be described as a network. Although 
officially established, its work is soft and informal. For this reason, it is 
complicated to evaluate its opportunities to influence. However, it has been 
explained that they are real and potentially valid on the national and local levels 
through: (i) the law-making work of committees mainstreaming CRPD-related 
principles; (ii) national governments jointly with CSOs; and (iii) the political 
groups of the EU Parliament, which in turn may export best practices to national 
political parties. 
5.4 The EU Ombudsman 
This section focuses on the EU Ombudsman, which is a member of the 
established EU CRPD monitoring framework. The section aims to show and 
explain the EU Ombudsman opportunities to influence the implementation of the 
CRPD and independent living rights. The section includes this brief introduction 
and an analytical sub-section. 
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 “The European Ombudsman is an independent and impartial body that 
holds the EU’s institutions and agencies to account”.243 The EU Parliament  lays 
down the rules that govern this independent body. Also, it elects the Ombudsman 
for the duration of its term.244 In brief, the “European Ombudsman [is] 
empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union […] concerning 
instances of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies, with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union acting in its judicial role”.245  
Therefore, the mandate of the EU Ombudsman is similar to that of the PETI 
Committee. Generally speaking, both the bodies receive complaints by EU 
citizens who address: (i) the PETI Committee when regarding the application of 
EU law; and (ii) the EU Ombudsman when concerning the maladministration of 
EU institutions and bodies. 
While the EU Ombudsman is linked with the local level by its direct dialogue 
with the EU citizens, it has a mandate that excludes any investigation on the EU 
Member States. This characteristic represents a difference with the PETI 
Committee, which can report on presumed infringements of EU law by any EU 
Member State. 
 For this reason, an interviewee who was an EU Ombudsman officer 
declared that: 
probably, the first barrier, I mean, it’s our mandate, I would say. 
Because our work is not to address the Member States. So the 
main barrier is this one. But on the other hand, it could reach the 
domestic level, as we said, indirectly through the Commission.246  
As suggested in Section 3.2.3, the exercise of influence can be either direct or 
indirect. Therefore, the interviewee confirmed that the EU Ombudsman influence 
could indirectly reach the national and local levels passing through the EU 
Commission. The next sub-section seeks evidence that assesses the EU 
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Ombudsman opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights.  
5.4.1 The EU Ombudsman’s opportunities to influence 
In order to assess the influence of the EU Ombudsman on the implementation of 
the CRPD and independent living rights, it is necessary to explore the EU 
Ombudsman activities about CRPD-related issues. The main activities of the EU 
Ombudsman concern: (i) the complaints about EU bodies’ maladministration; (ii) 
the launch of strategic initiatives and inquiries; and (iii) the leading of the 
European Network of Ombudsmen.247 
5.4.1.1 CRPD-related complaints to the EU Ombudsman 
As far as complaints are concerned, it is possible to confirm that they can 
address CRPD-related issues. For instance, the cases 1418/2016/JN and 
101/2017/JN regarded an alleged infringement of the CRPD by an EU Member 
State. This accusation is curious because, in theory, the EU Ombudsman should 
not consider complaints against the EU Member States. In fact, “the complainant 
said that […] the UNCRPD forms part of EU law and […] since the EU forms an 
area of freedom, security and justice, the issue at hand should not be considered 
merely as an internal matter” but as an EU competence.248 Therefore, the matter 
of the complaint concerned the competence issue on the implementation of the 
Convention. The EU Ombudsman confirmed that the EU Commission had no 
competence to intervene on the matter at stake. 
As explained in Section 2.4, the competence issue is a cornerstone of the 
cooperation between the EU and its Member States to implement the CRPD. 
Therefore, any decision on competences concerns the power balance between 
the EU and its Member States on the CRPD implementation. This conclusion 
means that any decision stating that the EU has no competence implies that the 
competence belongs to the EU Member States. Therefore, it is true that the 
mentioned cases of the EU Ombudsman decided on the EU Commission non-
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competence. However, it is also true that the same decisions indirectly confirmed 
the EU Member States’ competence. In theory, the EU Ombudsman could have 
declared the complaint inadmissible because the TFEU states that decisions on 
competence issues are under the jurisdiction of the ECJ.249  
In 2019, the EU Ombudsman decided on a complaint concerning the 
mandate of the EU Commission on the use of ESI Funds by its Member States 
about disability rights. In short, “the Ombudsman finds it concerning that the 
Commission’s interpretation [about deinstitutionalisation] is at odds with that of 
the UN Committee”. However, “the Ombudsman accepts that, in this case, the 
Commission does not have a legal basis that enables it to recover the EU funds 
spent on the social care institution”.250  
This decision entails that the ex-ante conditionalities251 of the ESI Funds 
Regulation are not enough to guarantee that no EU money be spent for building 
or renovating institutions in breach of Article 19 CRPD. In addition, this example 
is similar to the previous one about the informed divergence between the PETI 
Committee and the EU Commission. In fact, also in this case, the EU 
Commission refuses any responsibility on social issues because subject to 
national competence. Furthermore, also in this case, the EU law seems not to 
implement the CRPD correctly, and this prevents EU citizens from fulfilling 
independent living rights. For this reason, “the Ombudsman invites the 
Commission to […] consider the need to address the lack of an appropriate legal 
basis identified in this case to ensure that the spending of EU funds complies 
fully with the CRPD”.252 
5.4.1.2 CRPD-related initiatives and inquiries of the EU Ombudsman 
As far as the EU Ombudsman’s strategic initiatives and inquiries are concerned, 
at least two examples built upon the CRPD Committee Concluding Observations 
on the EU. The first example regards a formal approach by the EU Ombudsman 
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to the EU Commission about the CRPD Committee’s concerns on European 
Schools. The EU Commission replied and guaranteed compliance with the 
CRPD.253 In December 2018, the EU Ombudsman asked for a follow-up, which 
was still ongoing at the time of concluding this research.254 The second example 
is about the EU Ombudsman investigation on the EU Commission website’s 
accessibility as a consequence of the CRPD Committee’s concerns.255 The initial 
informal correspondence became an inquiry, which ended with a decision of the 
EU Ombudsman that addressed recommendations to the EU Commission.256  
It is interesting to note that the earliest correspondence of both these 
examples underlines the role of the EU Ombudsman as a member of the EU 
CRPD Framework. Section 5.3.2.1 explained that two reports of the EMPL 
Committee represented the monitoring initiative of the EU Parliament as a 
member of the EU CRPD monitoring framework. Similarly, also the mentioned 
two strategic inquiries of the EU Ombudsman show the independent activity of a 
member of the framework that acts under the mandate of the framework itself. In 
fact, the EU Ombudsman reported on these activities during the meetings of the 
EU CRPD monitoring framework, as documented by the available minutes.257 
As far as strategic initiatives and inquiries are concerned, there is another 
example that is worth mentioning because it is about the use of ESI Funds. In its 
assessment, the EU Ombudsman stated that the EU Commission “should do all 
in its power to ensure respect for fundamental rights as the money is spent. The 
fact that the Commission is not directly responsible for managing the funds 
should never be used as a reason for not acting if fundamental rights have been, 
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or risk being violated”.258 In brief, the EU Ombudsman stated that the EU 
Commission should “strictly and without exception” apply its control on the use 
of EU money by the Member States in respect of the disability-related ESI Funds 
ex-ante conditionalities.259 
Also on this occasion, the EU Ombudsman addressed its assessment to 
the EU Commission, but the implications for the national and local levels should 
be evident. An interviewed officer of the EU Ombudsman was asked to provide 
insights on this relevant matter. The interviewee declared that: 
when we started doing this, we didn’t do it thinking about the Article 
19 of the CRPD. This was launched because the new legal 
framework about these funds, Cohesion funds, so the whole platter 
of funds.260 
The link with independent living rights is a probable consequence of the inquiry’s 
public consultation. This involved international agencies and civil society 
organisations as the OHCHR, FRA, EDF, and ENIL-ECCL. Among these, 
“several respondents referred to the use of ESI Funds to maintain or extend the 
institutionalisation of children and disabled persons”.261 
 The interviewee explained that: 
when the Member States implement this law about funds, and they 
disburse money, European money, so they should ensure 
compliance with the fundamental rights of the Charter. And the 
Commission has an obligation to scrutinise the Member States.262 
It follows that if the EU Commission does not meet its obligation, it would be 
subject to the EU Ombudsman scrutiny for maladministration. Therefore, the EU 
Ombudsman verifies that the EU Commission control the national and local 
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authorities when spending EU money in compliance with independent living 
rights. This example explains how the influence of the EU Ombudsman can 
indirectly reach the national and local levels. 
 In addition, the inquiry of the EU Ombudsman is not only a form of control, 
but it is also an instrument to guide the EU Commission. As explained by the 
interviewee: 
the Commission’s role is also giving guidelines, providing some 
needs for the Member States: how they should understand this 
human rights compliance.263  
Therefore, the EU Ombudsman directly provides guidance to the EU 
Commission that indirectly reaches national governments. As explained in 
several parts of Chapter 3, knowledge and expertise are essential resources to 
exercise influence. Also Newman and Posner classified policy guidelines as a 
form of soft law.264 As such, the guidance offered by the EU Ombudsman is a 
strategy to influence the EU Commission that can have effects also at the 
national and local levels. 
 Interestingly, the 2015 inquiry about ESI Funds seems to be devalued by 
the 2019 decision, which was investigated at the end of the previous part of this 
sub-section. In fact, the inquiry is very straightforward about the EU Commission 
responsibilities on the use of ESI Funds. On the other hand, the decision seems 
to erode the 2015 strictly and without exception approach. Unfortunately, the 
interviews took place before this decision was given. Otherwise, it would have 
been interesting to collect insights comparing the two documents. 
Lastly, the interviewee described also a direct influence of the EU 
Ombudsman on the national and local levels by involving the national 
Ombudsmen and supporting their control over domestic institutions. The 
interviewed officer explained that: 
all funds, all European funds and Cohesion funds, are under shared 
management between the administration from the European Union 
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in Brussels and the Member States. So we thought that it would be 
good to engage national Ombudsmen into that exercise.265 
So once we have funds, which should be administrated by national 
administration, the national Ombudsman should have a control 
over this national administration. And we only as a supervisor, we 
stay as the supervisor of the Commission.266 
Because we interested the national Ombudsmen, to whom the 
subject was completely unknown in that time to them. They didn’t 
know how even that the funds required human rights compliance 
[…] and they know now.267 
5.4.1.3 The European Network of Ombudsmen 
The involvement of national Ombudsmen introduces the following discussion 
about the European Network of Ombudsmen (ENO). The interviewed EU 
Ombudsman officer explained that: 
when we started the Network it was in 1995 […] it was a brilliant 
idea to ensure implementation of European law at the national 
level. To ensure that citizens’ rights are complied with, you have to 
scrutinise what happens in the Member States.268  
As such, the establishment of the Network was an intentional strategy to exercise 
influence on the national and local levels. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 showed that the 
strategy to use international networks to reach and influence the national and 
local levels is in common with the EU Commission and Parliament. Besides, 
Section 5.5 will explain that also FRA adopts the same strategy. Therefore, each 
of the four analysed EU institutions and bodies take advantage of the influencing 
opportunities of international networks to influence the implementation of the 
CRPD. This evidence confirms the theoretical contents of Section 3.5 about the 
incremental use of international networks to exercise influence. 
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Officially, the EU Ombudsman explains that “the ENO helps to share 
information about EU law and its impact in EU Member States. It facilitates 
cooperation between ombudsmen, with a view to safeguarding the rights of EU 
citizens and individuals under EU law”.269 Therefore, the EU Ombudsman tries 
to exercise its influence by offering cooperation and guidance to the national and 
regional Ombudsmen through the European Network of Ombudsmen. As the 
interviewee emphasised: 
the national Ombudsmen, in many, many of their complaints, 
cases, they have to implement European law as well, and they 
would need some guidance on this, how to do it.270 
Lastly, the interviewee also explained that the European Network of 
Ombudsmen supports the development of parallel investigations. These 
represent an innovative opportunity for the national Ombudsmen to involve the 
EU Ombudsman on national cases concerning EU law. The interviewee said 
that: 
the Court of Justice of the European Union can reply [national 
Courts], and they cannot have together cases, while we could. So 
this is very, very important: the flexibility of the European 
Ombudsman, that we could engage with national Ombudsmen on 
cases which are somehow common to both of us.271 
Therefore, in addition to international networks, the EU Ombudsman takes 
advantage of another crucial characteristic of the new EU governance, which is 
flexibility.272 Thanks to its flexibility, the EU Ombudsman can develop soft 
strategies to influence the implementation of the CRPD even if the hard mandate 
does not confer on it such a competence. 
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5.5 The EU Fundamental Rights Agency 
This section focuses on the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which is a 
member of the EU CRPD monitoring framework as well as its chair and 
secretariat at the time of this research.273 The section aims to show and explain 
FRA’s opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. The section includes this brief introduction and an 
analytical sub-section. 
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was established in 2007 through 
an EU Regulation.274 It built upon the existing European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia275 expanding its mandate to the whole range of human 
rights. “The objective of the Agency shall be to provide the relevant institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Community and its Member States when 
implementing Community law with assistance and expertise relating to 
fundamental rights”.276 Therefore, FRA has a clear mandate to interact with the 
EU Member States on the implementation of EU law concerning fundamental 
rights. Also, its mandate confers on FRA soft resources to meet its objective: (i) 
data analysis; (ii) surveys; (iii) thematic reports; and (iv) public awareness.277 As 
such, the following sub-section seeks the confirmation that these soft resources 
can offer opportunities to influence the implementation of the Convention and 
independent living rights. 
5.5.1 The EU Fundamental Rights Agency’s opportunities to 
influence 
In 2017, FRA published a Programming Document that explains that “the agency 
situates its work in the wider context of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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European Union”.278 However, “United Nations instruments also guide FRA’s 
work in the strategic area of operation of equality and non-discrimination. These 
include the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)”.279  
The search for sources in FRA’s website concluded with several 
examples of the Agency’s commitment to the implementation and monitoring of 
the CRPD and independent living rights. For instance: (i) in 2012, FRA wrote a 
report on independent living rights in nine EU Member States;280 (ii) “in 2014, 
FRA began implementing a multi-annual project on the right to independent living 
of persons with disabilities, as set out in Article 19 of the CRPD, […] the findings 
of this project illustrate how a commitment made at international level […] 
translates into concrete action taken at local level”;281 and (iii) since 2016, FRA 
has been dedicating a chapter of its annual report to the “developments in the 
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”.282 
The findings of the multi-annual project that began in 2014 are relevant to 
this thesis. In detail, FRA’s project included three phases: (i) it started developing 
human rights indicators on Article 19 CRPD; (ii) it undertook country studies; and 
(iii) it focused on disseminating the results. An interviewee who worked on the 
project clarified that these three phases include three modalities to engage with 
the national and local levels: data collection, data analysis, and data 
dissemination.283 
 (i) Human rights indicators are “a tool to assess progress in implementing 
fundamental rights and formulating rights-based public policies […] they facilitate 
comparability between Member States thus permitting systematic identification 
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of good practices”.284 In particular, the human rights indicators on Article 19 
CRPD might “allow EU Member States, national human rights bodies, Article 33 
monitoring bodies, academics, civil society organisations, disabled persons 
organisations and others to apply the indicators in practice”.285  
Therefore, Priestley has explained that FRA’s indicators on Article 19 
CRPD “aim to assist in monitoring the extent to which EU Member States fulfil 
their obligations under Article 19 of the convention”.286 Thus, the development 
by the Agency of human rights indicators on Article 19 CRPD could be seen as 
a soft strategy to influence the national level on the implementation of 
independent living rights. Also, FRA’s indicators are accurate as they include 
concrete topics as deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance.287 The final 
part of Section 4.3 suggested that any activity that considers specific topics can 
be more influencing than generic measures. The assumption was confirmed by 
the analysis of the DHLG in Section 4.4.3. Therefore, the fact that FRA’s 
indicators address specific topics can increase their opportunities to influence 
the implementation of deinstitutionalisation and personal assistance policies.   
 (ii) The country studies developed by FRA under its project on 
independent living include: (a) an overview of institution-based and community-
based services in all the EU Member States; and (b) detailed case studies on 
five EU Member States. About the overview, it is possible to consult the 
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research’s raw material288 and the final report.289 The raw material includes one 
report for each EU Member State written by national contractors following a 
standard scheme. The final report is not a mere summary, but it suggests shared 
parameters to define institutions and community-based services, which include 
personal assistance schemes. In the same way, about the five case studies, it is 
possible to consult the research’s raw material290 and the final report.291 Also in 
this case, the raw material includes one report for each EU Member State written 
by national contractors following a standard scheme. The final report is not a 
mere summary; instead, it is a critical comparative analysis that suggests general 
monitoring methodologies as well as specific good practices to pursue 
deinstitutionalisation and to promote personal assistance schemes. 
 (iii) The dissemination of FRA’s outcomes starts with the publication of its 
reports. For instance, the mentioned reports about indicators and country studies 
are public and available on the Agency’s website. Besides, the Agency has 
published three thematic reports on: (a) services’ structures;292 (b) funding;293 
and (c) outcomes.294 These three reports build upon the previous work on 
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indicators and country studies. They present findings with a thematic perspective 
that may be easier to share and disseminate. The effort to make findings 
available to all is confirmed by the publication of the three reports’ easy-to-read 
versions.295 These findings are presented at institutional meetings and public 
events as well.296 All the relevant publications of FRA may be considered as 
resources to exercise influence on the implementation of independent living 
rights, and they need to be disseminated with valuable strategies.  
 An interviewee who was personally involved in FRA’s project on 
independent living explained that the Agency offers guidance: (i) directly to 
national and local authorities; or (ii) to EU bodies to indirectly reach the national 
and local levels.297 This indirect approach is similar to that of the EU Ombudsman 
addressing the EU Commission, which was explained in the previous section. 
Furthermore, the described initiative of the EU Ombudsman about ESI Funds 
included a public consultation to which FRA submitted its contribution. This 
shows that indirect influences might pass through several passages. 
The interviewee highlighted that FRA’s expertise is probably their main 
resource to influence: 
so, in that way it’s also about being an authoritative and respected 
and informed voice in those discussions.298 
It is interesting the use of the word authoritative as it links this insight with the 
contents of Section 3.2.4 about the exercise of influence through authority. In 
particular, Wrong299 and Dowding300 suggested that authority derives from: (i) 
 
295 ‘The Right to Independent Living of Persons with Disabilities - Publications’ (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) <https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2014/rights-
persons-disabilities-right-independent-living/publications> accessed 25 January 2019. 
296 ‘The Right to Independent Living of Persons with Disabilities - Events’ (European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights) <https://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2014/rights-persons-
disabilities-right-independent-living/events> accessed 25 January 2019. 
 In addition to the meetings listed on the events’ webpage, there are those within the EU 
CRPD governance introduced in the previous chapter, among others. 
297 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 282) 5. 
298 ibid. 
299 See Section 3.2.4: Dennis H Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Blackwell 1979) 
35–64. 
300 See Section 3.2.4: Dowding (n 156) 143–144. 
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legitimation; (ii) competence; and (iii) personality. Due to its authority, the 
outcomes of FRA are widespread, as the interviewee said: 
in terms of the evidence, yes there’s lot of different ways in which 
you can see the value of FRA’s work and if you look at the EU 
Disability Strategy for example, it’s making reference to our 
research, it’s calling on FRA to do certain things. If you look at 
resolutions of the European Parliament, it’s drawing on FRA’s 
findings to say the EU needs to do this or the Member States need 
to do that, on the basis of this report by FRA. Or look at the Council 
conclusions on independent living at the end of last year, they are 
making reference to FRA’s reports on deinstitutionalisation 
published last year.301  
 As argued by Nye, authoritative strategies aim to influence: (i) changes; 
(ii) agendas; and (iii) preferences.302 The fact that FRA focuses on specific topics 
is enough to turn on the light on such topics. As a consequence, they enter in 
the agendas of several actors and alter their preferences. Therefore, the 
influence of FRA probably starts before the publication of any deliverable.  
 An interviewed officer of FRA confirmed this consideration: 
[the work on specific topics] enables us to bring together all of the 
key actors in this area in each country and really to discuss with 
them, you know, what the findings of your research are, what the 
issues in that country are, who we need to reach out to, who needs 
to take responsibility for implementing Article 19.303 
The feeling is that the networking that results from the engagement on FRA’s 
projects is as important as the final publication of any report. Indeed, it is during 
the work on projects that national and local authorities face issues that they may 
not have touched without the operative stimulus offered by FRA. 
 The interviewee put a strong emphasis on this aspect and explained that: 
 
301 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 282) 5. 
302 See Section 3.2.4: Nye (n 241) 11–13. 
303 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 282) 4. 
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even though these people sit in the same city they don’t necessarily 
meet each other, they don’t necessarily talk each other. And so 
when we come we organise this meeting […] they actually get 
together and they discuss these issues in a way they don’t 
necessarily normally do.304 
 Sometimes, national authorities may not agree on specific topics: 
When it comes to intense discussions on the national level, having 
an EU body come in can actually be really effective in terms of, sort 
of facilitating discussions […] being viewed more as a kind of 
neutral voice, and expert voice in domestic developments and so, 
hopefully, being able to effect a change in that way. 305  
This getting together offered by FRA influences national policies:  
I mean, in terms of Bulgaria, they have just published a new 
strategy on deinstitutionalisation of adults. […] Now, that came 
about a week before our meeting. Was that strategy approved at 
that point because we were going to Sofia? […] The publication of 
that strategy coincides with the work that we’re doing. We hear 
informally from contacts in Bulgaria that it was our reports, that our 
reports made a difference in the drafting of this strategy.306 
This strategy to engage with the national and local levels can have 
influencing effects as those just described. However, it can be complicated 
because: 
the EU is very diverse. The twenty-eight Member States are very 
different as the challenges they face. While there are 
commonalities, there are also differences.307 
As the interviewee clarified, the real barrier for FRA’s activities is another: 
 
304 ibid 6. 
305 ibid 4. 
306 ibid 6. 
307 ibid. 
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it is that there is a resource question.308 
FRA’s website reveals that the Agency has 90 staff members.309 It is not a 
significant number to monitor the implementation of all human rights in all the EU 
Member States. They are aware of this limit and develop strategies to overcome 
it. Among such strategies, the interviewee emphasised networking opportunities: 
so, basically, a lot of the times what we are doing is using networks 
where we kind of get into the countries […] we can use them as 
multipliers for the findings that we have, and have more of an 
impact at the domestic level.310 
 As seen for the EU Commission, Parliament, and Ombudsman, also FRA 
intentionally uses the opportunities of networking to reach and influence the 
national and local levels. Section 3.5 explained that international networks 
represent a vital and low-cost opportunity to exercise influence. Networking is so 
crucial to FRA that the Agency has established: (i) National Liaison Officers;311 
(ii) a multidisciplinary research network (FRANET);312 and (iii) a cooperation 
network with CSOs named Fundamental Rights Platform.313 In addition, FRA 
works in collaboration with external international networks as those of National 
Equality Bodies, National Human Rights Institutions, and National 
Ombudspersons.314 
When we talk about engaging at the EU level, we are not just talking 
about engaging with the EU institutions as “the EU” but those EU 
 
308 ibid. 
309 ‘Who We Are’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fra/who-we-are> accessed 14 February 2019. 
310 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 282) 3. 
311 ‘National Liaison Officers’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/eu-member-states/national-liaison-officers> 
accessed 25 January 2019. 
312 ‘FRANET’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/research/franet> accessed 25 January 2019. 
313 ‘Civil Society and the Fundamental Rights Platform’ (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights) <https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/civil-society> accessed 25 
January 2019. 
314 ‘National Human Rights Bodies’ (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) 
<https://fra.europa.eu/en/cooperation/national-human-rights-bodies> accessed 25 January 
2019. 
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institutions are always engaging with the Member States, so that 
makes a big difference. Then, for FRA we have a number of 
networks that we co-ordinate that enable us to reach out at the 
national level.315 
A lot of the time, the impact that you have may not be so tangible. 
It might not be written in black and white, but it’s the presentations 
you give at an important meeting, it’s the conversations that you 
have with the people that are devising law and policy.316 
As suggested by Dowding, the difficulty of quantifying influence is not a measure 
for its exercise.317 Therefore, black and white pieces of evidence are necessary 
but not essential to state that the authoritative work of FRA on independent living 
rights is influencing the implementation of that principle. 
5.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter is the second among the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It 
analysed four EU institutions and bodies that are members of the EU CRPD-
related governance: (i) the EU Commission; (ii) the EU Parliament; (iii) the EU 
Ombudsman; and (iv) the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. The chapter 
explained how these four EU institutions and bodies can independently influence 
the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
 The analysis of the chapter revealed that the investigated four EU 
institutions and bodies have opportunities to exercise their influence. This 
conclusion is similar to the one of the previous chapter, but their preliminary 
analyses are different. In fact, while the previous chapter explored EU soft 
entities, this chapter investigated EU institutions and bodies that are established 
by hard norms. These hard norms confer mandates that should limit the fields of 
activities of the established entities. 
In the previous chapter, this limit was described as a barrier for acting 
under the broad mandate of the EU CRPD-related governance. It was explained 
 
315 ‘Interviewee 1’ (n 282) 4. 
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that the broad mandate of the EU CRPD-related governance was met through 
the complementarity of its single members. This chapter unpackaged such 
complementarity and it analysed the CRPD-related activities of the single 
members. The direct consequence of exploring the activities of single entities is 
that the analysis found little correspondence with the governance theories 
included in Chapter 3. This because governance systems include several actors, 
but the analysis of single actors may shadow their external situation and show 
internal processes only. On the other hand, the analysis of single entities allowed 
discovering their effort to increase their networking opportunities. Such internal 
effort is the basis to develop governance systems, as explained in Chapter 3. 
This chapter showed examples of EU influences as findings from: (i) the 
documentary research; (ii) the conducted interviews; and (iii) the comparison 
between evidence and theories. The conducted interviews offered the main 
findings of the analysis. This because the interviewees allowed the development 
of retroductive reasoning that relocated the EU opportunities to influence to a 
deeper level.  
For instance, the previous chapters explained that guidelines are forms of 
soft law that can influence national and local policies. However, this chapter 
revealed that developing guidelines offer preliminary networking that influences 
as much as the final deliverables. Also, the analysis suggested that the EU 
entities can influence CRPD-related issues proportionally with the number of 
persons with disabilities that they include. This consideration relocates the 
possibility to influence from abstract entities to real persons who, at the end of 
the day, are just a few at the EU level. 
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Chapter 6  
Influence of EU governance processes on the implementation 
of the CRPD and independent living rights 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the last of the three analytical chapters of the thesis. It explores 
two crucial processes of the EU governance: (i) the European Semester; and (ii) 
the ESI Funds. The exploration aims to assess their opportunities to influence 
the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights.  
While the previous chapters investigated the EU CRPD-related governance 
and four institutional members of this governance, this chapter focuses on two 
EU governance processes that are not CRPD-related but that are expected to 
give their contribution to the implementation and monitoring of the Convention. 
This expectation derives from the analysis of the previous chapters. These 
explained the duties and the efforts to implement the CRPD in any EU policy.  
Therefore, the focus on the European Semester and the ESI Funds 
assesses the level of the CRPD implementation within these two processes. 
Such an assessment verifies if the EU CRPD-related governance either is 
influencing the broad EU governance or is a close box disconnected from the 
other processes of the EU governance. Building upon the explanations included 
in the previous chapters, the assumption is that the EU CRPD-related 
governance is trying to exercise its influence on the European Semester and the 
ESI Funds. The chapter seeks verification of this assumption from: (i) the 
documentary research; (ii) the conducted interviews; and (iii) the comparison 
between pieces of evidence and theories. 
Two sections follow this introduction. The first one is about the European 
Semester, and the second one focuses on the ESI Funds. Both the sections 
include an introductory description of the process and three analytical sub-
sections. The analyses are mainly inductive as they start from observed 
situations to develop general understanding. The provided explanations are 
often intuitive and seek verification from the comparison between the different 
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sources (documents and interviews) as well as from the findings of the previous 
chapters. 
6.2 The European Semester 
“Introduced in 2010, the European Semester enables the EU member countries 
to coordinate their economic policies throughout the year and address the 
economic challenges facing the EU”.1 As Maatsch explained, “the European 
Semester constitutes a soft governance tool: the Commission monitors 
compliance with ‘hard’ (budgetary) and ‘soft’ (socio-economic) criteria, but it 
cannot veto national budgets which are (still) tailored by national governments”.2 
Therefore, the European Semester cannot coerce the EU Member States on any 
course of action, but it can try to influence them. As such, the European 
Semester is relevant to the thesis because it is an example of EU soft 
governance. 
Thus, if the European Semester included CRPD principles in its 
processes, it could exercise influence on their implementation. For instance, “in 
core policy areas of the European Semester, thematic factsheets provide cross-
country information on economic or social challenges”.3 This means that the 
European Semester includes a social dimension. Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.3.2 
explained that the EU Commission and Parliament show a social approach to 
the CRPD implementation. Therefore, the European Semester may concern 
social matters that are relevant to the Convention. 
For example, the European Semester thematic factsheet on social 
inclusion mentions disability several times. It concludes with the request of 
“ensuring that [disabled] people have access to health services as close as 
possible to their community (including in rural areas), institutionalisation can be 
 
1 ‘The European Semester: Why and How’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-
coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-
semester/framework/european-semester-why-and-how_en> accessed 4 March 2019. 
2 Aleksandra Maatsch, ‘Effectiveness of the European Semester: Explaining Domestic Consent 
and Contestation’ (2017) 70 Parliamentary Affairs 691, 692. 
3 ‘Thematic Factsheets’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/european-semester/thematic-factsheets_en> accessed 21 August 
2019. 
 
 
 237 
avoided”.4 Although not mentioning the CRPD, this quotation concerns a 
principle that directly connects with the implementation of the Convention and 
independent living rights.  
Generally speaking, the European Semester represents the response of 
the EU to the economic crisis of the last decade. In extreme synthesis, the EU 
Commission describes the European Semester as “an annual cycle of 
coordination and surveillance of the EU’s economic policies”5 that have reformed 
the “stick-based”6 Stability and Growth Pact and introduced the macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure7 as well as a new Treaty on Stability.8  
The description of the European Semester as a governance cycle reminds 
the explanations of Chapter 3 about governance processes. For instance, Figure 
3-5 suggested a cyclical scheme that illustrates the EU tendency to develop 
governance cycles. As the following explanations will confirm, the cyclical 
scheme suggested by Zeitlin9 can summarise the general characteristics of the 
European Semester. The cyclicality of governance processes is an essential 
influencing strategy because it sets common priorities to implement at the 
national and local levels, and it includes peer review mechanisms that evaluate 
results and correct strategies with a mutual learning principle. 
 Verdun and Zeitlin suggested that “although the Semester involves no 
legal transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the EU level, it has given 
the EU institutions a more visible and authoritative role than ever before in 
monitoring, scrutinizing and guiding national economic, fiscal and social policies, 
 
4 ‘Social Inclusion’ (EU Commission 2017) European Semester Thematic Factsheet 10 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/european-semester_thematic-
factsheet_social_inclusion_en_0.pdf> accessed 10 January 2019. 
5 ‘The EU’s Economic Governance Explained’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-
coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-
semester/framework/eus-economic-governance-explained_en> accessed 4 March 2019. 
6 Valentin Kreilinger, ‘National Parliaments, Surveillance Mechanisms and Ownership in the 
Euro Area’ (Jacques Delors Institut 2016) 13 <https://www.delorsinstitut.de/2015/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Nat.Parl_.SurveillanceOwnership-Kreilinger-JDIB-Mar16.pdf> 
accessed 5 March 2019. 
7 ‘The EU’s Economic Governance Explained’ (n 5). 
8 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 2012 
(Document 42012A0302(01)). At the time of this research, all the EU Member States 
ratified this Treaty except for  the UK, the Czech Republic, and Croatia. 
9 See Section 3.4.3: Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘New Forms of Governance: Beyond Hierarchy?’ (2016). 
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especially within the euro area”.10 Wrong explained that authority is a resource 
that allows the exercise of influence.11 As such, the establishment of the 
European Semester can be interpreted as a strategy to increase the EU’s 
authority and influencing opportunities. 
During the European Semester cycle, “the Commission also monitors 
Member States’ efforts in working towards ‘Europe 2020’”.12 The Europe 2020 
Strategy13 is a political agenda for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” on 
which the EU Member States have agreed.14 The Europe 2020 Strategy 
represents a common framework to guide the efforts of the EU Member States’ 
governments towards the same priorities. These priorities are the main targets 
of the Strategy.15 These targets are translated into national strategies that are 
implemented through National Reform Programmes (NRPs).16 
On this, the European Economic and Social Committee suggested that 
the “Member States should include specific targets for persons with disabilities 
in their National Reform Programmes” due to a close link between the European 
Disability Strategy17 and the Europe 2020 targets.18 As the Disability Strategy is 
one of the EU strategies to implement the CRPD,19 some principles of the 
Convention may be included in the NRPs and discussed during the European 
 
10 Amy Verdun and Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Introduction: The European Semester as a New 
Architecture of EU Socioeconomic Governance in Theory and Practice’ (2018) 25 Journal 
of European Public Policy 137, 138. 
11 See Section 3.2.4: Dennis H Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (Blackwell 1979) 
21–24. 
12 ‘The EU’s Economic Governance Explained’ (n 5). 
13 EU Commission Communication, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth 2011 (COM(2010) 2020 final [OJ C 88/27]). 
14 ‘Europe 2020 Strategy’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-
economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-
monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-
strategy_en> accessed 4 March 2019. 
15 EU Commission Communication COM(2010) 2020 final Annex I. The UK is the only country 
that has not adopted the targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy. 
16 ibid 29. 
17 EU Commission Communication, European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed 
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe (COM(2010) 636 final). 
18 ‘EESC Opinion: European Disability Strategy 2010-2020’ (European Economic and Social 
Committee 2011) SOC/403 2 <https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-
information-reports/opinions/european-disability-strategy-2010-2020> accessed 4 March 
2019. 
19 European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 para 2. 
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Semester as a consequence. This consideration has been confirmed by an 
interviewed officer of the EU Commission, who held the view that: 
the European Semester as a framework for assessing reform 
policies is also a tool for assessment of the implementation of the 
European Disability Strategy.20 
This insight confirms that, although tailored for economic issues, the European 
Semester can offer occasions to discuss the implementation of the Convention. 
6.2.1 The European Semester governance process 
The European Semester governance process respects a precise timeline, which 
is summarised by Figure 6-1.21 The yearly cycle of the European Semester 
includes four passages, which are the so-called: (i) autumn, (ii) winter, (iii) spring, 
and (iv) summer packages. 
Figure 6-1 – The European Semester Timeline 
 
20 ‘Interviewee 14’ (3 August 2018) 3. 
21 ‘Visual Presentation of the European Semester Economic Coordination Cycle’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2018-european-semester-timeline_en> accessed 5 March 
2019. 
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(i) The autumn package gives the start to the European Semester annual 
cycle. In this occasion, the EU Commission sets out the shared priorities that the 
EU Member States are asked to pursue. These priorities are explicated in a 
series of five documents: (a) the Annual Growth Survey; (b) the Alert Mechanism 
Report; (c) the draft Joint Employment Report; (d) recommendations for the Euro 
area; and (e) opinions on the national Draft Budgetary Plans for the Euro area 
only.22 The inclusion of CRPD-relevant matters in these documents could offer 
the EU opportunities to influence the implementation of the Convention. 
 (ii) During the winter package, the EU Commission publishes a country 
report for each EU Member State to assess the progress on structural reforms 
as identified in the previous year’s recommendations. Besides, an in-depth 
review is addressed to the countries mentioned in the Alert Mechanism Report.23 
The inclusion of issues regarding the implementation of the Convention could be 
the occasion to exercise influence. 
 (iii) The spring package sees the EU Member States submitting to the EU 
Commission their national reform programmes (NRPs) together with their 
stability (Euro area) or convergence (non-Euro Area) programmes. Such 
programmes should be the national translation of the dialogues that took 
previously place at EU level. The NRPs develop around the Europe 2020 targets, 
whereas the stability/convergence programmes are three-year budget plans.  
 (iv) During the summer package, the EU Commission sends country-
specific recommendations (CSRs) as the result of the comparison between the 
national programmes and the EU priorities. The CSRs aim to suggest realistic 
achievements with a 12-18 month time horizon, and national governments 
should formally adopt them in July.24  
 
22 ‘Setting the Priorities’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/european-semester/european-semester-timeline/setting-
priorities_en> accessed 5 March 2019. 
23 ‘The Analysis Phase’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/european-semester/european-semester-timeline/analysis-
phase_en> accessed 5 March 2019. 
24 ‘EU Country-Specific Recommendations’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-
coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-
semester/european-semester-timeline/eu-country-specific-recommendations_en> 
accessed 5 March 2019. 
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However, the formal domestic adoption is a voluntary choice of national 
governments because the CSRs are non-legally binding Recommendation of the 
EU Council. In fact, the EU Treaties state that the EU Recommendations are 
formal acts without binding force.25 For this reason, Section 3.4.1 suggested that 
they are a kind of soft law. This non-coercive situation classifies the European 
Semester as a form of soft governance. Therefore, if the CSRs included CRPD-
related issues, national governments could be influenced on their adoption. This 
explanation means that the CSRs can be targeted by groups of interest that want 
to exert influence on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living 
rights. 
 It is interesting to mention a briefing report of the European Parliament 
stating that “the CSRs are politically binding [and] a failure to implement the 
recommendations might result in further procedural steps”.26 In essence, the EU 
Member States must respond to the received recommendations in the following 
year, or report on them at least. The idea of politically versus legally binding is 
fascinating. It reflects the dichotomy soft versus hard EU law that is one of the 
cornerstones of this thesis.27 In short, the quoted report promotes the 
interpretation that political agreements can be binding. Such an interpretation 
would suggest that governance processes’ outcomes can be binding as well. As 
governance processes can influence but cannot coerce, then influence can be 
binding as a consequence.  
Such an interpretation assumes that the European Semester can produce 
political recommendations that exercise their binding influence on the national 
and local levels. The assumed binding stance of politics’ influence does not 
derive from coercive procedures but is a probable consequence of the “penalty 
default” principle of Ayres and Gertner.28 In short, the CSRs can have a binding 
 
25 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012 (OJ C 
326/47) Art 288. 
26 M Hradisky and M Ciucci, ‘Country-Specific Recommendations: An Overview’ (European 
Parliament 2018) 3 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/624404/IPOL_BRI(2018)624
404_EN.pdf> accessed 7 March 2019. 
27 See Section 3.3.2. 
28 See Section 3.3.3: Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, ‘Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules’ (1989) 99 The Yale Law Journal 87. 
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force insofar it is more convenient to respect than ignore them. This 
understanding is impressive and confers strategic importance on the CSRs. 
 With regard to the CSRs, an interviewee who was engaged in the 
European Semester process explained that: 
in the framework of the European Semester, the Country Desk 
together with other services of the Commission contribute to the 
preparation of the [CSRs]. It analyses the National Reform 
Programme, the implementation of CSR, and monitors the 
progress in the reform priorities.29  
An interviewed colleague of the previous officer clarified that: 
the thematic units might wish to submit significant detail [to be 
added to the CSRs].30  
Section 5.2.1.1 classified the EU Commission Disability Unit as the 
thematic unit that oversees CRPD-related issues. Thus, these interviewees’ 
insights suggest that sharing information with the Country Desks to write the 
CSRs is an essential task of that Unit. This finding of the conducted interviews 
depicts a procedure that does not appear in any official document analysed 
during this research. On the other hand, confirmation arrived from an informant 
of the research. This situation means that the Disability Unit can try to exercise 
its influence on the Country Desks to include CRPD-related issues in the CSRs, 
which they contribute to preparing for the European Semester. 
6.2.2 The European Semester and the EU CRPD-related governance 
The previous sub-section explained that the deliverables of the European 
Semester process might influence the implementation of the CRPD when 
including relevant topics. This possibility is a consequence of the effectiveness 
of the governance process at stake. However, such effectiveness is put into 
question by several authors. For instance, Kreilinger explained that the European 
Semester has critical weaknesses, among which he emphasised the national 
implementation of the CSRs. The author summarised the results of his research 
 
29 ‘Interviewee 14’ (n 20) 3. 
30 ‘Interviewee 13’ (30 April 2018) 2. 
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with the table below,31 which shows that the majority of the EU Member States 
implemented less than 50% of the 2013 CSRs.  
 Therefore, the inclusion of CRPD-related topics in the CSRs does not 
guarantee their implementation at the national level. This because, as previously 
explained, national governments are not bound to implement the 
recommendations they receive. However, the inclusion of relevant topics in the 
CSRs is the obvious pre-requisite for their implementation. As such, the inclusion 
of CRPD-related topics in the CSRs is the first challenge. For this reason, the 
CRPD-related governance entities try to exercise their influence on the inclusion 
of relevant recommendations in the European Semester CSRs. The research 
found several shreds of evidence of this kind of activity as revealed here below. 
Figure 6-2 - Progress on the CSRs implementation (2013) 
Asked about the inclusion of independent living rights’ topics in the CSRs, 
an interviewee civil society activist was concerned that:  
the European Semester is a lot of work for very few results.32  
Where the lot of work stands for the interviewed activist’s attempts to influence 
the EU Commission on the inclusion of few words in the CSRs about 
independent living rights. Besides, the few results are confirmed by the EU 
Commission itself, as documented in the following passage. 
 
31 Kreilinger (n 6) 45. Low = less than 37.5% ; Medium = between 37.5 and 50% ; Highest = 
more than 50% 
32 ‘Interviewee 7’ (25 June 2018) 8. 
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 During the 2012 DHLG, the EU Commission reported about the just 
concluded cycle of the Semester. It admitted that “the European Semester 
concentrates on economic policy coordination, which explains relatively few 
mentions of disability [however] attention is systematically drawn to disability 
issues in internal discussions”.33 This emphasis on internal discussions can be 
connected with the contents of Section 5.5.1 about the opportunities to influence 
that start before the publication of any deliverable. In fact, the networking that 
coordinates the preparation of the CSRs can raise awareness on specific topics 
even if not subsequently included (for any reason) in the recommendations 
themselves. In addition to this consideration, the DHLG meetings minutes 
include pieces of evidence that the Group tried to exercise its influence on the 
European Semester process. 
During the first 2013 DHLG, several members underlined that a stronger 
focus of the European Semester on disability could have avoided horizontal 
spending cuts on services for persons with disabilities during the last economic 
crisis. On this, the EU Commission confirmed its commitment to include disability 
issues in the European Semester process.34 At the following meeting, “some 
DHLG members proposed to put the European Semester process at least once 
a year on the agenda of the DHLG. The Commission requested DHLG members 
to reflect on possible recommendations the DHLG could make to better integrate 
disability related issues in the European Semester”.35  
During the first 2014 DHLG, “the Commission presented the state of play 
of the European Semester process and gave information on JUST D.3 
involvement in the European Semester process from a disability perspective”.36 
As inferred in previous sections,37 JUST D.3 was the unit of the EU Commission 
 
33 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2012) 5 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
34 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2013) 2 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
35 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2013) 7 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
36 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (EU Commission 2014) 8 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&group
ID=1259> accessed 18 December 2018. 
37 See Sections 4.2.3; 4.3.3; 4.4.3.2; and 5.2.2. 
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entrusted with the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point before the relocation to 
EMPL C3. The minutes also reveal that “JUST D.3 makes systematically use of 
information and data of the Academic Network of European Disability experts 
(ANED)”.38 This revelation suggests that ANED supported the EU CRPD focal 
point in the attempt to exercise influence on the inclusion of disability-related 
issues in the CSRs and in their preliminary analyses. 
In sum, the documentary findings explored above show that the EU 
CRPD-related governance tries to exercise its influence on the European 
Semester process. However, the DHLG minutes that follow the quoted 2013 and 
2014 ones present a decreased focus on the European Semester, but the fact 
that discussions are not reported does not mean they did not take place. As 
inferred at the end of Section 4.4.3.2, it seems that the policy on the transparency 
of the DHLG’s chair changed with the 2015 relocation of the EU CRPD focal 
point from DG JUST to DG EMPL. Is this another example of the increased 
confidentiality of the new course? 
 Unfortunately, the interviews provided no answer to this question. 
However, an interviewee and an informant of the research clarified that there are 
three main ways to influence the European Semester on the inclusion of CRPD-
related issues in its deliverables: (i) through the DG EMPL C3 unit (the Disability 
Unit of the EU Commission); (ii) through the DG geographic units; and (iii) 
through the European Semester national offices.39 The European Semester 
national offices are part of the EU Commission representation offices, which are 
listed on the EU Commission website together with their employees.40 These 
were included in this thesis’ list of possible interviewees. 
 The suggested three ways to influence the CSRs have in common an 
established cooperation between the Disability Unit and the country desks, as 
explained at the end of the previous sub-section. Therefore, it is possible to 
presume that what arrives at the Disability Unit also reaches the country desks 
and vice versa. As such, it is vital to understand how CRPD-related information 
 
38 ‘Draft Minutes of the EU Disability High Level Group Meeting’ (n 36) 8. 
39 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 8. 
40 ‘Local Offices in EU Member Countries’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/contact/local-offices-eu-member-
countries_en> accessed 7 March 2019. 
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that concern the European Semester reach: (i) the Disability Unit; (ii) the DG 
geographic units; and (iii) the European Semester National Offices. 
6.2.2.1 Influencing the CSRs through the Disability Unit 
The first way to influence the CSRs drafting on the inclusion of CRPD-related 
issues is passing through the EU Commission Disability Unit. For instance, it 
seems that ANED can be an example of this kind of process. Section 5.2.2.2 
explained that the Disability Unit supports the financing of the Academic Network 
of European Disability Experts. In turn, “ANED provides a coordinating 
infrastructure of academic support for implementation of the European Disability 
Strategy and the [CRPD]”.41 At the time of writing, ANED has a website that 
shows three main instruments of its infrastructure: (i) DOTCOM; (ii) thematic 
reports; and (iii) country reports on the European Semester. 
(i) DOTCOM is a “database of information about [among others] national 
laws, policies, strategies and initiatives in the Member States of the European 
Union”.42 Therefore, it offers impartial transparency concerning the national 
implementation of disability-related measures.  
(ii) ANED’s thematic reports address 12 thematic areas, among which: EU 
2020, and independent living rights.43 Its research on EU 2020 includes country 
reports as well as EU-level syntheses of the mainstreaming of disability-related 
issues within the European Semester.44 Its research on independent living rights 
consists of two series of reports (2011 and 2019) that analyse the implementation 
of independent living rights in each EU Member State.45 
(iii) ANED’s country reports on the European Semester are yearly reports 
about the national implementation of the CRPD via the EU Disability Strategy as 
included in the Europe 2020 targets.46 These are the reports that ANED submits 
 
41 ‘About Us’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) <https://www.disability-
europe.net/about-us> accessed 6 March 2019. 
42 ‘DOTCOM’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) <https://www.disability-
europe.net/dotcom> accessed 6 March 2019. 
43 ‘Themes’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) <https://www.disability-
europe.net/theme> accessed 6 March 2019. 
44 ‘EU2020’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) <https://www.disability-
europe.net/theme/eu2020?page=4> accessed 6 March 2019. 
45 ‘Independent Living’ (The Academic Network of European Disability experts) 
<https://www.disability-europe.net/theme/independent-living> accessed 6 March 2019. 
46 ‘EU2020’ (n 44). 
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to the Disability Unit to suggest CRPD-related issues that could be included in 
the European Semester deliverables. 
In sum, ANED “was established by the European Commission in 2008 to 
provide scientific support and advice for its disability policy Unit”.47 In turn, the 
Disability Unit uses ANED’s deliverables to exercise its influence on the inclusion 
of disability-related issues in the European Semester outcomes. Also, ANED’s 
deliverables are published on a dedicated website.  
An informant of the research revealed that the effort on web transparency 
is a crucial part of ANED’s contract with the EU Commission. This insight is 
confirmed by the relevant original tender, dated 2007.48 The informant added that 
this contractual aspect has become more significant over time. On this, the 
webpage that summarises the contractual details of the second (2014) tender 
shows that ANED’s funding is increased.49 Following the informant’s insights, it 
can be assumed that part of the rise has supported the development of new 
research as well as its publication on the existent website. Coherently, the new 
tender asks to produce the new series of country reports for input in Europe 2020 
European Semester process.50 Besides, it requires the development of a website 
“for data gathering, analysis and sharing of the information on the situation of 
people with disabilities”.51 This means that the Disability Unit of the EU 
Commission is financing the development and publication of reports that monitor 
the activities of the EU Member States in relation with disability rights within the 
EU2020 and the European Semester frameworks.  
Section 5.2.2.2 explained that the Disability Unit of the EU Commission acts 
under the mandate of the EU CRPD focal point and deliberates on ANED’s 
funding. Sections 4.2 and 5.2.2 emphasised the confidentiality of the EU 
 
47 This quotation is the chapeau of almost all the ANED’s country reports. 
48 ‘Tender No VT/2007/005 - Academic Network of European Disability Experts’ (EU 
Commission 2007) <https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=1026&langId=en> 
accessed 31 January 2019. 
49 ‘Services - 285196-2015’ (TED Tenders Electronic Daily, 2015) 
<https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:285196-2015:TEXT:EN:HTML> accessed 1 
August 2019. ANED’s yearly funding has increased from 500 to 700 thousand Euro. 
50 ‘Tender JUST/2014/RDIB/PR/EQUA/0062’ (EU Commission 2014) 7–8 
<https://www.pdffiller.com/jsfiller-
desk16/?projectId=331527481&expId=5459&expBranch=3#f470f5dd9764a76636b15cfcf6
8290c7> accessed 1 August 2019. 
51 ibid 10. 
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Commission Disability Unit, which in turn finances the transparency of ANED. 
This exciting aspect is not contradictory, and it can be explained by the fact that 
ANED’s website publishes thematic studies and country reports without including 
works that directly monitor the EU CRPD focal point. This consideration means 
that ANED does not screen the work of the Disability Unit. In turn, the Unit uses 
the authoritative and transparent work of ANED to investigate the EU Member 
States implementation of the CRPD. With the data provided by ANED, the EU 
Commission has the opportunity to exercise its influence through the European 
Semester. As a consequence, this is an evidence how the EU Commission uses 
transparency with influencing strategies. 
6.2.2.2 Influencing the CSRs through the DG geographic units 
The second way to influence the European Semester on the inclusion of CRPD-
related issues in its deliverables is through the EU Commission geographic units. 
For instance, an interviewee revealed to work for a network of CSOs that works 
in this direction.52 This international network is named European Expert Group 
on the Transition from Institutional to Community-based Care (EEG), and it 
focuses on independent living rights. The EEG includes 12 organisations, among 
which there are EDF and ENIL.53 
The same interviewee explained the EEG effort to engage with the 
European Semester, and she argued that their scarce resources oblige them to 
focus on a few countries only. Generally speaking, the interviewee was 
concerned about their opportunities to influence the EU Commission on 
mentioning independent living issues in the CSRs. In detail:  
you can send them a hundred-page report about institutions to get 
maybe the word into the country report.54  
Besides, even when getting the word into the initial country report, the 
final CSRs may ignore the point. The interviewee explained that: 
 
52 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 8. 
53 ‘From Institutions to Living in the Community’ <https://deinstitutionalisation.com/> accessed 
1 August 2019. 
54 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 8. 
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[the CSRs] are so focused on employment that we just don’t find 
them relevant for people in institutions. [...] They are not going to 
be caught by these measures. They need so much more than 
employment. Without support you cannot have employment 
anyway.55 
We’ve done a lot of discussions with the Commission about how 
can we make sure that deinstitutionalisation gets into the European 
Semester and through the country specific recommendations and 
they told us it’s very difficult, it’s, they even told us, don’t bother, 
kind of don’t waste your time.56  
 To verify the concerns of this interviewee, a personal analysis of the 2018 
CSRs57 verified that: (i) none of them directly touches deinstitutionalisation; (ii) 1 
of them mentions disability with regard to pensions;58 (iii) 5 of them address 
disability in liaison with employment;59 (iv) 6 of them quote disability as a matter 
of poverty;60 and (v) 1 of them named disability and the school system.61 
Therefore, the concerns of the interviewee seem to be well-founded. Would it be 
different if the EEG addressed its reports to the EU Commission Disability Unit 
instead of to the geographic units, as ANED does? 
6.2.2.3 Influencing the CSRs through the European Semester national 
offices 
The third way to influence the European Semester on the inclusion of CRPD-
related issues in the CSRs may pass through the European Semester national 
offices. Also in this case, the conducted interviews supported the analysis of the 
 
55 ibid 7. 
56 ibid 8. 
57 ‘2018 European Semester: Country Specific Recommendations / Council 
Recommendations’ (European Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-
european-semester-country-specific-recommendations-council-recommendations_en> 
accessed 6 March 2019. 
58 Slovenia [10]; 
59 Romania [11]; Netherlands [11]; Malta [9]; Ireland [16]; Denmark [6] 
60 Romania [12]; Lithuania [13]; Latvia [10]; Estonia [8]; Croatia [10]; Bulgaria [11] 
61 Malta [10] 
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thesis. For instance, an interviewee from one of these national offices explained 
that: 
the European Semester Officers (ESOs) are locally active 
members of so called Country Teams based in the Brussels 
headquarters. We provide country-specific knowledge to the 
Teams. Our role is, through the added value of local presence, to 
enhance the analysis, reporting and communication of the 
“European Semester”, including the “Country Specific 
Recommendations” and the implementation of the “Europe 2020 
Strategy”.62  
In extreme synthesis, they provide information to the EU from the national 
and local levels and vice versa. It seems interesting to note that when asked how 
the ESOs may promote the implementation of the CRPD and independent living 
in national and local policies, the interviewee replied:  
(a) via topical events […]; (b) awareness raising actions […]; and 
(c) dialogue with relevant stakeholders […].63  
In sum, the interviewee did not mention the CSRs. This consideration 
means that they probably do not even try to get independent living topics in the 
CSRs. Which is coherent with their colleagues suggesting the EEG activists don’t 
waste your time.64 However, the interviewee listed three strategies to engage 
with the national and local levels, which means that the European Semester 
governance process uses soft instruments to exercise its influence.  
On the other hand, the interviewee clarified that: 
the European Semester Officer has the task to monitor, analyse, 
assess and report on macroeconomic and budgetary 
developments, as well as relevant microeconomic and socio-
economic issues.65 
 
62 ‘Interviewee 15’ (19 June 2018) 1. 
63 ibid 2. 
64 See above. 
65 ‘Interviewee 15’ (n 62) 2. 
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This description seems to exclude any social dimension of the European 
Semester. This interpretation confirms the concerns of the previous EEG activist, 
and it questions about how the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy is 
interpreted by the interviewed EU Commission local officers.  
In line with these concerns, the interviewed officer declared that they are 
in contact neither with the EU CRPD focal point nor with the EU CRPD monitoring 
framework.66 On the other hand: 
we are in continuous contact with various [local] authorities and 
actors, in the role of organisers or participants in events, 
roundtables, seminars, bilateral exchanges, etc.67  
As the same interviewee admitted, this networking could have the opportunity to 
exercise influence on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living 
rights.68 The problem is that the data of this research suggest that the European 
Semester national offices do not engage on the topic, and they do not liaise with 
the EU CRPD-related governance either. Therefore, this situation looks like a 
missed opportunity. 
 A second interviewee from a different European Semester national office 
confirmed the absence of any link between the ESOs and the EU CRPD-related 
governance, explaining that they communicate with the EU Commission 
geographic units instead.69 The interviewee added that the national and local 
debates influence the ESOs’ activities. Therefore, if these are not concerned with 
CRPD and independent living rights, the ESOs may not address the issue either. 
This because:  
in order to have impact these recommendations need to focus on 
a very few number of economic issues and ideally issues on which 
the Member State in question is ready to take ownership and take 
action.70  
 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid. 
68 ibid 3. 
69 ‘Interviewee 10’ (15 May 2018) 1. 
70 ibid 2. 
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This insight entails that little influence on the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights is exerted through the European Semester national 
offices. The interviewee held the view that the European Semester does not have 
any competence on these issues when stating that: 
the European Semester process seeks to promote domestic policy 
that can improve the economic performance of each of the Member 
States, tackling the key challenges that hinder improved economic 
performance.71 
The introduction to this section explained that the European Semester has 
a social dimension that this interviewed officer seemed to ignore. This situation 
may derive from a lack of adequate training. However, the EU Commission shall 
train the ESOs on CRPD-related topics. As explained in section 5.2, training the 
staff is essential to interpret and implement the Convention correctly. Despite 
this, a third interviewee declared that: 
[the CRPD] has never emerged during the [ESO’s] works on the 
Semester [because disability-related issues are] totally out from our 
competence.72  
In sum, all the interviewees from the three contacted ESOs confirmed that 
they do not engage with any CRPD-related matter. This finding shows a gap that 
may reduce the influence of the European Semester on the implementation of 
the Convention and independent living rights.  
6.2.3 The European Semester’s opportunities to influence 
The previous sub-sections explained that the European Semester has exciting 
potentialities to promote and monitor the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. However, such potentialities face several barriers that 
limit the exercise of its influence on disability-related issues. This sub-section 
suggests further opportunities (used or lost) that may derive from the European 
Semester. The following discussion builds primarily upon the conducted 
 
71 ibid. 
72 ‘Interviewee 9’ (15 May 2018) 1. 
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interviews. These offered original insights that public documents usually do not 
include. 
 For instance, an interviewee who participated in the EU CRPD-related 
governance explained that: 
the European Semester is actually a tool and an instrument that 
allows to sort of bypass the issue of EU competence in some 
specific areas of work very important for the implementation of 
Article 19. […] And I say bypass the issue of EU competence 
because usually the European Union doesn’t have direct 
competence on giving direction to Member States in these field, but 
being the European Semester they do an analysis of the situation 
in the countries, highlighting problems, also with regard to the 
possibility to live independently in the community for people. […] It 
is an important hub because it gives the opportunity to influence 
national reforms.73 
 This quotation supports the assumptions of the thesis. The interviewee is 
saying that the EU cannot use hard instruments to force on the implementation 
of independent living rights because of the conferral principle. This issue was 
explained in Chapter 2. Despite this, the EU Commission has developed the 
European Semester as a governance process that bypasses the competence 
issue. Such an expedient allows the EU Commission to lead coordinating 
activities with the EU Member States on issues on which it cannot legislate with 
hard measures. This coordination offers the occasion to harmonise policies and 
to influence the national and local levels as a consequence. Therefore, it can be 
affirmed that the European Semester is a strategy of the EU Commission to 
influence the domestic level of the EU Member States. As such, the EU CRPD-
related governance and civil society activists can target the EU Commission to 
influence the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
 The same interviewee provided an example of this influencing process: 
we facilitated, for instance, a meeting between our Latvian 
members, and the European Commission official responsible for 
 
73 ‘Interviewee 6’ (14 March 2018) 1. 
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using the [ESI] Funds in Latvia. […] So the minister had this 
meeting to highlight the importance of promoting 
deinstitutionalisation in Latvia to the attention of the commissioner, 
and then this resulted in a concrete country specific 
recommendation given to the Latvian government of investing in a 
national reform on deinstitutionalisation.74  
This episode confirms the previously mentioned interviewee saying that the 
CSRs address topics on which the national governments already agree.75 This 
issue is important because it explains the European Semester as a continuous 
dialogue. The process is not an infringement procedure, it is a circular and 
cyclical strategy to reach agreement. 
This evidence of the research suggests one question, at least: if the CSRs 
include recommendations on which the national governments already agree, is 
it correct to talk about CSRs’ influence? With regard to the Latvian example, 
there were several actors involved that agreed on the urgency of addressing 
deinstitutionalisation, and they put it down in black and white. This finding 
complicates the identification of any influence. This is because it relocates the 
influence on deinstitutionalisation to a moment before the publication of the 
relevant CSR. 
The fact that the CSRs are not unilateral acts allows to describe them as 
the result of a governance cycle. As explained by Figure 3-5, different actors 
decide on common courses of action to be implemented and reciprocally revised. 
As such, the CSRs are documents that formalise previous informal agreements 
on specific topics between the EU Commission and national governments. The 
written and public formalisation of such agreements is in itself the result of 
previously occurred influencing processes. However, having specific written 
commitments can strengthen the enforcement of the already exercised influence, 
and it can give the start to a new cycle. 
The interviewee remembered that Latvia received the recommendation on 
deinstitutionalisation: 
 
74 ibid 3. 
75 ‘Interviewee 10’ (n 69) 2. 
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a long time ago when the country specific recommendations that 
were given to the country were more in number.76  
Figure 6-3 - CSRs - some stylized facts   
On this, the figure above77 shows that the total number of CSRs halved from 
2014 to 2018. Vanhercke, Zeitlin and Zwinkels suggested that the reduction of 
the CSRs aimed to focus on actionable and monitorable priorities, but it reduced 
the social engagement of the European Semester.78 Therefore, it reduced the 
possibilities that disability-related issues could be mentioned in the CSRs and 
the opportunities to influence the implementation of the CRPD and independent 
living rights as a consequence. 
Hradisky and Ciucci emphasised that the Junker Commission also modified 
the timing of their publication.79 In detail, the CSRs are delivered earlier in the 
European Semester “in order to leave more time for review across national 
delegations”, as explained by Vanhercke, Zeitlin and Zwinkels.80 This finding 
supports the assumption that the CSRs are part of an ongoing cyclical dialogue 
that continues from one year into the next. The CSRs are the conclusion of an 
analytical process and the stimulus for the new cycle starting with the autumn 
package.  
 
76 ‘Interviewee 6’ (n 73) 3. 
77 Hradisky and Ciucci (n 26) 2. 
78 Bart Vanhercke, Jonathan Zeitlin and Astrid Zwinkels, ‘Further Socializing the European 
Semester: Moving Forward for the “Social Triple A”?’ (European Social Observatory 2015) 
<http://www.ose.be/files/publication/2015/vanhercke_zeitlin_2015_EuropeanSemester_re
port_dec15.pdf> accessed 7 March 2019. 
79 Hradisky and Ciucci (n 26) 1–2. 
80 Vanhercke, Zeitlin and Zwinkels (n 78) 8. 
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 On the other hand, the interviewee expressed some concern about this 
timing issue. On this, the released insight was: 
that actually due to time constraint, officials need to work in parallel, 
so in some cases the conclusions are already drawn before having 
the analyses. Although we are talking about such long-term 
reforms, it’s very easy to have the conclusions without waiting for 
the result of the analysis.81  
It follows that the redefinition of the timing has increased the opportunities 
to dialogue for certain actors at the expenses of others. This situation appears to 
be a situational influence82 that relocates the opportunities to impact on the 
CSRs. The absence of time to discuss the analyses increases the importance of 
informal dialogues. This finding means that an excellent informal relationship 
with EU Commission key units and officers can be more effective than a hundred-
page report about institutions,83 which nobody has the time to read. In turn, this 
aspect increments the importance of the EU CRPD-related governance. Lastly, 
this awareness might develop more targeted strategies than those explored in 
the previous sub-section in order to have the word in the CSRs. 
To conclude, despite the expressed concerns about the European 
Semester relevance to the implementation of the CRPD and independent living, 
an interviewed civil society activist declared a positive feeling about the future 
development of this governance process. This because:  
the European Semester will play a bigger role with the CSRs.84  
For example, the European Semester can be the future arena to discuss the 
partnerships agreements for accessing ESI Funds and verifying their correct use, 
[and] this wasn’t the case in the previous programming period.85  
 
81 ‘Interviewee 6’ (n 73) 4. 
82 See Section 3.2.3: Keith M Dowding, Rational Choice and Political Power (Edward Elgar 
1991) 47–49. 
83 See above. 
84 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 7. 
85 ibid. 
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This finding opens to new opportunities for the European Semester to exercise 
its influence, and immediately links to the next section about ESI Funds. 
6.3 The European Structural and Investment Funds 
Section 2.6.1 revealed that it happened that ESI Funds had financed the 
development of institutions during the financial period 2007/13.86 To avoid such 
a misuse, Section 4.4.3.1 disclosed that the 2013 ESI Funds’ Regulation had 
included disability-related ex-ante conditionalities to promote the use of funds in 
accordance with the CRPD. The same section presented pieces of evidence 
about the DHLG influence on the drafting of the new Regulation.  
In its Concluding Observations to the EU, the CRPD Committee 
recommended to “develop an approach to guide and foster deinstitutionalization 
and to strengthen the monitoring of the use of the European Structural and 
Investment Funds. […] The Committee also recommends that the European 
Union suspend, withdraw and recover payments if the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights is breached”.87 This recommendation was delivered after the 
ratification of the new ESI Funds’ Regulation. It is worth highlighting that the 
Committee did not ask for new rules but to enforce the just approved ones. 
Section 5.4.1.1 investigated a decision of the EU Ombudsman88 stating that the 
norms of the ESI Funds Regulation are not enough to guarantee that no EU 
money be spent to build or renovate institutions. This section tries to verify if the 
ESI Funds-related governance has any opportunity to exercise influence on the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights taking advantage of 
the Regulation’s novelties and despite its limits. 
 
86 See also: Camilla Parker and Ines Bulic, ‘European Structural and Investment Funds and 
People with Disabilities in the European Union’ (European Parliament 2016) PE 571.386 
<https://enil.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/COMMITTEES_PETI_2016_11-09_Study-
EUFunds-Disabilities.pdf> accessed 1 August 2019. 
87 ‘Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of the European Union’ (Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2015) CRPD/C/EU/CO/1 para 51 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRP
D%2fC%2fEU%2fCO%2f1&Lang=en> accessed 10 October 2018. 
88 See Section 5.4.1.1: ‘Decision in Case 417/2018/JN on How the European Commission 
Dealt with Concerns Raised about Alleged Human Rights Abuses in a Social Care 
Institution That Had Received EU Funding’ (European Ombudsman, 17 September 2019) 
<https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/119185> accessed 30 October 2019. 
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 The ESI Funds is a policy framework for five different EU Funds.89 The 
policy is regulated by a specific EU Regulation (CPR).90 Since this Regulation is 
an instrument of EU secondary legislation, it shall respect and protect the rights 
of persons with disabilities stated in the CRPD.91 This is because the Convention 
is an international treaty concluded by the EU, which became part of the EU 
legislative sources.92 It is also for this reason that Article 7 of the ESI Funds 
Regulation states that “the Member States and the Commission shall take 
appropriate steps to prevent any discrimination based on […] disability […] 
during the preparation and implementation of programmes”.93 Attention to 
persons with disabilities is paid in several articles of the Regulation, and this 
confirms the intentionality to use ESI Funds in respect of their rights. 
 Section 4.4.3.1 explained that the DHLG exercised its influence on the EU 
Commission during the drafting of the ESI Funds Regulation. In detail, several 
members of the Group asked to include conditionalities that the EU Member 
States should have respected before obtaining any funding. As a consequence, 
the observance and monitoring of such conditionalities shape governance 
processes that aim to implement the ESI Funds Regulation itself correctly. As 
some of the conditionalities specifically mention the CRPD and independent 
living rights,94 it can be affirmed that they represent an example of how an 
international treaty concluded by the EU is mediated via EU legislation. On this, 
Section 4.2.1 suggested that this mediation is an implementation duty that 
follows the conclusion of human rights treaties. 
 
89 (i) European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); (ii) European Social Fund (ESF); (iii) 
Cohesion Fund; (iv) European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development; and (v) European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund. 
90 EU Parliament and Council Regulation, laying down common provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European 
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 
(1303/2013 [OJ L 347/320]). CPR stands for Common Provisions Regulation 
91 UN General Assembly Resolution, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and 
Optional Protocol 2006 (A/RES/61/106) Art 19. 
92 See Section 2.3.1. 
93 EU Parliament and Council Regulation 1303/2013 Art 7. 
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The EU Commission “shall oversee the application of Union law”,95 as 
stated in the EU Treaties and explained in Section 5.2. As Union law is stating 
how EU money can be used at the national and local levels, there may be some 
EU Commission process in place that verifies the correct supply and expenditure 
of EU Money. This situation is what the section seeks to analyse.  
 The ESI Funds Regulation regulates seven-year funding periods. While 
the 2007/13 cycle mainly focused on cohesion policies, the 2014/20 one “aims 
to maximise their contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy”.96 At the time of 
writing this thesis, the 2014/20 cycle is close to its conclusion and discussions 
on the 2021/27 Regulation drafting have just been launched. The re-negotiations 
of the cycle for the funding period 2021-27 officially started the 2 May 2018 with 
the publication by the EU Commission of a package of legal proposals.97 Here, 
“the Commission proposes to strengthen the link between the EU budget and 
the European Semester of economic policy coordination, which takes regional 
specificities into account”.98 This confirms the insights of the interviewees and 
informants mentioned at the end of the previous section about this probable 
novelty of the new ESI Funds cycle. 
 The websites of the EU Council99 and Parliament100 include information 
about the ongoing negotiations. Besides, the EDF website has a page that is 
dedicated to the post-2020 financing period,101 showing the civil society’s 
lobbying on this significant revision process. It will be interesting to analyse this 
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revision process once concluded because a similar study appears still overhasty 
at the time of writing this thesis. 
6.3.1 The ESI Funds governance process 
To access ESI Funds, the EU Member States have to respect guiding principles 
as the Common Strategic Framework (CSF) that is part of the ESI Funds 
Regulation itself.102 The CSF “provide[s] strategic guiding principles […] in line 
with the policy objectives and headline targets of the Union strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth”.103 This idea links to the Europe 2020 Strategy 
already mentioned in the previous section about the European Semester, 
explaining that it includes the implementation of the EU Disability Strategy and 
the CRPD.  
Also, if the EU Member States want to access ESI Funds, they have to 
respect the conditionalities that are stated in the ESI Funds Regulation.104 Such 
conditionalities are named ex-ante because they are conditions that the 
governments need to demonstrate before being funded. If the conditions are not 
respected, governments can receive ESI Funds after submitting a National 
Reform Programme (NRP) that explains how they intend to satisfy the 
conditionalities during the funding period. This process is a concrete example of 
how the EU tries to influence national policies because funding opportunities are 
subject to EU harmonisation goals.  
Section 3.3.1 mentioned Nye and his classification of economic (soft) 
power.105 The ESI Funds governance is an example of economic influence 
where the EU Member States are not coerced on any harmonisation process. 
However, they have to adhere to EU minimum standards if they want the money. 
As anticipated above, specific ex-ante conditionalities touch on the CRPD and 
independent living rights. Therefore, the ESI Funds governance can influence on 
these matters because the EU Member States receive money if their application 
“includes measures for the shift from institutional to community based care”.106 
No EU law obliges national governments to shift from institutional to community 
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based care because this is a national competence; but, if they want EU money, 
they need to conform. This is influence, as defined in Section 3.2.1. 
 Based on both the Common Strategic Framework and the ex-ante 
conditionalities, any EU Member State concludes a Partnership Agreement (PA) 
with the EU Commission. “The Partnership Agreement should translate the 
elements set out in the CSF into the national context and set out firm 
commitments to the achievement of Union objectives through the programming 
of the ESI Funds”.107 This is interesting because it states that the EU money shall 
be spent to achieve Union objectives, not national ones. Therefore, the national 
PAs are the domestic transposition of the EU CSF and have to respect the ex-
ante conditionalities together with their disability-related dispositions.  
The Partnership Agreement is a “document prepared by a Member State 
with the involvement of partners in line with the multi-level governance 
approach”.108 Chapter II of the ESI Funds Regulation explains in detail the 
procedure to prepare the PAs. The procedure concludes with the EU 
Commission that approves the PAs after making observations about their 
consistency with the relevant National Reform Programme, Country Specific 
Recommendation, and ex-ante evaluations.109 The observations are part of a 
process where the EU could influence the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. This process is like a dialogue, similarly to what 
explained about the European Semester CSRs in the previous section.  
 The multi-level governance approach mentioned in the ESI Funds 
Regulation,110 reflects the shared management principle that characterises the 
ESI Funds governance. This approach entails that, on one hand, the Regulation 
is an EU hard law emanated under the exclusive competence of the EU and 
legally binding on the EU Member States. On the other hand, “Member States 
and the Commission shall be responsible for the management and control of 
programmes in accordance with their respective responsibilities”.111 In detail, 
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“Member States shall fulfil the management, control and audit obligations, and 
assume the resulting responsibilities”.112 
It seems relevant to link the shared management principle with the ideas 
about the shared tasks and responsibilities between the EU and its Member 
States on the implementation of the CRPD.113 Indeed, these situations seem to 
share the same critical factor: to substitute the word competence with softer 
concepts that reflect governance processes more than conferral duties. The case 
of the ESI Funds Regulation is paradigmatic because it is hard law, but it is 
programmatic rather than prescriptive only. 
Literature about EU environmental law describes the programmatic 
approach of law as “requiring Member States to draw up plans and programmes 
for the achievement of EU […] goals”.114 Also, “the programmatic approach 
allows room for flexibility […] this latter aspect is referred to as adaptability or 
adaptiveness”.115 Flexibility links to the experimentalist governance theories 
included in Chapter 3. In fact, von Homeyer suggested the emerging of 
experimentalist features in the EU environmental law.116 This original link 
between environmental and ESI Funds governance suggests a general trend of 
the EU towards the development of legal instruments that do not coerce and 
sanction but that establish soft management processes for the achievements of 
EU goals. Within this framework, the ESI Funds Regulation develops soft shared 
management processes that aim to harmonise the national and local levels to 
the minimum standards required to access funding. Among these minimum 
standards, there is “the shift from institutional to community based care”.117 
 An interviewee who oversaw Regional Development Fund’s programmes 
explained 
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the principle of shared management: there is a programme about 
which agreement has been reached between the European 
Commission and the Member State, after which a managing 
authority in the Member State carries out the programme, while the 
European Commission monitors. Other crucial elements are the 
regular reporting as well as the monitoring committees.118 
This means that the EU Member States prepare national Operational 
Programmes (OPs) based on their Partnership Agreements. The ESI Funds 
Regulation states that “each programme shall set out a strategy for the 
programme’s contribution to the Union strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth consistent with this Regulation, the Fund-specific rules, and with 
the content of the Partnership Agreement”.119 Once the PAs are operative, the 
OPs must comply with them, and they can receive funding.  
However, “the Commission may decide, when adopting a programme, to 
suspend all or part of interim payments to the relevant priority of that programme. 
[...] The failure to complete actions to fulfil an applicable ex ante conditionality 
which has not been fulfilled […] shall constitute a ground for suspending interim 
payments by the Commission”.120 
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Figure 6-4 - Procedure for assessment of the fulfilment of ExACs 
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Figure 6-5 - Procedure for lifting of suspension of interim payments 
  
 
 
 266 
The need to respect conditions and monitor such respect implies the 
establishment of a governance process that is summarised by the two figures 
here above.121 The monitoring part is mostly in charge of the national and local 
authorities and only supervised by the EU Commission. As suggested by 
Bachtler and Ferry, this procedure may cause principal-agent issues.122 
However, national and local authorities should also be monitored by CSOs. 
Besides, the national CRPD monitoring frameworks could investigate if the 
expenditure of ESI Funds is in line with the Convention. In case of issues, the 
national CRPD monitoring frameworks could ask the EU CRPD-related 
governance to take action. 
As a matter of example, ANED’s European Semester country reports123 
include a section about the implementation of the ESI Funds in relation to 
disability. These reports are sent to the EU CRPD focal point, and the EU 
Commission Disability Unit should follow up presumed infringements. In addition, 
ENIL launched its campaign EU Funds for our rights “to encourage the European 
Commission and the Member States to improve the monitoring and complaints 
system, in order to ensure that Structural Funds are used to support the rights of 
people with disabilities, rather than restrict them”.124 
6.3.2 The ESI Funds and the CRPD 
In writing their Partnership Agreements, the EU Member States need to consider 
the 11 Thematic Objectives (TOs) that are listed in Article 9 of the ESI Funds 
Regulation.125 TOs 9 and 10 are close to disability-related matters. These two 
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TOs link to the ex-ante conditionalities that are relevant to disability-related 
matters. In particular, all the three ex-ante conditionalities of TO 9 ask to invest 
in “the shift from institutional to community based care”.126  
In addition to thematic conditionalities, there are also area conditionalities. 
These are more general and are relevant to each TO because concerning 
horizontal areas.127 Among these, the third general ex-ante conditionality is 
about the disability area. In detail, it asks for “the existence of administrative 
capacity for the implementation and application of the United Nations Convention 
on the rights of persons with disabilities”.  
In sum, these are examples of CRPD implementation through the 
inclusion of its principles in the EU legislation. Section 4.2.1 suggested that the 
EU Commission has the duty to include CRPD principles in its legislative 
proposals because it is the established EU CRPD focal point. It explained that 
this kind of implementation allows the enforcement of soft principles that are 
included in hard law through courts and sanctions. On the other hand, the 
previous sub-section explained that the programmatic approach of the ESI 
Funds Regulation adds a step between the adoption of hard law and its 
enforcement: the shared management. As such, the enforcement of the ESI 
Funds Regulation (that means the adoption of the coercive measure that it 
entails, as the suspension of the funding) may remain a programmatic matter of 
soft governance. 
 This is why guidelines explain how completing the shared management 
tasks, satisfying the duties of the Regulation as a consequence. Among these 
guidelines,128 one explores the ex-ante conditionalities’ rationale, and it includes 
assessment grids.129 This internal guidance includes explanations about: (i) the 
TO 9 ex-ante conditionality, and (ii) the disability area ex-ante conditionality.  
 
inclusion, combating poverty and any discrimination; (10) investing in education, training 
and vocational training for skills and lifelong learning; (11) enhancing institutional capacity 
of public authorities and stakeholders and efficient public administration. 
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(i) The explanations about the TO 9 ex-ante conditionality include 
definitions that are relevant to independent living rights, for instance: (a) 
institution; (b) community based services; (c) deinstitutionalisation; and (d) 
transitional period.130 This policy is significant because if the EU Member States 
want to access ESI Funds, they should harmonise their independent living rights 
policies with these definitions. Also, the text of Article 19 CRPD itself is part of 
the guideline explanations as a legal basis that supports the conditionality 
itself.131 The guideline shows how the EU looks at the Convention as a legislative 
source to respect and implement. This clarification means that the 
implementation of the ESI Funds Regulation (spending EU money) promotes the 
implementation of independent living rights principles as stated in the CRPD and 
included in the Regulation itself.  
 (ii) The explanations about the disability area ex-ante conditionality 
include the definition of persons with disabilities stated in the Convention.132 
Also, the guidance explains that “effective implementation and application of the 
UN CRPD will facilitate the implementation of the horizontal principle of equality 
and non-discrimination”.133 This will guarantee the correct use of EU money. In 
fact, “the ex-ante conditionality sets out the minimum requirements which need 
to be fulfilled ex ante to ensure that there is full compliance with the UN CRPD 
in areas that fall under EU competence”.134 Among these areas, the EU 
Commission “should do all in its power to ensure respect for fundamental rights 
as the money is spent”.135 “ESI Funds therefore have to be implemented in 
accordance with the obligations stemming from the Convention”.136  
In short, the ex-ante conditionalities are minimum standards to which the 
EU Member States need to harmonise in order to obtain ESI Funds. The 
importance to set minimum standards to exercise influence on the national and 
 
130 ibid 259. 
131 ibid 265. 
132 ibid 351. 
133 ibid. 
134 ibid. 
135 See Section 5.4.1: ‘Decision of the European Ombudsman Closing Her Own-Initiative 
Inquiry OI/8/2014/AN Concerning the European Commission’ (European Ombudsman, 11 
May 2015) <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/59836> accessed 23 
January 2019. 
136 ‘Internal Guidance on Ex Ante Conditionalities for the European Structural and Investment 
Funds - Part II’ (n 129) 352. 
 
 
 269 
local levels has been explained in Section 2.4.2 and described as a strategy of 
the EU to influence issues where it has not full competence. This situation entails 
that the EU is taking advantage of its economic resources to influence 
independent living issues, where it shares the competence with its Member 
States.137 
 Due to the importance of the ESI Funds to implement independent living 
rights, several interviewees were asked to confirm the findings of the 
documentary analysis. For instance, a participant in the EU CRPD-related 
governance emphasised that:  
the Commission disburses money if there is compliance, and if the 
Commission sees that there is no compliance they have rights to 
suspend funding.138  
As an interviewee quoted in the previous section said that the European 
Semester is a process that bypasses the competence issue, another interviewee 
used the same idea for the ESI Funds when stating that: 
independent living is not about EU competence as such, you know, 
they have to be linked to structural funds or they have to be linked 
to something that is within the EU competence.139  
These interviewees confirm the conclusions above: (i) the EU has not full 
competence on the CRPD and independent living rights, but it has to respect a 
treaty it concluded; (ii) the EU is directly responsible for the use of ESI Funds 
and cannot finance projects that do not respect the CRPD and independent living 
rights; and (iii) if the EU Member States want EU money, the use of this money 
should respect the Convention and independent living rights. In this way, without 
coercion, the EU exercises its influence on national and local policies. 
An interviewee that monitored the use of ESI Funds revealed that: 
the structural funds being used for deinstitutionalisation, it’s 
something very specific to the EU. You don’t get this anywhere else 
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in the world: somebody actually giving you money to change the 
way the system works.140  
This quotation describes the ESI Funds governance as an EU strategy that uses 
money as a resource to exercise influence. At the beginning of the previous 
section, this aspect was linked to Nye’s classification of economic (soft) power.141 
However, while the previous interpretation was that the EU Member States were 
attracted by the opportunity to be funded, this interviewee overturns the 
perspective suggesting that the EU induces national governments to change the 
way the system works. This perspective raises the question about what happens 
when the EU stops to pay. The next sub-section will try to offer answers to this 
doubt.  
An officer of the EU Commission responsible for Social Fund programmes 
explained that: 
ESF Regulation is implemented in line with Treaty provisions and 
CRPD is a) part of legislative acquis b) the only UN convention so 
far in which EU as such is party.142  
The legal consequences of the EU conclusion of the CRPD were explained in 
Section 2.3.1. This quotation is significant because it clarifies that the correct 
implementation of the ESI Funds Regulation must respect the Convention. This 
conclusion means that all the EU Commission and national officers that work on 
the shared management of the ESI Funds should be aware of the CRPD and its 
principles. 
 Besides, two interviewees revealed that 12 countries have 
deinstitutionalisation in their Partnership Agreements as a funding priority for the 
financing period 2013/20.143 When asked why only 12 countries, one of the two 
interviewees explained that there was much public attention on those 12 
countries at the time of drafting their PAs. Several CSOs focused their resources 
on these countries to have deinstitutionalisation in their PAs, and they were 
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successful.144 This example implies that the attraction and inducement of EU 
money is not enough to plan national independent living policies with the use of 
ESI Funds. The influence of CSOs is always essential to promote and monitor 
these kinds of policies. 
In this case, the influence of CSOs took advantage of the EU CRPD-
related governance to reach the EU Commission. As the interviewed campaigner 
explained: 
the Commission has much more influence when it comes to 
Partnership Agreements, then the Operational Programmes are 
much more Member States’ job. So you have to influence whoever 
has the biggest role. There are the Partnership Agreements and 
the Operational Programmes, this is where the Commission has 
influenced. After that it’s gone, pretty much. So that’s why we are 
so focused especially on Partnership Agreements because the 
Operational Programmes are mainly, I mean, they are completely 
drawn by the Member States.145  
Coherently with this explanation, an interviewee that worked in the EU 
Commission explained about the 12 countries that included deinstitutionalisation 
in their partnership agreements: 
the Commission can push [these 12 countries] to use ESF money 
for DI. [The other countries] are not amongst those MS, hence [the 
Commission] cannot push them.146 
 This insight entails that the influence on the drafting of the Partnership 
Agreements can be classified as a situational strategy as defined by Dowding.147 
Successful situational influences set situations that allow the exercise of 
influence on specific topics, which would be otherwise prevented. 
 
144 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 7. 
145 ibid. 
146 ‘Interviewee 11’ (n 142) 2. 
147 See Section 3.2.3: Dowding (n 82) 47–49. 
 
 
 272 
FRA stated that “the most significant example of the EU’s obligations 
under the CRPD concerning deinstitutionalisation is ESIF”.148 In its report, the 
Agency explained that “the European Commission identified a need for 
measures for the shift from institutional to community based care in 12 EU 
Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia”.149 This 
sub-section has explained that the quoted the European Commission identified 
is, in reality, the result of influencing relationships that include several actors. 
 To conclude, the Partnership Agreements between the EU Commission 
and the EU Member States are uploaded on a webpage of the EU Commission 
website together with the EU Commission Observations on the governments’ 
drafts.150 It could be intriguing to compare: (i) the draft PAs; (ii) the EU 
Commission Observations; and (iii) the final PAs. Such comparison could reveal 
possible influences of the EU Commission on the inclusion of independent living 
principles in the final agreements. Unfortunately, the draft documents are not 
available, and this kind of complete comparison is not possible as a 
consequence. 
6.3.3 The ESI Funds’ opportunities to influence 
The previous sub-sections explained that the ESI Funds governance has 
compelling potentialities to promote and monitor the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights. However, such potentialities face several barriers 
that limit the exercise of their influence on disability-related issues. This sub-
section analyses these barriers to suggest further opportunities (used or lost) 
that can derive from the ESI Funds to promote the implementation of the CRPD 
and independent living rights. 
The sub-section includes two parts: (i) the first part builds upon the 
conducted interviews; and (ii) the second part presents some good practice 
example and develops some inductive reasoning. 
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6.3.3.1 Insights on the ESI Funds governance 
Due to the importance of the ESI Funds for the correct implementation of the 
CRPD and independent living rights, several interviewees were asked to share 
their insights on the matter. This part of the sub-section analyses the results of 
the conducted interviews. 
An interviewee officer of a European DPO explained that: 
[the ESI Funds] in theory it is a very good tool. In practice the 
barriers at national level have been in terms of lack of awareness 
about what independent living implies, and what financing 
independent living services actually means.151  
This consideration raises two interpretations: (i) the first is that national and local 
officials may not be adequately trained; and (ii) the second is that they may try 
to resist European harmonising influences.  
(i) About the training of national and local officers, it can be emphasised 
that the general ex-ante conditionality on disability requires “arrangements for 
training for staff of the authorities involved in the management and control of the 
ESI Funds”.152 Also, training is a measure that can be financed by the ESI Funds 
themselves. Indeed, the ESI Funds Regulation includes several dispositions that 
allow financing capacity building about the shift from deinstitutionalisation to 
community-led services.153 Therefore, the Regulation includes training within the 
conditionalities to obtain funding, but it also provides money to promote training 
opportunities. Training means that national and local officers learn and follow EU 
guidelines. As suggested by Newman and Posner, policy guidelines are a form 
of soft law that can exercise influence.154 As such, promoting training means to 
exert a strategy on harmonisation. 
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 (ii) The national and local acceptance of such harmonisation is not always 
guaranteed. This situation would represent a resistance to EU influences. On 
this, an interviewee activist of civil society confirmed that: 
the way deinstitutionalisation is being interpreted by the Member 
States is the problematic part because of course Member States 
they want the money but they don’t want to change too many 
things.155 
This interviewee is not talking about the lack of awareness suggested by the 
previously quoted one. Instead, this professional is highlighting that the point is 
political and cultural. This clarification entails that national governments are 
aware of their internal situations as well as of the EU attempts to change them 
by influencing on the adherence to EU minimum standards. So the critical factor 
is that national governments want EU money, but they are not always willing to 
harmonise their policies to EU objectives. This clarification seems to put national 
governments in a bad light. In reality, an interviewed human rights expert 
explained that: 
all Member States have services for people with disabilities, all 
Member States have institutional services, and all Member States 
have community-based services. I mean, they are experts or 
people in that country are experts to the extent that they run those 
services. Are they expert in the CRPD? Not necessarily. Do you 
have to be an expert in the CRPD to run those services? I mean, 
that’s an open question.156 
This perspective entails that the resistance of any national government to 
the EU harmonising policies on independent living rights is a matter of local 
culture, traditions, and beliefs that nurture interpretations that may diverge. Local 
interpretations can legitimately diverge because independent living issues are 
national competence. For instance, Section 5.2.2.1 revealed that Sweden has a 
human rights approach to independent living while other countries and the Union 
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have a social approach. Should Sweden harmonise its approach to the EU 
example? 
 Even when national governments are not interested in harmonising their 
policies to the EU ones, they may be interested in the economic opportunities 
offered by the ESI Funds. On this, an interviewee that developed research on 
the topic suggested that: 
the use of the funds or any specific tool can be very much useful in 
supporting concrete change, especially in those countries where 
they don’t have financial resources.157  
Therefore, this supports the previous consideration about the ESI Funds being 
an EU Commission strategy to exercise economic influence on the 
implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. Another interviewed 
civil society activist held the view that: 
[money] it’s the reason why a lot of Member States don’t want to 
close down institutions, develop alternatives, they say they don’t 
have funding, that’s the excuse. So obviously structural funds being 
available for this purpose is really a big opportunity […] especially 
when it comes to this transition period when you have higher costs 
while keeping the old system and already putting into place the new 
services.158  
However, this situation has the risk that national governments may promote 
deinstitutionalisation policies for economic opportunities more than for political 
and cultural beliefs. This links to the question raised in the previous sub-section 
about what happens when the EU stops to pay. 
 On this, the interviews suggested a darker side of a situation where the 
implementation of human rights is based on economic convenience more than 
on political and cultural values. In fact: 
[national governments] want to keep the old system still and then 
they want to have some new services, and of course that is 
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completely unsustainable, they cannot afford that, and once the 
structural money runs out they cannot afford to continue funding 
new services if they keep pouring money into the old system so 
that’s the problem.159  
This revelation means that some national government may use ESI Funds to add 
services taking advantage of EU money without thinking about definitely shifting 
from deinstitutionalisation to community services.  
Furthermore: 
a lot of the Member States are actually building small institutions 
as an alternative to large institutions, so just moving people around 
into these building groups, moving people around in there.160  
Also in this case, the domestic interpretation of independent living rights diverges 
from the harmonisation to EU guidelines. The border between small institutions 
and community services can be the object of never-ending discussions. Besides, 
Parker and Bulic suggest another issue laying in the fact that, usually, institutions 
are a public property where public workers are employed.161 This issue may 
cause local bureaucratic resistances that cause or support the political choice to 
maintain the status quo. 
 In addition to the just described issues, the previous interviewee 
suggested other weaknesses of the ESI Funds governance. For instance:  
that’s kind of the contradictory part within the structural funds 
system, it’s actually the managing authorities that have to monitor 
themselves, that’s a bit ridiculous but that’s the way it works but it 
doesn’t work.162  
As explained in the previous section, the PAs are the result of a dialogue 
between the EU Commission and the national governments. However, the OPs 
are monitored by the national managing authorities, the assessments of which 
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are subject to the EU Commission audit. This situation illustrates the principal-
agent issue within the ESI Funds governance.163 
 An interviewee that oversaw Social Fund programmes revealed that: 
the assessment of conformity with the EaCs is a one-off exercise 
at the beginning of the programming period that allows MS to 
access and use ESF money and we can see that a number of MS 
tend to forget their obligations.164 
This insight stimulated a second question to confirm if the EU Commission is 
used to suspending the funding when its officers see that a number of MS tend 
to forget their obligations. Unfortunately, the interviewee did not reply to this 
additional question. 
The emphasis of this last quotation suggests that the probability of 
suspending any funding is remote. In fact, the documentary search found no 
cases concerning any funding suspension.165 On one hand, the avoidance to 
suspend funding is challenging to understand because it has been described as 
a powerful instrument. On the other hand, the shared management of the ESI 
Funds has been previously explained as a programmatic governance process 
where the dialogue is expected to substitute coercive measures. 
The implementation of the ESI Funds Regulation as a soft governance 
tool rather than its enforcement as a hard legal instrument increases the flexibility 
of the instrument itself. For instance, an interviewee was concerned that: 
what the Commission has introduced was the ex-ante 
conditionalities, you know, the pre-condition of having strategies in 
place. But you have strategies of varying quality in the Member 
States. I mean they’re not in line with the CRPD necessarily. I mean 
some have been criticised by the CRPD committee but they were 
still accepted as a fulfilment of the ex-ante conditionalities. So yes, 
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164 ‘Interviewee 11’ (n 142) 2. 
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this should have been a way to ensure that actually Member States 
have a plan and that there is a kind of common agenda there.166 
Although not in line with the CRPD necessarily, Member States have a plan on 
deinstitutionalisation due to the opportunities of the ESI Funds governance more 
than because adhering to any CRPD Committee concern. This perspective 
highlights an EU opportunity to influence the implementation of the Convention 
and independent living rights. 
6.3.3.2 An original illustration of the ESI Funds’ area of influence 
The interviews and the documentary research revealed some actual examples 
that confirm assumptions and insights about the influencing role of the ESI Funds 
governance on the implementation of the CRPD and independent living rights. 
This part of the sub-section presents an explicative approach and builds some 
deductive and inductive conclusions upon those examples. 
For instance, the country studies developed by FRA under its project on 
independent living167 revealed the following compelling case of Bulgaria. In 2007, 
Bulgaria was at the centre of severe scandals for breaching independent living 
rights. “The need of change in the institutional approach of taking care of people 
with disabilities was triggered by a BBC documentary ‘Bulgaria’s Abandoned 
Children’ which provoked immense backlash both in-house and 
internationally”.168 As suggested in the previous sub-section, the role of civil 
society to public scandals is crucial to raise awareness and to push the EU to 
intervene. In fact, during the 2007/13 funding period, the EU contributed through 
the ESI Funds to tackle the institutionalisation of children in Bulgaria. The results 
were so positive that the experience was included in the 2014/20 funding period 
guidelines for the use of ESI Funds as an excellent practice to replicate.169 This 
successful example is a piece of evidence of EU influence on the national and 
 
166 ‘Interviewee 7’ (n 32) 6. 
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168 Maria Doichinova, ‘From Institutions to Community Living: Drivers and Barriers of 
Deinstitutionalisation - Case Study Report: Bulgaria 2018’ (EU Agency for Fundamental 
Rights 2018) 5 <https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/bulgaria-independent-
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169 ‘Draft Thematic Guidance Fiche for Desk Officers - Transition from Institutional to 
Community-Based Care (de-Institutionalisation - DI)’ (n 153) 7. 
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local levels in implementing the CRPD and independent living rights through the 
targeted use of ESI Funds. 
The case of Bulgaria seems to be an example of good practice where civil 
society, domestic and EU authorities cooperated within the ESI Funds 
governance to allow the fulfilment of independent living rights by Bulgarian 
children with disabilities. On this, an interviewee that was responsible for 
Bulgarian Regional Fund programmes was satisfied that:  
it is now considered that Bulgaria has fulfilled all the ex-ante 
conditionalities. We discuss horizontal policies with the managing 
authorities and they are covered in the annual reporting 
documents.170  
Although Bulgaria indeed closed all the institutions for children, the report 
of FRA about this case concluded that “civil society organisations and DPOs 
have raised concern that the DI policy in Bulgaria […] substitut[es] bigger with 
smaller institutions keeping people with disabilities isolated from the community, 
and falling short to obligations enshrined in Article 19 of the Convention on the 
Rights of persons with disabilities”.171  
In addition, the 2018 Fundamental Rights Report of FRA stated that 
“Bulgaria, Estonia and Sweden [are] the only three Member States yet to appoint 
monitoring bodies [for the implementation of the CRPD]”.172 This situation 
reveals that Bulgaria seems not to be fully respecting the general ex-ante 
conditionality on disability asking for “the existence of administrative capacity for 
the implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities”.173 
These data show that: (i) the Bulgarian managing authorities are reporting 
that Bulgaria respects the ex-ante conditionalities to access ESI Funds; (ii) the 
EU Commission DG unit that oversees Bulgarian funding programmes confirms 
that Bulgaria respects the ex-ante conditionalities; but (iii) independent 
 
170 ‘Interviewee 12’ (n 118) 2. 
171 Doichinova (n 168) 5. 
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monitoring activities suggest a different reality. This situation reflects and verifies 
the concerns expressed in the final paragraphs of the previous part of this sub-
section. 
Despite this, the interpretation of the ESI Funds Regulation as a 
programmatic instrument174 suggests a different approach. For instance, FRA’s 
Fundamental Rights Report clarifies that “preparations in Bulgaria took a step 
forward with the establishment of an interagency working group to design the 
coordination and monitoring mechanisms”.175 This means that Bulgaria shows 
an evolving situation that may have been enough to satisfy the EU Commission. 
Therefore, even if decontextualized situations may show critical points that civil 
society activists contest, the whole picture can highlight ongoing processes that 
slowly tend to harmonise national and local policies with EU guidelines.  
In order to promote these processes, the ESI Funds governance must 
maintain a lock-in effect with the meaning that Druzin suggested for this idea.176 
In sum, it is possible to interpret the ESI Funds governance as an international 
network that national governments join when they ask for EU money. This 
interpretation would explain the adherence to any ex-ante conditionality as a self-
standardisation effect177 of the networking properties of the ESI Funds 
governance. Following this reasoning, exceeding over-standardisation may 
prevent the national governments’ participation in the network because the 
opportunity cost could be imbalanced. 
This assumption reminds Abbott and Snidal when suggesting that the 
success of soft instruments also depends on the convenient cost opportunity to 
engage on them. The authors explained that soft instruments are successful 
when politically and economically more convenient than hard ones.178 The ESI 
Funds Regulation is a hard instrument with a programmatic approach that 
promotes its implementation with soft governance processes.179 This 
interpretation entails that the shared management of the ESI Funds has to 
 
174 See Section 6.3.1. 
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promote solutions that national governments consider convenient. Only this 
consideration would promote the participation in the funding framework giving 
the start to self-standardisation (harmonisation) effects. 
These assumptions offer alternative perspectives to interpret the 
described Bulgarian example. It is probable that the domestic effort to promote 
the mentioned successful deinstitutionalisation policies for children has been the 
result of opportunity cost strategies that included political and economic 
considerations. This idea implies that over-standardisation duties may have 
prevented the opportunity to adhere to the ESI Funds governance and to obtain 
first-step results as the closure of institutions for children. 
This assumption can be generalised to suggest that the domestic 
availability towards change is subject to evaluations about the opportunity cost 
of receiving EU money versus adhering to EU standards. The distinctive Gauss 
chart below visually shows this inductive conclusion. Its bell curve suggests that 
national and local authorities judge the opportunity cost of accessing ESI Funds 
advantageous when it is: (i) beyond a certain amount of money; but (ii) before a 
limit towards harmonisation. Also, the two vertical dotted bands highlight that the 
economic opportunity cost can be altered by socio-political pressures as the 
raise of public scandals as well as lobbying and electoral schemes. 
 
Figure 6-6 - The opportunity cost of accessing ESI Funds 
 The coloured area of this original chart also represents the ESI Funds 
opportunity to influence the national and local levels on the minimum standards 
included in its ex-ante conditionalities. This is because domestic authorities are 
available to harmonise their policies to such EU conditionalities only: (i) if the 
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amount of money is worth the value; and (ii) if the necessary harmonisation is 
not excessive.  
As said, the financing period 2014/20 is finishing, and there are ongoing 
consultations to draft the new regulation. An interviewee that was lobbying to 
include more CRPD-related provisions revealed that:  
now they’re going to change it in the new period again: instead of 
“ex-ante conditionalities” they will have “enabling conditions” which 
will be supposedly monitored throughout the programming period. 
So there won’t be just one point where they’re ticking the box and 
then it’s done. So potentially that could work better.180  
In accordance with the chart above, this novelty may risk reducing the coloured 
area from its right-hand side because it entails significant national and local 
efforts on harmonisation to EU standards. 
However, these notable efforts may be compensated by an increase of 
the EU budget from 959 billion Euros for the MFF 2014-20181 to 1,135 billion 
Euros for the MFF 2021-27.182 Depending on their allocation (which is under 
negotiation while conducting this research), these additional funding may be 
used to expand the coloured area from its left-hand side. Furthermore, the ESI 
Funds governance will link to the European Semester cycles. This new situation 
may expand the area of the two vertical dotted bands because of the influencing 
opportunities of the Semester itself. The figure below illustrates the inclusion of 
these last considerations in the chart above. It graphically predicts the evolution 
of the EU strategy to influence the national and local levels through the ESI 
Funds governance. 
The two charts are illustrative and have been originally generated from 
the inductive analysis of this section. Although resulting from a research with a 
specific focus, they suggest the general idea that the actual influence of agents 
depends on a cost opportunity calculus of targets. 
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Figure 6-7 - The evolution of the ESI Funds influencing strategy 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter is the third and last analytical chapter of the thesis. It investigated 
the European Semester and the ESI Funds processes to show and explain how 
they can influence the implementation of the CRPD and independent living 
rights. 
 The analysis of the chapter assessed the influence of the European 
Semester and the ESI Funds processes with an explicative approach. The 
approach established a link between the two processes and the CRPD, and their 
connection with the CRPD-related governance. Such a connection has been 
challenging to show because it mainly develops through informal activities. For 
this reason, the interviews offered outstanding support to this chapter.  
The explorations of the previous pages revealed the implementation of 
the Convention within EU governance processes that are not CRPD-related. 
They explained that these processes could be relevant to the implementation of 
the Convention if the CRPD-related entities monitor and lobby to obtain desired 
results. The goal of the chapter has been to reveal these underlying influencing 
relationships. The explicative approach of this chapter’s analysis can be the 
basis to develop more in-depth research on the importance of the European 
Semester and of the ESI Funds for the implementation of the CRPD. 
The investigation of such underlying influencing relationships offered the 
opportunity to establish links between the European Semester and the ESI 
Funds with the contents of the previous chapters. For instance, it has been 
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explained that the Disability Unit has the opportunity to influence the European 
Semester. As far as ESI Funds are concerned, they exert economic influence, 
but they are the result of situational influences where the EU CRPD-related 
governance plays an important role. 
Another interesting analytical finding of this chapter is the consideration 
of the ESI Funds Regulation as a programmatic instrument. This consideration 
explains that its enforcement is a matter of soft governance processes. In 
addition, the accession to funding is subject to pre-conditions that are like goals 
to achieve. This perspective explains the possibility to be financed as a reward 
after reaching EU objectives. This idea of awarding instead of punishing also 
concluded the previous chapter, and this is emblematic of its probable 
importance. Is this the EU governance’s new course, based on an awarding 
approach?
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This study started with the idea that the EU is committed to international human 
rights, but it has only partial competences to emanate relevant hard legislation. 
This limitation could prevent the Union from correctly fulfilling its obligations 
under international law. The research question concerned the translation into 
practice of the EU commitment to international human rights when the Union 
cannot legislate specific principles. The thesis’ initial assumption was that the EU 
might use non-coercive instruments to achieve its aims. Lastly, the whole 
research revolved around this hypothesis to explain the Union’s non-coercive 
opportunities to implement international human rights. 
The verification of the initial assumption has been challenging. The 
originality of the approach made a significant preparatory work necessary to set 
the hypothesis in a real context and a theoretical framework. The context is the 
EU implementation of the CRPD (the only international human rights treaty 
concluded by the Union at the time of this research) and its Article 19 concerning 
independent living rights. The theoretical framework is an innovative linkage 
between four different areas: (i) power theories; (ii) soft law; (iii) experimentalist 
governance; and (iv) international networks. The theoretical framework chapter 
suggested that the EU can exert soft influence (instead of hard power) to 
implement international human rights. Also, it proposed that the EU opportunities 
to influence derive from strategies that use the resources of soft law, 
experimentalist governance, and international networks. 
The analytical part of the work explored documents and interviews to find 
evidence concerning the EU actual use of influencing strategies to implement 
the CRPD and independent living rights. The interviews are a crucial element of 
the research. Since soft processes are often informal, insights from active actors 
are essential to understand the EU processes. Finally, the search for evidence 
produced an impressive amount of original material. This supports the idea that 
the Union can implement international human rights through the exercise of its 
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influence, partially bypassing the competence issue. Lastly, the research 
confirmed its initial assumption, revealing that the EU has several soft 
opportunities to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights principles. These 
conclusions take stock of the main analytical findings and suggest some future 
policy and research agenda. 
7.2 The trust in influence to realise human rights compliance 
The typical approach to study the implementation of human rights looks at the 
ratification of relevant hard legislation and the adoption of judgements and 
sanctions to make such legislation respected. This research criticised the 
prevalence of this hard approach by arguing that social actors can agree on 
sharable principles through alternative softer procedures. 
 The awareness that soft power can be as concrete as hard power 
represents a radical shift because of giving a choice to policymakers that they 
have unlikely considered so far. The importance of this factor is paramount due 
to its impact on political strategies and allocation of resources. For instance, if 
governments privileged hard power to implement human rights, they would 
invest in hard legislation, controls and sanctions. However, if governments 
considered soft power to implement human rights, they would invest in 
influencing instruments. 
 This thesis revealed the EU effort to implement the CRPD through 
influencing instruments, and it showed that soft power matters. The increasing 
use of soft resources and strategies was a response to the limits of hard power, 
and it originated from actual necessities. These have become inextricable factors 
of the current governance of the Union, among others: (i) knowledge; (ii) 
flexibility; (iii) accountability; (iv) participation; and (v) conditionality. Any study on 
the EU effort to implement the CRPD must address soft power in order to assess 
the Union compliance with the Convention adequately. This research aims to be 
an example of conducting studies that focus on influence. 
 The EU CRPD-related governance is a pioneering case that canalises 
and exerts influence on human rights implementation. However, the assessment 
of its impact is a compound exercise that implies a conceptual shift from hard to 
soft powers. For example, laws that prevent institutionalisation are a tick in the 
boxes of indicators that look for hard outcomes. However, can a meeting about 
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deinstitutionalisation between EU representatives and the 28 Member States be 
classified as a soft outcome? Indeed, the thesis argued that this kind of effort 
could be valuable insofar as it allows the development of common positions and 
goals, and it exposes policymakers to public pressures aiming at the realisation 
of the undertaken commitments. 
 The CRPD duty bearers realise their obligations when persons with 
disabilities enjoy their human rights. However, the CRPD duty bearers satisfy 
their obligations when demonstrating solid effort towards human rights fulfilment. 
This should be implicit when considering the progressive realisation of human 
rights, which entails a road map heading from the commitment to the realisation. 
Such a road map includes strategies that can be hard or soft. Deliberated choices 
about strategies take into account their chance of success. This thesis revealed 
the EU effort to develop soft strategies aiming at realising CRPD principles. 
 The monopoly of hard power caused issues at the EU level when the 
differences among its Member States were so deeply-rooted that any hard 
obligation to uniform could have caused centrifugal non-compliance. Then, the 
Union started to use soft strategies to incentivise dialogue and cooperation about 
sensitive issues in order to harmonise national policies to shared and centripetal 
standards. This successful strategy inspired trust in influencing instruments, 
which are now the usual means to set common priorities between the EU and its 
Member States.  
 On one hand, the use of hard power is consolidated, and it results from 
well-built structures and processes that belong to the legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. On the other hand, the deliberated use of soft power is still 
embryonic, and the structures and processes that exert influence have no 
standard architectures yet. Despite this, the EU has developed its CRPD-related 
governance which supplements hard government procedures and somehow 
enters in competition with them. There seems to be an indefinite balance 
between the EU hard and soft powers and the thesis suggested an increasing 
use of influencing resources and strategies to implement the CRPD. 
 The EU conclusion of the Convention impacted on the Union’s structures 
and processes by fostering the development of a related governance. In turn, 
this impacts on the CRPD implementation with its soft action that mainly aims to 
coordinate and harmonise the policies of the Union and its Member States. Such 
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coordination needs to be strategically planned to optimise its potential influence. 
The thesis revealed that the strategies of the Union adopt models that are 
theorised by experimentalist governance authors. The next section suggests a 
conclusive reflection about this theoretical convergence. 
7.3 The EU experimentalist CRPD-related governance and 
beyond 
The research emphasised the EU need for flexibility to govern its complex 
society. For this reason, the Union takes advantage of soft instruments despite 
its institutional rigidness, which is bypassed through the establishment of 
governance architectures. The thesis explained that the EU uses its influence to 
implement the CRPD and that, for this reason, it needs governance structures 
and processes that can foster soft instruments. This research considers the effort 
to develop the EU CRPD-related governance as a strategy to satisfy its 
obligations as State Party to the Convention. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis illustrated the main characteristics 
of the experimentalist governance model, and it suggested that the EU shares 
some of them in its soft architecture. The analysis allowed to explain real 
situations in light of experimentalist theories and, vice versa, to create new 
thinking about the model.  
 The comparison between the studied situation and the theories revealed 
that some processes of the EU CRPD-related governance adopt methods that 
show pieces of experimentalist governance characteristics. This consideration 
entails that none of the observed processes perfectly adheres to the theoretical 
model. Therefore, it seems relevant to question why there is a gap between 
theories and reality in order to suggest a future research agenda on the topic. 
First of all, the analysis inferred a natural and partially unconscious 
tendency towards the theoretical experimentalist model. Such a tendency is due 
to the observed presence of favourable pre-conditions. For instance, the 
competence issue causes an uncertain distribution of power which can 
incentivise alternative governance processes. Also, the strategic uncertainty that 
derives from limited resources can be a valid reason to innovate classic 
processes.  
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The research inferred that the EU CRPD-related policies that develop 
experimentalist governance structures and processes are unconscious in the 
sense that they do not seem to move from the will to develop that specific model. 
The adoption of any experimentalist procedure probably represents a natural 
solution for the involved actors to achieve their aims. This perspective bolsters 
the experimentalist governance model because of appearing as a natural 
evolution, which is a consequence of the raise of soft law in the international 
sphere. 
On the other hand, the analysis revealed some critical factors that cause 
discrepancies between observations and theories. The research suggested that 
the central criticality is that the leading entities of the EU CRPD-related 
governance are institutions with hard mandates to respect. This finding entails 
that hard competences may affect the full potentialities of soft structures and 
processes. Also, the availability of adequate resources to sustain governance 
architectures is a significant burden to realise the experimentalist model in full. 
Indeed, the experimentalist model includes several procedural passages 
(involvement of actors, establishment of common aims, domestic 
implementation, peer review, assessment of results) that are resource 
consuming and cannot function without adequate resources. 
For instance, theorists depicted experimentalist governance as cyclical 
processes. This idea implies that new governance cycles build upon the results 
of the concluding cycles. However, the processes of the EU CRPD-related 
governance seemed more circular than cyclical. As such, they take place with 
regularity (one or more times a year), but their starting points usually do not build 
upon previous cycles. 
The analysis highlighted several difficulties in developing cyclical 
processes. The critical factor is that the outcomes of any cycle should be revised 
and included in the goals of the upcoming cycle. Also, the horizontality of 
governance processes implies that the revision of outcomes is an exercise 
among peers. For this reason, experimentalist governance theorists considered 
peer review as a necessary step of the model. However, the investigation of the 
EU CRPD-related governance found no well-established experimentalist peer-
review processes. The analysis suggested that this absence was due to a lack 
of resources and transparency. 
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Resources have already been considered as essential to sustaining the 
different steps of any governance architecture. In particular, peer-review 
processes require valuable resources because of entailing the contribution of an 
extensive range of actors and the moderation of a leading entity. This exercise 
is expensive and, therefore, it cannot be taken for granted as the experimentalist 
theories seem to do. On one hand, the CRPD Committee takes advantage of 
peer review when drafting its comments and observations. Its processes are 
transparent, and every document is available on the web for consultation. On the 
other hand, the EU CRPD-related governance does not show a similar 
engagement on peer review.  
Transparency would be essential to providing the material for peer-review 
processes and disseminating its results. Also, it would improve accountability 
and partially fill the democratic deficit of governance processes, as suggested by 
experimentalist governance theorists. However, the analysis inferred that 
transparency could be a potential barrier to establish and manage governance 
processes. This issue probably derives from the hard mandate of the institutions 
that lead governance structures that limits their flexibility and explicit recourse to 
soft mechanisms. The problem is that the absence of transparency prevents the 
dissemination of documents and the realisation of public peer-review processes 
as a consequence. 
The peculiar finding of the research is that EU CRPD-related governance 
processes are undertaken notwithstanding the highlighted difficulties. The 
observations suggested that: (i) if transparency is an obstacle to participation 
and flexibility; (ii) if non-transparency prevents the development of peer-review 
processes; and (iii) if the absence of peer-review processes does not allow the 
establishment of cycles; (iv) then it may be challenging to promote pure 
experimentalist governance processes even with fulfilling resources. This 
conclusion might both stimulate new research on experimentalist governance 
and suggest EU policymakers about their ongoing effort on the CRPD 
implementation. 
7.4 A new EU soft-law-making agenda based on participation 
The thesis emphasised the increasing importance of the EU soft power and the 
consequent need for structures and processes that develop and implement soft 
 
 
 291 
law. The analysis explained the EU effort to implement the CRPD in the light of 
influencing opportunities arguing that it might satisfy the obligations of the Union 
as State Party to the Convention. The crucial underlying factor of the discussion 
lays on the deliberate strategy to invest in governance systems because of 
entailing an EU soft-law-making agenda. 
 The EU strategy to develop soft structures and processes has several 
examples, among others: the Open Method of Coordination, the European 
Semester, and the CRPD-related governance. These systems are very different 
from one another because there is no standard model for governance 
architectures yet. While the concept of government has constituent factors (i.e. 
the division of powers between legislative, executive and judicial), the idea of 
governance can be defined as still embryonic. This situation reflects the historical 
domain of hard power over soft power, and the thesis inferred an ongoing 
evolution. 
 The CRPD includes human rights principles and suggests constituent 
factors for its governance system. This shows a tripartite scheme which includes 
a focal point, a monitoring framework, and a coordination mechanism. May this 
scheme represent an attempt to set a balance of soft powers? How can the 
experimentalist governance theories consider any division of powers? What 
might be any starting point for the EU soft-law-making agenda? 
 Participation is an underlying thread that links the CRPD, governance 
theories and all the pages of this thesis. Participation could be the starting point 
of any soft power strategy and a desired outcome as well. Indeed, participation 
is the antithesis of hard power where the vertical and pyramidal decision-making 
elite excludes rights holders from any opportunity of cooperation and imposes 
laws through coercive instruments. 
 Nothing about us without us is a slogan that persons with disabilities have 
been campaigning to ask for more participation in the decision-making processes 
that concern their lives. It seems relevant to interpret that slogan in light of the 
dichotomy between hard and soft power. This is because one of the reasons for 
the exclusion of persons with disabilities from decision-making processes was 
the hard structure of governments. The participation of civil society is a soft 
wedge that undermines the monopoly of hard power because this is conceptually 
based on centralisation instead of multilateralism. 
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 Democratic policymakers cannot ignore structured and competent 
requests for participation. This is mainly due to two reasons that are linked to the 
balance of powers. The first reason is political because ignoring social categories 
might not be convenient for electoral purposes. The second reason is that social 
categories have a monopoly on direct knowledge concerning their matters. 
Saying nothing about us without us, persons with disabilities have meant to ask 
them what is right for them because they know it. Democratic systems (seem to) 
have welcomed this request for participation with the consequent enlargement 
of the policy-making arena and the need for soft governance architectures that 
handle increasing participation.  
 The whole thesis illustrated this situation in the EU CRPD-related context 
and the picture suggested an irreversible scenario. This consideration about 
disability policies can be expanded to any other social category where the 
relevant actors want to participate in the decision-making processes that impact 
on their lives. Indeed, social campaigns about issues like gender, environment, 
elderly, and racism all ask for more participation in policy-making processes in 
order to have the opportunity for giving a contribution.  
This entails that the Union soft-law-making agenda could and should 
develop around the principle of participation. The idea is that the identification of 
standard structures and processes for governance architectures might not be as 
constitutional as the observance of the principle of participation seems to be. 
With this in mind, it can be argued that any governance system is active when 
social categories are satisfied with the opportunities to participate in their 
relevant policy-making arena. Since governance architectures are horizontal, the 
involved actors should have the flexibility to develop the structures and 
processes that best suit their needs. 
This approach depicts a new model for democracy that emphasises 
participative and corporativist principles. The EU Commission has already been 
defined as a corporativist entity where different DGs underpin the interests of 
relevant social categories. If the DGs were like governance architectures, they 
would allow the transparent participation of stakeholders in their decision-making 
processes. This means that citizens may not need the mediation of political 
parties because of having the opportunity for participating in the executive 
branch where fostering their interests.  
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Such a scenario is revolutionary, but only because it was impossible to 
avoid representative parliamentarians since not far ago. Nowadays, technology 
could allow single citizens to participate in any meeting and peer review any draft 
law. Also, citizens can rely on representative organizations where they can elect 
and be elected as a spokesperson. Indeed, representative organisations can be 
as powerful as political parties and enter in competition with them. Organisations 
can network, become international influencing actors and be crucial entities of 
governance architectures. Reliable and active participation (direct or through 
representative organisations) might complement the democratic deficit caused 
by the increasing pervasiveness of soft power. 
Such an evolutionary reality is what this thesis investigated and explained 
as the contemporary effort of the EU to implement the CRPD. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This research demonstrates that the EU exercises profound influences at the 
domestic level of its Member States on the implementation of the CRPD and 
independent living rights. It has identified the many levers available to the EU 
and explained how their strategic use could impact on the enjoyment of human 
rights principles by the EU citizens. The EU’s adoption of the CRPD was an 
unprecedented and historical act. It raised many questions, starting from the 
purpose of this gesture. Was it symbolic, or an act of substance? If it was the 
latter, how could the Union fulfil its obligations under the Convention given the 
complexities of its jurisdiction based on the competence issue? 
In 1532, Machiavelli wrote Il Principe, where he stated that “sono dua 
generazione di combattere: l’uno con le leggi, l’altro con la forza”.1 The Middle 
Ages had just ended, and the citizens of Europe had only known hard laws and 
sharp swords. In Machiavelli’s opinion, states could be governed only by 
coercive means: either hard laws or repressive measures. After the Thirty Years’ 
War, the Westphalian sovereignty principle exported this approach to 
international relations. In short, states could not interfere on the internal matters 
of other states, unless they wanted to start a conflict. After three centuries and 
 
1 Which translates as “there are two kinds of combat, one by means of laws and the other by 
force”. 
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the two World Wars, the flags of the United Nations and European Union have 
been giving the illusion that something is changing in power relations among 
states and between governments and citizens. 
The research underpinning this thesis strongly suggests there is much 
more than leggi (law) and forza (coercion) that can be used to govern society. 
As such, states’ intervention is no longer to be conceptualised in terms of 
battlefield only. Also, the phenomena of globalisation are blurring the borders of 
jurisdiction and opening the gates of policy-making arenas. Within these arenas, 
influence is outclassing coercion.  
This thesis illustrates that the EU’s success in achieving its mandate has 
been through the innovative use of soft mechanisms that harmonise the 
domestic policies of its Member States by incentivising participation. In turn, 
participation encourages the rise of policy-making arenas, where the exercise of 
influence is legitimised in all its subtle semblances. As Churchill observed, “many 
forms of government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and 
woe […] democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other 
forms”. This thesis suggests that democracy could be reinterpreted as a form of 
influencing governance, bypassing the monopoly of coercive government. Is it 
time for new forms of participative democracy? Will human beings be able to 
overcome the sound and fury of their souls, enhancing influence over power? 
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